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STUDIES IN THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

BY
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Corrigenda.

Page 68 in the title of § 7, for Politics read Polities.

Page 133 in the title of § 10, for Democracies read Aristocracies.

STUDIES IN
THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

INTRODUCTION.

The Politics of Aristotle is accessible to English readers through several excellent translations from the Greek into English. The most important of these translations are: The Politics of Aristotle, translated into English with an analysis and critical notes, by J. E. C. Welldon, M. A., London, Macmillan, 1897; and The Politics of Aristotle, translated into English, with introduction, marginal analysis, essays, notes and indices, by B. Jowett, M. A., 2 vols., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1885. Besides these there is a most admirable edition of three of the most important books of the Politics—I, III, IV (VII), the text of Bekker, with an English translation by W. E. Bolland, together with short introductory essays by Andrew Lang, Longmans, Green & Co., 1877.

As commonly received at present the text of The Politics is divided into certain general divisions called books and subdivisions called chapters. These books and chapters would by a contemporary writer be more likely designated as chapters and sections respectively. While no rigorous method, such as we would expect in a modern scientific writer, characterizes Aristotle's treatise on Politics, each chapter or book has essentially one main thought which may serve as the title of such book or chapter. I have summarized these as follows:

I. On the Nature of the State and the Elements of Political Economy.

II. An Examination of Constitutions (Polities) Literary and Historical; or Projected and Existing.

III. Constitutional Theory—What is the best constitution (polity)?

IV. The Forms of Government.

V. Political Revolutions.

VI. Democracy and Oligarchy, Further Considered; and Magistrates or Administration.

VII. On The Theory of The Life of The State.

VIII. Education.

This is the common order of the eight books. A more logical order was introduced by Bekker, the textual critic, "who has left little to be improved in the text of Aristotle." The order of Bekker is shown in the following comparative table:

THE COMMON ORDER.	BEKKER'S ORDER.
I.	I.
II.	II.
III.	III.
IV.	VII.
V.	VIII.
VI.	IV.
VII.	VI.
VIII.	V.I

Jowett in his translation follows the common order in the arrangement of the books as commonly received, while Welldon follows the order proposed by Bekker. The order of Bekker is also, in part, followed in these studies. The balance of evidence respecting the original order is possibly in favor of the common order but the logical order may perhaps be improved by the changes proposed by Bekker. The hints which we have from Aristotle himself respecting the order in which he takes up his subjects, are not always satisfactorily carried out, even in those sections in which we have presumably the original order.

The translation of the complete text of The Politics makes an ordinary octavo volume of about 400 pages. The text of the Nichomachean Ethics, the Treatise of Aristotle, to which the Politics is most closely related, is somewhat shorter, occupying about 350 pages.

English readers who may desire to consult The Ethics may do so by referring to either of two excellent translations from the Greek into English: The Nichomachean Ethics of Aris-

totle, newly translated into English, by Robert Williams, 3rd Edition, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1879; The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, translated with an analysis and critical notes, by J. E. C. Welldon, M. A., London, Macmillan & Co., 1892. A study of The Ethics of Aristotle forms the appropriate introduction to the Study of The Politics. In the Ethics there are numerous paragraphs, especially in the opening and closing sections, in which Aristotle alludes to the importance of political science, and argues for its proper recognition and careful study. In the last paragraph of The Ethics Aristotle tells us that the study of political science has been too much neglected by previous writers and he promises to enter upon the consideration of it himself, "in order to complete so far as in us lies that branch of philosophy the object of which is man;" and he submits the following program:

"We will first attempt to examine in detail, all such particular statements of our predecessors as may commend themselves. And we will then proceed to frame a collection of constitutions, and to derive therefrom certain general rules as to what are the causes by which a state is preserved, and what are the causes by which it is destroyed; and further what modifications must be made in these rules, so that they may be applicable to each particular form of constitution. And we will then consider for what reasons it is that some governments are successful, and others are not. For, after such an investigation, we shall be in a better position to determine, not only what is the absolutely best form of government, but also in what manner each particular form of government must be ordered, and of what laws and of what customs it must make use. Here, then, we leave Ethics, and commence the consideration of Politics."[1]

The separation of ethics and politics is not as distinct as might be inferred from this utterance. A patient study of

[1]The Ethics of Aristotle, Bk. X. Ch. IX, (Williams' translation, p. 328.) This paragraph and several others are quoted by the writer in his paper on the Political Philosophy of Aristotle, printed in The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for November, 1897, (Vol. X, No. 3) and separably issued by the Academy as No. 212, Nov. 16, 1897.

both the treatise on Ethics and the treatise on Politics, will convince any student that the Politics is really a wider study of Ethics. In the Ethics Aristotle investigates the foundations of conduct in individuals, he propounds a theory of personal conduct; in the Politics he examines into the foundations of the structure and life of men considered in their collective relations, and arrives at a theory of collective conduct.[1] The relation of the Ethics to the Politics may be indicated by further selections from the Ethics:

"It is difficult for one to receive from his early days a right inclination to virtue, unless he is brought up under virtuous laws; for a life of temperance and steadfastness is not pleasant to most people, and least of all to the young. It follows that the nurture and pursuits of the young should be regulated by law. * * * * * * * Now the authority of a father does not possess such force or compulsion, nor indeed does that of any individual. * * * But the law has a compulsory power, as being itself in a sense the outcome of prudence and reason; and whereas we hate people who oppose our inclinations, even if they are right in so doing, we do not feel the law to be grievous in its insistence upon virtue. (Nich. Eth. B. 10. c. 10.; Welldon's Transl. p. 344-6). For repetition of the last sentiment see The Politics, III. 11, §19.

If the state does not attend to this the father must; and he can do so best "if he has learnt the principles of legislation," *i. e.*, he must conduct his family as a miniature state. But now comes the hard question. What are these principles and how can he learn them—Who teaches them?

Repeating himself Aristotle proceeds (Nich. Eth. 10. 10.; Welldon's Transl. p. 348): "It is the duty of any one who wishes to elevate people, whether they be few or

[1] "During the last century, enlightened philosophers have been fond of repeating that the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property. But the ancients taught a nobler lesson, that ethics and politics are inseparable; that we must not do evil in order to gain power; and that the justice of the individual and the justice of the state are the same. The older lesson has survived; the newer is seen to have only a partial and relative truth," B. Jowett, The Politics of Aristotle, p. xiii (Introduction.)

many, by his treatment, to try to learn the principles of legislation, if it is laws that are the natural means of making us good." He has elsewhere (Nich. Eth. 1. 10.; Welldon p. 22) observed "that the end of political science is the supreme good; and political science is concerned with nothing so much as with producing a certain character in the citizens, or in other words with making them good, and capable of performing noble actions." Compare also I. 13. (Welldon's translation p. 30) where he urges, as Welldon thinks, the importance of psychology to the statesman. The statesman must understand the faculties of man that he may direct their training. In this sense the science of education is a political science. Aristotle looks at the science of education, therefore, not as a primary science, but as a branch or part of the art and science of legislation. This is his constant assumption. Legislators must aim at the training of the habits to make good citizens, Nich. Eth. 2. 1. (Welldon, p. 35). Thus throughout the Ethics and as frequently in the Politics, great importance is attached to the science of legislation—the science of right laws. Occasionally in the Ethics and frequently in the Politics the theory of governmental organization, *i. e.*, of constitutional law, is placed by the side of this science of legislation and co-ordinated therewith.

These essays have been undertaken with the purpose, and in the hope, of doing for the social and political philosophy of Aristotle, and Plato,[1] what has long since been repeatedly done for their phychology and metaphysics, namely, to expound their leading conceptions on social subjects in systematic form, and by the aid of a modern terminology to bring them within the comprehension of readers unskilled in Greek dialectic or characteristic modes of Greek thought.

It may also be assumed that if the average American student of political and social science is to read the text of the Politics at all, it will be through an English translation. The references are therefore given in such a way as to enable the

[1] See preface to part II below.

student to find his way to either a Greek text or to any one of the several excellent translations.

Two conspicuous merits in the social and political philosophy of both Aristotle and Plato, deserve special mention and continuous recognition, merits common indeed to some other Greek thinkers of their age; they are: first, the merit of originality and clearness of thought—their views were in large measure in the nature of first thoughts on their subjects, and secondly, the merit of penetration and breadth—they looked at society as a whole, and therefore apprehended it in its multitudinous relations and functions with a perspicacity and exactness that are often wanting in modern thinkers, who too generally make their observations of contemporary society through the lenses of academic dissertations and the accumulated literature of many centuries, instead of seeing at first hand, men as they are in the complex of their social relations.

It is their breadth of view and the freshness of their observations, that should be especially commended to the attention of the younger generation of students of the social and political sciences in our time.

Back to Aristotle is the appropriate watchword of much of the best work now being done in the direction of a broader and more exacting study of human society, and this joined to the rise of the young science of sociology promises a new development of the political sciences.

In protest against the tendency of contemporary political philosophers to find the whole science of politics in an abstract conception of the state or in an ingenious discussion of the doctrine of sovereignty, Woodrow Wilson finely observes: "If a physicist were to discuss all the separate laws, all the differential analyses of his science, and were to reduce its entire body of principles to some general statement of the correlation of forces, he would hardly be conceived to have done physics a service." [1] The students of political science have a larger mission. They must learn to think of their duty

[1] Essays (Political Sovereignty), p. 78–9.

as primarily an obligation to find first the whole body of knowledge dealing with the state, and to this problem they must set themselves in the spirit of the historian, as has been so well pointed out by Professor Seeley,[1] but not as mere annalists; they must work not the less, also, in the spirit of the philosopher.

Both Aristotle and Plato call formal attention to the parts of which a state is composed. Each recognizes that the state is the result of successive larger and larger associations; each also recognizes that the original and secondary units of association also tend to persist after the larger association has been formed, *e. g.*, the family, or house, and the village —stages of society familiar to the early Greek observers; just as we have in the later political development free cities, dukedoms, principalities, and republics surviving as political units in the great federal states of our own times. In modern political philosophy there has been an overwhelming tendency to neglect these larger social units to the presence and importance of which sociologists are now calling attention.[2]

As Sir Frederick Pollock has so well observed: The minimizers of state functions do not make sufficient allowance for the distinction between the direct action of the state and its delegated action, between central and local or intermediate bodies.[3] The antique city-state has become an intermediate governing body; but the modern city is still a part of the state, and what the great central organ of government commits or delegates to its local and intermediate units and what it permits these to do, all this is still properly regarded as the action of the state. Likewise do the social classes which make up the body politic receive thoughtful treatment in the classical discussions of politics which we are here considering.

It is for the sake of their broad and thoughtful study of so-

[1] Introduction to Political Science.

[2] See for example Gumplowicz, Grundriss der Sociologie; Spencer, Sociology, Part V.

[3] Cp. Pollock, History of the Science of Politics, p. 123.

ciety that modern students may well be urged to devote some time not only to the Politics of Aristotle, but also to the Republic of Plato, and such other political treatises or fragments of treatises as survive from the classical period of Greek thought.

I.

ON THE NATURE OF THE STATE, AND THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

A. ON THE NATURE OF THE STATE.

§ 1. *The Definition of the State.* The state is the highest form of organized human association; it is the all-inclusive association, embracing all lesser associations, individual, corporate, and public.[1] "Since we see that every state is an association of some sort, and that every association is formed for the attainment of some good (for it is to obtain what appears to themselves to be good that men always act), it is clear, that while all associations aim at some good, that one which is the highest of all, and includes all, will aim at the highest good in the highest degree, and this is that which is called the state and the state association (*αὕτη δ'ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις και ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικη*)[1]

We must especially distinguish between this largest and all embracing form of association and its parts. As the whole is greater than its parts, so the state is something more than a family writ large. Plato and Xenophon were wrong, for these are among the writers to whom Aristotle alludes when he says: "They are wrong," who confound, as some do, the positions of magistrate in a free state, of king, of householder, and of slaveowner * * * For they hold that all of these differ from one another only in degree (in the matter of large

[1]Compare Aristotle, The Politics, I. 1. 1. See also Plato, The Republic iv. 420; and below § 41 of Essay 1 on the Republic.

or small numbers), and not in kind; for instance, if a man is in authority over a few, they call him a slavemaster, if over a greater number, a house-holder, if over a still greater, a magistrate or a monarch, implying that there is no difference between a large house-hold and a small state, and the only difference (they say) between a magistrate and a monarch is that, when one individual is personally supreme over the rest by himself, he is a monarch (Βασιλικὸν); but if in the terms of a science of this kind, he is in turn ruler and subject, he is a magistrate (Πολιτικὸν)[1]

"But this is not the truth; and what we say will be clear if we follow our usual method of investigation. For just as in the other departments of science, it is necessary to analyze what is compound, till we reach atoms that are incomposite (for these are the smallest elements of the whole), so also it is by examining the component elements of a state, that we shall have a clearer view of the differences between these elements, and also see if it is possible to arrive at any scientific result in each of the subjects we have mentioned."[2]

§ 2. *The Constituent Elements of the State.* "Now it is by examining things in their growth from the very beginning that we shall in this, as in other matters, obtain the clearest view. It is necessary then, in the first place, to group in couples those elements which can not exist without each other, such as the female and male, united for the sake of reproduction of species, * * * * * and also that which naturally rules, and that which naturally is ruled, connected for the sake of security.[3]

This is to say, human society can be resolved into two elements: (1) the relation of male and female, that is, the sexual re-

[1] Aristotle uses the word Πολιτικός in two senses: (1) Meaning a man holding magisterial office in a free state, *i. e.* in a republic or democracy, where office is elective and generally rotatory; and (2) meaning a man who devotes himself to political science, or the art of politics. In the latter sense the word has, I think, the several shades of meaning indicated in the three descriptives: politicist, politician, and statesman.

[2] I. 1. 3.

[3] I. 2. 1.

lation, or as we might say, the family; and (2), the relation of master and slave, or in more explicit language, a relation of natural ruler and natural subject, that is the relations of private property based upon the principles of order and security, of law and progress.

These two relations produce respectively the household, or family, and the village or tribal community. The family (*ὁ οἰκὸς* or *οἰκία*) and the village community (*ἡ κώμη*) are the two primary forms of association, the one biological and physiological, the other sociological and psychological. From these two primary forms or principles of associations (*κοινωνία*)[1] all other and wider associations arise. This is saying that all motives to human action may, ultimately be reduced to these two: family or love, and property or wealth. Critics of the Politics have from time to time observed, Jowett, for example, that Aristotle gives only a logical account of the genesis of the state, that he builds up a state out of its elements, but does not inquire what history or pre-historic monuments tell about primitive man.[2] This is too strong a statement of the extent to which Aristotle employs the deductive logic. The Aristotelian use of the inductive logic is as noteworthy as his use of deductive logic.

Aristotle studied politics, not simply by the deductive method; he shows his appreciation in many ways of what is at the present time called the statistical and historical method of inquiry into problems of social structure and social function. That his sense of the statistical and historical method was not as clearly developed as it is at present in the most advanced schools of scientific history may be granted; but it must be affirmed with equal confidence that in his study of the origin of the state, he has given us proof of a commendable zeal to

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[1] *Κοινωνία, κοινός.* Here we have a root which might properly be joined to *λόγος* to form the word koinology or konology, which might be offered, along with other suggestions, that have been made, as a substitute for sociology (formed by the union of a Latin and a Greek root). But such suggestions are not at all likely to secure acceptance in use. Language is seldom originated in so artificial a manner. It is especially difficult to displace a word that has once gained currency.

[2] Cp. Jowett, The Politics, Introduction, p. xiii.

combine induction with deduction in the study of human society first by an appeal to the forms of social organization and to the habits of association that prevailed among the Greeks and among the barbarians contemporary with himself; and secondly by frequent citation of the traditions handed down by his own ancestors concerning their social and political life in dim and distant times. Finally we may observe that his transition from deductive reasoning to historical description is gradual, and rests upon his observation of contemporary life of Greek and barbarian, and upon the authority of Hesiod and Homer.

§ 3. *The Historical Genesis of the City-State.* Human society can be resolved into two ultimate elements, the sexual relation and private property. From these two principles of association, namely, the sexual relation, and the property relation, all forms of association may be derived and their first concrete product is the household; and Hesiod was right when he wrote:

'Get thee
First house and wife and ox to plough withal,'

for the ox is to the poor what a servant is to the rich." This initial association is to meet the immediate wants of the day and its members are sharers of the meal-bin (ὁμοσιπίους) or 'sharers of the table' (ὁμοκάπους.)

The next step in the progress of association is the formation of the village which aims at something more than the immediate wants of the day. The village is a federation of households. "Entirely in accordance with nature does the village seem to be an offshoot from the household (ἀποικία οἰκίας), consisting 'of those who' in the language of some, 'are suckled by the same milk, children, and children's children'."

The third stage in the progress of association is the federation of villages into the city-state. When this federation is effected, there is a tendency to carry the family organization through the village into the government of the larger group consisting of several villages. That this was the view of Aristotle may be inferred from his description of the patriarchal family as archetype of the state in terms, which Sir Henry

Maine might himself have employed in drawing his pictures of the primitive village-community.[1] "Our city-states were originally governed by kings, as also are barbarian tribes to this day; for they were an aggregate of units governed by kings." How one king out of the number of kings at the head of the several units was chosen, Aristotle does not tell us in this connection; but that each unit was headed by a king he affirms by explaining that "every household was governed by its oldest member as by a king, and thus the offshoots (villages) were similarly governed thro' the sympathy of kinship. And this is what Homer means: 'Each man is the oracle of law to his children and to his wives'. For then families were scattered, and this was the way in which they lived in olden times. This is the reason also why all men say that the gods are governed by a king, for men themselves are either still subject to a king, or were so in ancient times. And just as men represent the appearance of the gods as similar to their own, so also do they imagine that the lives of the gods are all like their own."[2]

§ 4. *The Nature and End of the City-State.* "The association formed of several villages is the complete city-state, having fullness of power to satisfy its wants, and originating for the object of living, but going on for the object of living well—or originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life."[3] And, therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the city-state, for it (ἡ πολίς) is the end of the other forms, namely, of the household (ἡ οἰκία, or ὁ οἶκος) and the village or tribal community (ἡ κωμή, or ἀποικία οἰκίας); and this may be affirmed because the natural development of anything is its end. What each thing is when fully developed we call its nature.[4] Its complete development is also its highest good; the complete self-sufficing life is first attained in the city-state. The conclusion from these

[1] The Ancient Village Community.
[2] I. 2. 6—8; Bolland and Lang p. 110—1.
[3] Cp. I. 2. 3—9.
[4] I. 2. 10.

lines of reasoning has already been noted, namely, that the state is a natural institution; but now comes an important corollary.

§ 5. *Man is a Political Animal.* From these considerations, namely, these from which we have just established the naturalness of the state, it follows not only that the state is a natural production or one of nature's productions, but it also follows that man himself is by nature a social, a political animal, Πολιτικὸν ζωον, and that the man who is without a country thro' natural taste and not by misfortune is certainly utterly degraded, or else a being superior to man, he is the 'tribeless, lawless, hearthless one' whom Horner denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war, having no ties, he is like an exposed piece in the game of backgammon."[1]

"That man is a political animal that is a social animal in a fuller sense than any tree or gregarious animal is evident *from another line of reasoning;* for nature we say makes nothing without an object, and man is the only animal that possesses rational speech. Now the utterance of a cry is a sign of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found to belong to other animals; for to this point has their nature reached, namely, to the perception of pleasure and pain, and to the power of manifesting this to one another. But rational speech is intended to explain what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For this gift is the distinguishing property of man as compared with other animals, namely, that he is the only one which has the perception of good and bad, just and unjust, and the like. And it is the association of creatures who have this power, that produces the family (οικίαν) and the state (πόλιν)."[2]

Aristotle insists first of all upon the fact that the city-state is a product of natural forces as truly as the family itself or the village; and secondly that the city-state exists not merely for the sake of life but for the sake of a good life; and thirdly

[1] I. 2. 10.

[2] I. 2. 10—12. Bolland and Lang; p. 112-3.

he affirms that man himself is also by nature political—this he re-enforces by several lines of argument; and finally he affirms that the state is greater than and prior to individual families and to individual men. This last proposition requires treatment next.

§ 6. *The State is Prior to the Family and to the Individual.* "The state also in its real nature comes before the family and our individual selves; for the whole must necessarily come before the part. * * * * * The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: He is no part of a state."[1]

The discussion of this proposition from the old or Aristotelian point of view has lost its charm to modern students; its importance passed with the passing of the controversies concerning realism and nominalism in the older schools of metaphysics. Aristotle's contention that the state is prior to the family and to the individual means that the concept of the state is a wider and more all-embracing one than the concept of the family or of the individual man, that both the family and the individual man are but parts of a larger whole which we call the state or the race or a race.

The proposition does however have new interest in the light of recent work of sociologists who have attempted to determine the nature and genesis of the family. Various students have been led to the conclusion that long before we can trace any distinct types of the family whether monogamous, polygamous or polyandrous, we find the horde or race (nation) more or less held together by ties of common wants, from which and within which some forms of the family are gradually evolved and differentiated. From the point of view of organic content and form, the horde, or herd, that is the large collective group, antedates the higher and later differentiation

[1] I. 2, 14 (Jowett, p. 4-5).

of the family within the herd. The reply may of course be made that the state did not originate from the herd but by a series of federations which could only have had their beginning after a reasonable development of the family itself had been attained. But as a subject of speculation the question of priority in point of time may now be raised.

Modern sociology under the guidance of the hypothesis of evolution also teaches that forms of associatian existed prior to the development of man as man, and that these larger and primeval phases of association aided in the making of man into man, that is, aided in the development of those characteristics of man which we regard at the present time as distinctly human or humane. The logical priority of the state to the individual will also bear re-emphasis: The state rests on definite and enduring relations which are above the caprice of the individual; the citizen enters at birth a common heritage of race, language, religion and law; he is born into a framework of institutions which he has not made and can not, to any great extent, change.[1] The city makes the man. *πόλις ἀνδρα διδασκει* was a saying of Simonides.

§ 7. *The Purposive Element in the Organization of the State.* Aristotle has been arguing for the naturalness of the origin and development of the city state, and one might infer from the tenor of his argument that he is about to neglect or deny the action of will in the formation of the state. To have done this would have been un-Greek. The Greeks believed popularly in the effectiveness of legislation—Plato and some of the other philosophers sought to discourage the strong tendency to look for relief from mere legislation[2] and Aristotle undoubtedly emphasized the dominance of natural forces, of natural selection if we may borrow a modern phrase to describe the thought of an ancient thinker, in the development of the city-state; but he recognized also the existence or presence of what

[1] Cp. S. H. Butcher, Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, pp. 51–55; and see also Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on Political Obligations, G., p. 122, H., p. 142.

[2] See below §45 of Essay I. on the Republic of Plato.

we now call artificial selection, by which we mean the conscious play of will on external forces with the purpose of modifying environment. "It is true," says Aristotle, "that the impulse in all men is directed by nature towards just such association (ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν), *that is, toward political association;* but still the first organizer, συστήσας,[1] was the author of the greatest blessings."[2]

The purposive element in the guidance of the state is most extensively recognized by Aristotle, as by Plato, in his treatment of education. He looks to the lawgiver to give expression to those ideals toward which and by means of which the life of youth is to be elevated and fashioned for the sake of maintaining the conditions not only of life, but of a good life.

To the Greek mind generally, and to this sentiment Aristotle pronounced no dissent, part of the office of lawgiver was to be a moral teacher, a preacher of righteousness. "To the great law-givers of the past," as Butcher observes, "the Greeks looked back as other nations do to the founders or reformers of their religion." Law was by them identified with reason of which it was in its highest phases but the expression, but an expression consciously made by the great man into whose hands the destiny of association was often committed.[3] "As man in his condition of complete development, *that is, in the state*, is the noblest of all animals, so apart from law and justice, he is the vilest of all."

§ 8. *On the Nature of Justice and the Parts of the State.* "Injustice is always most formidable when it is armed; and nature has endowed man with arms which are intended to subserve the purposes of prudence and virtue but are capable of being wholly turned to contrary ends. Hence if a man be de-

[1] One who puts things together.

[2] I. 2. 15. Bolland and Lang, p. 114. Welldon p. 7.

[3] For a brief discussion of the Greek conception of law and of the law-giver, the reader is referred to Butcher, Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, Essay II, especially pp. 55—66; and for a fuller discussion to W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. 1.

void of virtue (ἀρετή), no animal is so unscrupulous or savage, none so sensual, none so gluttonous. Just action, on the other hand, is bound up with the existence of the state;[1] and the administration of justice which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society."[1] "Justice is another's good," that is, justice is benevolence; and again "Justice is a sort of proportion," Aristotle tells us in another place. In both these definitions of justice taken respectively from the second chapter of the first book of The Politics, and from the sixth chapter of the fifth book of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle approaches the conception of justice worked out by Plato in the first four books of The Republic. "Justice" says Plato "is doing one's own business and not being a busy body."[2] This definition is given on the assumption that each has a business, a station in life which he must fill, a function he must perform. To find then what is a man's place, his duty, and his own, is to find what is just concerning him. This recognition of men as belonging to classes having definite and positive missions in society and assigning them what is due them in their stations is a principle of order in human society. Justice is proportionate in the sense that to each shall be assigned his good, his duty, his property, as determined by his station or his status in society.

In the immediate connection in The Politics from which the first of Aristotle's definitions above quoted is taken, nothing is said directly of the parts of the state; but we are allowed to infer from what precedes and follows, that Aristotle still has under consideration the principles from which all forms of association spring, namely, the principle of the family and the principle of private property, these producing respectively

[1] I. end of ch. 2. The translation quoted is, in the last sentence, the rendering of Jowett; a more literal translation would run thus: Justice is political and its administration is the very order, τάξις, of political association. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν. Compare the modern conception of liberty as state-created. See Burgess Pol. Sc. and Comp. Const. Law, Vol. 1, p. 52, 53, 55, 88, 174.

[2] See Essay I, below on the Republic of Plato, especially § 46 of the Essay. See The Republic of Plato, IV. 433a. (Jowett's Dialogues of Plato, Vol. III).

and jointly, the house and the village which Aristotle treats as the constituent elements of the city-state. Nevertheless we may argue that Aristotle recognizes that the justice which belongs to a given man, is determined by his station or rank in life, because his definitions in so far as they both assert that justice is a principle of order, do imply a recognition of classes similar to those which Plato recognizes. We have now completed the discussion of what may be regarded as the first main topic of Book I., and we have only reached the end of the second chapter. The remainder of Book I. may be sketched much more rapidly—we shall find in it a larger number of views that are now regarded as antiquated. But the second chapter of the first book of The Politics, with the analysis of which we have so far chiefly occupied ourselves, is probably as crammed full of political wisdom, and as exact a statementof principles recognized today by scientific students of politics, as any passage of similar length extant in literature.

B. THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

§ 9. *On the Nature of the Household or Family as the Elementary Unit of Political Organization.* Now that it is clear what the elements are of which the city-state is composed, we must speak, in the first place, of households;[1] for every state is composed of households, and the parts of a household are those elements of which it in turn consists. Now the household, when complete, consists of slaves and free persons. But since each individual thing ought first to be examined in its smallest elements, and since the first and smallest elements of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children, we must first inquire into these three relations,

[1] Reading *περί οἰκίας*. Some texts read *περὶ οἰκονομίας*. Both Jowett and Welldon adopt the latter reading. Jowett translates *οἰκονομίας* the management of the household, and Welldon calls it domestic economy. Whichever reading we adopt the meaning remains about the same. *Οἰκονομική* is a term frequently employed in The Politics.

and see what each is and what its character ought to be. * * * * * * These three relations we may regard as certain parts of the household or the law of the household (*οἰκονομία*); but there is another part which is sometimes regarded as equivalent to the whole of domestic economy (*οἰκονομία*)—and sometimes as its principal part; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us. I am speaking of what is commonly called the art of wealth-getting, (*Χρηματιστικὴ*.)" [1]

This extract from the text of The Politics is sufficiently clear and complete to state the Aristolelian point of view without further comment except to say that only the first of the three relations is immediately taken up and treated with some degree of exhaustiveness, namely, the relation of master and slave. The second and third relation, namely, that of a husband to his wife and that of a parent to his child, are but briefly mentioned in the twelfth chapter of the first book. But Aristotle returns to these subjects in the fourth and fifth books of The Politics, (the seventh and eighth according to the common order), where he discusses marriage and the education of children at some length.

Perhaps the subject of greatest interest in Aristotle's treatment in the family is the manifold form, in which the question of bearing rule in the family comes up, combined with the question at times concerning the proper relation of the concerns of the house or family, and the concerns or interests of the state. Of the latter phase of the discussion we may say that Aristotle accorded on the one hand a large degree of independence and initiation to the head of the house, the housefather, while on the other hand, he held the relation of the house to the state, that is of the part to the whole, to be so vital that he insisted on a final and ultimate directive prerogative and power to be with the state. As a whole this is especially noticeable in his theory of state control of marriage and education.[2] Within the family the relation of husband and wife

[1] I. 3. 3.

[2] Cp. Welldon IV. (Jowett VII) 16–17; and Welldon V. (Jowett VIII).

and of parents and children, are described in terms borrowed from political science; for example, he distinguishes the paternal from the marital form of rule: "altho the head of the house rules over his wife and children as equally free beings, yet the kind of rule is different; his rule over his wife is constitutional (πολιτικῶς) while that over his children is regal (βασιλικῶς).[1] *The justification of these forms of rule lies in the fact*, that males are by nature better qualified to command than females, wherever the union is not unnaturally constituted, and those that are elder and more mature *are better qualified* to rule than those who are younger and immature * * * * * In most cases of political or constitutional rule there is an interchange of the functions of rulers and subjects, as it is assumed that they are naturally equal and indistinguishable. Nevertheless at any particular time an effort is made to distinguish the rulers from the subjects by insignia of office, forms of address, and acts of respect."[2]

§ 10. *Theories of Slavery.* "We will first consider the relations of master and slave in order to arrive at a practical conclusion, and also, if possible, to frame some theory of the subject better than those now in vogue. There are some thinkers, as I said at the beginning of this treatise, who hold that the ownership of slaves is a science, and identify the functions of the householder, the slave-master, the constitutional statesman and the king. Others again regard slave-owning as doing violence to nature on the ground that the distinction of slave and free man is wholly conventional and has no place in Nature, and is therefore void of justice as resting on mere force."[3]

Aristotle does nowhere put forward the defense of slavery as a temporary institution essential to the development of the race, but destined in its very nature to be provisional

[1] I. 12. 1. Bolland and Lang translate: "His rule over his wife is like that of a magistrate in a free state, over his children it is like that of a king." See note on use of πολιτικός above, under § 1, p. 2 of this Essay.

[2] I. ch. 12. 1; Welldon's Translation, p. 31-2.

[3] I. 3. 4.

and temporary, and to be succeeded by other forms of labor.

There is a passage in The Politics which is occasionally quoted to show that Aristotle anticipated a time in the develment of human industry, when slaves would no longer be needed.[1] After distinguishing between agent and instrument in the production of wealth, the slave being regarded as an instrument, he observes: "If every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the legendary figures of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephæstus, which, if we may believe the poet, 'Entered self-moved the conclave of the Gods,' if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave, and the plectrum strike the lyre without a *hand* to guide them, master-craftsmen would not need assistants, nor would masters need slaves"[2] ; more literally we should read, if combs would close the web and quills play the cithern of themselves. The invention of the machine-moved shuttle and of the elaborate mechanical musical instruments of our time seem to have transformed Aristotle's improbable supposition into an actual condition; and in current controversies respecting the beneficence of machine production, the tendency of informed opinion is decidedly in the direction of recognizing the modern industrial revolution and age of inventions as making for the advancement of mankind in the scale of civilization and for the amelioration of social conditions.[3]

Aristotle's own conclusion is that slavery is a natural, and apparently he believes also that it is a permanent social institution; but he distinguishes between permissible forms of slavery and forms not justifiable, between natural slave and merely legal slavery. "A natural slave is one who does not in his nature belong to himself, but to some one else[4] * * *

[1] Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy, p. 3.

[2] I. 4. 3.

[3] Cp. Wright, Outlines of Practical Sociology, parts V and VI.

[4] Near end of ch. 4. cp. the various renderings by the several translators of this passage. Near the end of ch. 5 there is a substantial repetition of this statement: "For he by nature is a slave who has the capacity of belonging to some one else (and on this account actually does belong to some one else), and whose share of reason only goes so far as to comprehend it in others, but who does not possess it himself." (B. and L. p. 121.)

he who belongs to some one else, though a man, is but an article of property." The reasoning of this passage as appears from the context, proceeds on the line of argument that everywhere in nature there is the distinction of higher and lower, of ruler and ruled, that some are born inferiors and ought therefore to be subject to their superiors.[1] Merely legal slavery, and the unjustifiable forms of slavery, appear under circumstances which bring about the triumph of might over right as in some wars of conquest. The law is a sort of convention by which all conquests in war are the property of the conquerer.

But on this point there is a disagreement between lawyers and philosophers, some holding all forms of legal slavery to be also just, others denying the justness of certain forms of legal slavery.[2] One ground of this disagreement lies in the ready confusion of virtue with force: "In a sense nothing is so well able to employ force as virtue, if possessed of external means, and *secondly*, the conquerer is always superior in respect of some good or other." But the real disagreement lies in the differing conceptions of justice: "Some hold that justice is benevolence or kindness (εὔνοια), others that it is simply the rule of the stronger." Now in the opinion of the former, slavery in all its forms should be held to be unjust, while in the judgment of those who accept the latter definition all state authorized forms of slavery are to be considered just.

Aristotle seems disposed to reconcile these views by his doctrine that justice is a sort of proportion, by which each individual master or slave has assigned to him a certain place, the securing of which to him is for that one justice; but this view is not very clearly presented.[3] Aristotle will not allow any line of reasoning to close the way to affirming on the one hand, the justice of some forms and the injustice of other forms of slavery: "No one would say that the man who did not deserve to be a slave, was really a slave. Otherwise

[1] Cp. I. 4 and 5.

[2] I. 6. 2–3.

[3] I. 6. 5.

men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves, if they chance to have been taken prisoners and sold." [1] It is, however, worthy of notice that there were anti-slavery philosophers whose opinions are presented by Aristotle with respect, and these asserted freedom to be the birthright of mankind before the age of Christianity and the stoic philosophy. Aristotle re-iterates his conclusion: "It is clear, that * * * in certain cases * * * it is for the advantage of the one party to be slave, and of the other to be master, and that it is also just, and that the one class ought to be ruled and the other to rule, with the rule for which they were intended by nature, a rule as of a master over slaves; but for the rule to be of a wrong character is against the interest of both classes. For the interests of the part and of the whole, of the body and of the soul, are the same, and the slave is really a part of the master, being a sort of animate and unattached part of his body. For this reason there is some advantage even in mutual friendship between master and slave, where they have been placed in their respective positions by nature; but where they have not been so placed, but are only there by law and force, the reverse is true."[2]

Finally comes a discussion of the government of slaves. The rule of slaves is monarchical as is the government of a household, whereas in the constitutional government of a state the subjects are free and equal to their rulers.[3] It is further suggested that instruction may be given to masters in regard to the management of slaves, and to slaves themselves in regard to their routine duties; but "such a science implies nothing great or elevated. * * * The art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them * * * * is a part of the science of hunting or war." [4]

In the text of The Politics more space is devoted to the discussion of slavery than to all the subjects preceding that

[1] I. 6 and 7.

[2] I. end of 6.

[3] Cp. I. 7.

[4] I. ch. 7. 4–5; cp. VII. 14. 21.

discussion in the first book as presented in §§ 1–9 above. From the examination of slavery, Aristotle passes to the whole question of property of all kinds, that is to the art of wealth-getting.

§ 11. *Wealth-getting.* As chapters 3 to 7 of Book I. are devoted to a discussion of slavery, so chapters 8 to 11, of the same book, are devoted to the subject of property and wealth considered in their entirety; but of this larger subject slavery forms a part as we are expressly told, tho' its discussion has been anticipated. We may now consider our discussion of slavemaster and slave to be complete, and, as we have seen that slaves like other things fall under the head of property, we may proceed after our usual manner to examine the whole question of property of all kinds, that is to the art of wealth-getting (*περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ Χρηματιστικῆς*)." [1]

Chrematistic is the term by which Aristotle seems to designate property as a whole, embracing with it the whole range of wealth and the special items which fall under it either as goods or services; and this term is here rendered into wealth-getting, in order to escape on the one hand the danger of giving it too narrow a signification, for example, by calling it money-making, as is done by Jowett, and other translators, and to escape on the other hand the danger of imputing to the term a too wide or too technical signification, for example, by calling it finance, as Welldon translates it.

Wealth-getting or chrematistic, Aristotle holds, should be distinguished from the house or the structure of the house (*οἰκία*) under which head we have examined the three elementary relations, namely, that of master and slave, husband and wife, parent and child (§ 9 above). But it is not so clear that it can be likewise distinguished from household-management (*οἰκονομική*). Yet it is certain that it is not synonymous with household management; altho' the latter may perhaps be regarded as one of the principal parts of chrematistic, notwithstanding the claims which may be made for classing it (oikon-

[1] I. 8. 1.

omik) as a distinct genus. In fact, Aristotle is conscious that a number of distinctions might be urged between things which he concluded to treat under a common title; for example, the distinction between property and wealth might be urged. So too, we might ask, what is the relation of agriculture to household management?[1]

Aristotle seems to think that agriculture, for example, should be merged into household management (oikonomik) as one of its constituent parts, altho' agriculture itself is recognized as part of a larger part, which we might term productive industries, or the art of acquisition (*κτῆσις*). But Aristotle is far from considering the whole of *κτῆσις* as part of oikonomik; he sets the art of acquisition in its main phases in contrast to the art of household management in its characteristic feature. Still less is chrematistik to be identified with oikonomik, for the latter is essentially concerned with the consumption of wealth—in the words of Aristotle: "Now that oikonomik is not the same as chrematistik, is evident because it is the function of the one to provide and of the other to use;"[2] that is, one provides what the other wants to use, a rather positive contrast of the production, or acquisition of wealth and the consumption of wealth.

From the last point of view oikonomik is narrowed to the conception of the proper use or consumption of wealth for purposes of the house. Aristotle, of course, sees that this is too narrow a use of the term, oikonomik, and he expands its meaning later, in the eighth chapter, so as to include in it the elementary forms of wealth-production as well as right-ordering in the consumption of wealth and simple forms of barter or exchange: "It appears then that there is at least one species of the art of acquisition, which is naturally a part of oikonomik, in as much as the latter is bound to provide, if it does not find

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[1] Reading *τῆςοἰκονομικῆς* instead of *τῆς χρηκατιστοκῆς* in I. 8. 31; the reading is doubtful, but in the light of the nondisputed reading of I. 8. 13, the reading here adopted seems to be most clearly the thought of Aristotle.

[2] I. 8. 2. Cp. also ch. 10.

already provided such articles as are capable of being stored, and necessary for life and useful for the association either of the state or of the family. Moreover it may be said that these and these alone constitute genuine wealth. For the amount of such sort of wealth as is enough for independence and a good life, is not unlimited like the wealth described by Solon in the line:

'No bound is set to riches in the world'.

For there is a limit, just as in the other arts; for in none are there any instruments limitless in number or size, and true wealth consists simply in an abundance of means suited to the purposes of households and states." [1]

It is interesting to observe that in the initial stages of the development of the science of oikonomik as a science, such strong emphasis should be laid upon the importance of right forms of the consumption of wealth.

Besides a distinct recognition of the logical separation of the use and production of wealth and the recognition of each of these as parts of the general theory of wealth getting, two other distinct scientific concepts of coordinate importance with these are present in Aristotle's discussion of Chrematistic. The first of these is the fact of exchange as associated with the phenomenon of value as distinguished from utility, and the second is a distinct recognition of the existence of a science of public finance based on the consciousness that each state must have material resources for performing its functions and fulfilling its mission.[2] Under the head of exchange and labor for hire (exchange of commodoties against services) Aristotle introduces an elenentary theory of distribution but he does not push his analysis to the extent of recognizing that the products of human industry may be awarded, in the sense of modern economic thought, to the several holders of the several factors or agencies in the production of wealth; and finally the science of public finance is so slightly treated that we can not

[1] I. 8. 13-15; Welldon, p. 20-1.

[2] Cp. I. 11. 13.

give Aristotle credit for any formal thought on the subject.[1]

§ 12. *The Art of Acquisition or the Production of Wealth.* "That there is then a certain art of the acquisition of wealth in accordance with nature to be practised by householders and statesman, and why this is so, is now clear. But there is another kind of the art of acquisition which is in an especial sense known as wealth-getting (chrematistik), as it rightly may be; and it is this which gives rise to the opinion that there is no limit to property and wealth; this second kind is so nearly allied to the first as to be considered one and the same with it. But it is neither the same as that before mentioned, nor yet widely different; the one exists by nature, the other does not exist by nature, but is rather the product of what may be termed experience or art."[2]

The distinction here made by Aristotle is substantially the distinction that for a long time was maintained by economists. There is the same haziness here and we are dealing with the same problem which confounded the earlier economists in their attempts to distinguish between productive and unproductive labor. The physiocrats were clear only that agriculture was a productive employment; economists since the school of the physiocrats have added one by one to the category of productive labor, until now all kinds of labor that meet with a measurable reward are held to be economically productive.[3]

In explaining the natural art of acquisition Aristotle says rather more than we ordinarily find included in what is called productive labor; because he wants to show not simply that nature furnishes the stuff or raw material with which man may satisfy his normal wants, but that nature actively with definite purpose and design provides for man and ought to provide for man both what is necessary for mere existence and whatever is necessary for living well.

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[1] The only distinct treatment of this topic extant from a writer contemporary with Aristotle is Xenophon's fragmentary discussion of Athenian Revenues. See Dakyns, The Works of Xenophon translated into English. v. 2, p. 325-49.

[2] I 9. 1—2.

[3] Cp. Gide, Political Economy, Bk. II, Pt. I, Ch. II, iii.

The natural art of acquisition in the developed life of the Greek city-state had these four distinct branches, namely: (1) live-stock farming—"A person must know what are the most profitable kinds of live-stock, and in what locality and under what conditions they are the most profitable, *e. g.*, what is the most profitable kind of property in horses, cattle, sheep or other animals. He must know which kinds are the most profitable not only as compared with others but in particular places; for they do not all thrive in the same country;"[1] (2) Husbandry, including field-culture and tree-culture; (3) Bee-keeping; (4) The management of fish and fowl.

This summary is given at the beginning of the eleventh chapter of the first book. To get at the bottom of the reasoning in regard to the art of acquisition by nature we must return to the eighth chapter of the same book: "There are various kinds of food and consequently varieties in the lives of animals and human beings. For as life is impossible without food, the differences of food have produced corresponding differences in the lives of animals."—This is a fine ancient way of saying that environment reacts upon organisms. "Some beasts are gregarious," the account proceeds, "others solitary according as their food requires, some being carnivorous, others fructivorous, and others again omnivorous. So that it is Nature that has ordained their modes of life with an eye to facilities and power of choice in getting their livelihood, even to the extent of making feasible the development and gratification of varying tastes."[2]

"The same is true of human beings. Their habits of life differ much. The most do-nothings are nomads, shepherds who lead an idle life and get their subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm. Others live by the chase, though in various ways, some by brigandage or by

[1] I. 11. 1—2; Welldon's translation, p. 28.

[2] I. 8. 4—5. Welldon's translation, p. 18-19; cp. Bolland and Lang, p. 129.

piracy, others by fishing * * * others again by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. But the most numerous class depends upon agriculture or the cultivation of fruits. Thus confining ourselves to those who do their own work but do not get their livelihood by means of barter or trade, men's lives may be pretty exhaustively classified as those of the nomad, the husbandman, the brigand or pirate, the fisherman and the hunter. Sometimes, however, people for convenience of living combine two or more of these and so supply the deficiencies of their life, where it fails of complete independence, *e. g.* the lives of nomad and brigand, or of husbandman and hunter are combined, and so in other cases as necessity suggests the combination."[1]

In these early and simple stages of culture, Nature herself seems to provide for men when they are full grown even as at the first moment of their birth. "For, looking now at the moment of birth, some animals produce with their young just that quantity of food which will suffice till the new-born can provide for itself by itself, as for instance, animals that are vermiparous or oviparous. But those which are viviparous have nourishment for their young within themselves for a certain time, namely nature's supply of what is called milk. So in like manner it is clear that at a later period of growth also we must conclude that plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the sake of man. * * * * * Therefore also the art of war so far as it is natural, is in a sense a branch of the art of acquisition * * * which must be used both against wild beasts and such men as being designed by nature to be ruled over, are unwilling to submit to this arrangement; war of this kind is by nature just."[2]

Such is Aristotle's conception of the basis of that part of the art of acquisition which he calls natural. Over against this part is a kind of acquisition which is not according to nature but according to art. Modern thinkers fail to accept the distinction, seeing that agriculture even in its primitive stages

[1] I. 8. 6—9, Welldon, p. 19.
[2] I. 8. 10–12.

is no less an acquired art than the latest phases in the evolution of factory production. To Aristotle, however, the antithesis between nature and art had great significance.

The unnatural part of the art of acquisition is also summarized in the eleventh chapter of the first book, altho' first in a formal manner defined in the opening of the ninth chapter of the same book. The unnatural art of acquisition in the developed Greek city-state, was said to consist in exchange of which there were three species: "commerce, of which in turn three subdivisions were recognized; marine trade (*ναυκληρία*), inland trade (*φορτηγία*), and shopkeeping or retail trade (*παράστασις*); these were said to differ from one another in relative security and the amount of profit they bring in. (2) The taking of usury—the loaning of money for hire (*τοκισμός*). (3) Hired labor (*μισθαρνία*), whether of skilled or unskilled labor.[1]

There is still a third part or branch of the art of acquisition which lies midway between the two, that have been described as the natural and unnatural, and has something in common with both. This third kind of acquisition or wealth-getting includes all those arts by which things useful, but not fruit-bearing, are secured from the earth, *e. g.* wood-cutting and all forms of mining; and this now embraces many kinds of metal obtained from the earth.

§ 13. *The Development of Exchange.* "In coming to the discussion of exchange, the first remark to be made is that every article of property admits of two uses, both of which are inherent in it, tho' not inherent in the same degree, one being proper to the article and the other not. To take *e. g.* a shoe, there is its use as a covering of the foot, and also its use as an article of exchange; both are uses of a shoe, for if you barter it to some one who wants a shoe in exchange for money or food, you use the shoe as shoe just as much as if you wear it, but the use you make of it in this case is not its proper use, inasmuch as barter is not the object of its production. The same is true of all other articles of property; there

[1] Cp. I. 11. 3-4, and 5.

is none that does not admit of use in exchange."[1] This is Aristotle's statement of the difference between what Adam Smith called value in use and value in exchange; and what contemporary economists are describing variously in terms of utility as objective and subjective, or simply as utility and value.

The origin of exchange is next carefully stated. "The use of articles in exchange arose in the first instance from natural circumstances, as people had more of some things and fewer of other things than they required." "And [as the true art of exchange was the outcome of natural wants] so conversely it is plain that retail trading is not a natural part of wealth-getting, chrematistik; else the barter would not be carried beyond the point of satisfying mere requirements." * * * Now in the earliest association, that is, in the family, there is no part for exchange to play, but when the associations become wider, *e. g.* in the village or state, individual households have in common many things as before, they also have many things separately, and these they may exchange against each other in kind as many barbarians do even unto this day, but they never go farther. "The art of exchange when thus limited is not unnatural, for it was adopted to fill up the measure of natural self-completeness."[2] So far then barter is permissible and even natural. Still it is out of this form, that the other, the unnatural and artificial form arose, as might have been expected.

We are next told how this came to pass, and telling it involved an explanation of the invention of coined money (*νόμισμα*).

§ 14. *The Invention of Coined Money, and Theories of Money.* So soon as barter was carried on over great distances the invention of money took place. "For as the benefits of commerce were more widely extended by importing commodities, of which there was a deficiency, and exporting those of

[1] I. 9. 2-4.

[2] I. 9. 4. 6.

which there was an excess, the use of a currency was an indispensable device. As the necessaries of nature were not all easily portable, people agreed for purposes of barter mutually to give and receive some article, which belonging itself to the class of useful articles, possesses a secondary use easily adapted to the wants of life, some such article as silver or iron, which was at first defined simply by size and weight; altho' finally they went further and set a stamp upon every coin to relieve them from the trouble of weighing it, as the stamp impressed upon the coin was an indication of quantity."[1] It was after the invention of money that the development of trade took such rapid strides and became relatively so important as a mode of wealth-getting, that it overshadowed all others even to the extent of bringing common opinion around to the view that wealth-getting, chrematistik, has to do almost exclusively with money-making. Wealth is often defined as a quantity of current coin. * * * * * * Sometimes on the other hand money is regarded as mere trash, and quite as conventional as its name implies, but to be by nature nothing at all, because if the people who use it give it up and adopt another, it is worth nothing at all * * * * And a man rolling in money may be without his needful food. And yet it is ridiculous that that should be wealth which a man may have in abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the old story, when his insatiable prayer had been granted, and everything which was set before him, turned to gold." It is because of this that modern economists have sought their safer premises, respecting the theory of value in the principle of subjective utility as distinguished from merely potential objective utility. Aristotle too, added, "It is for this reason that men seek something else than conventional money, or silver or gold as the true wealth and the true way of finding it."[2]

Now it is in amassing the profits of trade that we find a species of wealth-getting, to which there is no limit. To con-

[1] I. 9. 7–8.

[2] I. 9. 12.

ceive this notion of wealth-getting, is to lose all sight of distinction between living and living well; in fact, it is caused by an eagerness for mere living instead of the purpose to live well. This thought has been strongly emphasized in modern literature by Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris.

In this connection we have Aristotle's condemnation of usury. "Most reasonably of all is hated the trade of the usurer, because the gain comes from the money itself and not from the use for which money was devised." Our view at present is that under justifiable forms of borrowing this will not be the case. Jeremy Bentham replied to Aristotle that while money is not born out of money, it may yield increase by being transmuted into live-stock, or other productive agencies for the creation of wealth. The modern point of view is well put when we insist that legitimate forms of borrowing money must take the form of investment, either as plant or to secure control of other labor in the hope of winning returns that shall represent a real increase of store.

§ 15. *Writers on Economic Subjects.* "The most scientific of men's pursuits are those where there is the least element of chance; the meanest are those in which men's bodies are deformed; the most servile where there is the most use of the body alone; the most ignoble where the least excellence is required. But since works have been written on these subjects by certain persons, such as by Chares of Paros, and Apollodorus of Lemnos, on husbandry in both its branches of tilling the soil and growing plantations, and similarly by others on other subjects, let whosoever cares to do so study these matters in the writings of these authors."[1]

These writers are no longer extant; but the paragraph quoted gives us an intimation of the nature and scope of the treatment which industrial subjects had at that day received at the hands of aspiring students. A few scattered stories are cited, showing that it is easy enough to become rich if you

[1] Cp. I. 11. 6-7.

only set about the matter in the right way. The example of Thales, who by reason of his astronomical knowledge, foresaw the coming of a great olive harvest is cited. He bought up all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios, with only a little money, and when the time of olive harvest came, he charged high and arbitrary prices for the use of the presses. In a similar manner "a certain person in Sicily, having a sum of money deposited with him, bought up all the iron from the smithies, and afterwards, when dealers came from the marts, he was the only seller, tho' he did not make much increase in the price. Still he gained 100 talents in addition to his original 50." [1] Dionysius, the tyrant, told him to be gone and to carry his gains with him, but not to stop any longer in Syracuse, on the ground that his practices were inimical to the interests of the state. This exposition of the nature of a corner in the market or the securing of a monopoly is one of the few subjects in which The Politics enters upon the modern theory of distribution. Aristotle less clearly than Plato enunciates the doctrine of industrial freedom or free competition.

§ *16. On the Relation of Oikonomik to Chrematistik.* Are we to understand that this discussion of the theory of right or virtue is introduced as part of chrematistik? Not at all. More nearly does it become a suitable topic for discussion in connection with the theory of the family or house in distinction from that phase of household management which is allied to wealth-getting. Of the three relations, a discussion of which we were promised, only one has been fully and satisfactorily treated and that is the relation of master and slave; and from this relationship, which involves the property-idea, the discussion passed to the whole subject of wealth, which is treated with considerable fulness in respect to its consumption, or proper use, its production and its exchange, with occasional hints bearing on its distribution.

The relation of husband and wife, parent and child, is briefly taken up in the twelfth chapter of Book I, not as a

[1] I. 11. 11.

summary of the preceding subjects but as a treatment of the relations that remained to be considered; recognition of this has already been made in this chapter, § 9 above.

The thirteenth and final chapter of the first book is in the nature of a summary, a summary which contrasts oikonomik and chrematistik: "It appears then that in oikonomik more attention is devoted to human beings than to inanimate property, more to their virtue or excellence than to property, more to the virtue of free persons than to that of slaves."[1] In this final chapter we come back to a study of the house rather than to the management of the house; and to the management of a house that is to oikonomik rather than chrematistik. To use modern language, in oikonomik we have a large number of ethical problems to deal with, whereas in chrematistik the ethical questions are ignored; or rather those phases of wealth-getting which in the opinion of Aristotle are necessary as a condition of good living, namely, agriculture, mining and the simpler forms of exchange, are made parts of oikonomik and are ethically approved; while those parts of wealth-getting which transcend the needs of the household are ethically condemned.

We are kept somewhat in the dark as to the exact nature of those exchange transactions which are condemned in strong terms by Aristotle; but we may infer that they included all those transactions which represent the higher developments of commerce, and which in the judgment of Aristotle tended to superfluity. The contrast between the moral or natural financiering or wealth-getting, *i. e.*, chrematistik, which is a part of oikonomik, and immoral or unnatural, which is not part of oikonomik, is worked out toward the end of the ninth, and in the tenth, chapter of Book I.

Unnatural and immoral financiering or wealth-getting is an aspect of trading, and wealth which comes in this way is without limit.[2] There are those who make an end of wealth itself. "Nay, even some people who aspire to live well set their

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[1] I. 13, 1.
[2] Cf. I. 9. 12, 13.

minds solely upon sensual gratification and * * * * all their efforts are directed to money-making. * * * * * For as sensual gratification implies superfluity, they are eager to find an art productive of excess of pleasure."[1] And if they cannot obtain their end through the ordinary channels of commercial exchange, chrematistik in the unnecessary sense, they will try for it in some other way—putting their faculties to unnatural uses, perverting the arts and ordinary pursuits of life from their own true ends to the base purpose of merely getting an income.

Now financiering in the sense just sketched is not a necessary part of household management, of oikonomik. Financial resources, it is true, are prerequisites of the householder and the statesman, of the oikonomikos and the politikos; but they ought to be secured as it were at first hand and not thro' the remote and intricate paths of trade. "As statesmanship does not create men, but receives them from Nature's hand and makes use of them, so it is Nature's business to supply the means of sustenance in the shape of land or sea or anything else; while the householder starting with these means has merely to dispose of them aright. * * * * It is nature's function to supply every creature that is born with food in the residium of the substance of which the creature itself is formed. Therefore all forms of wealth-getting in so far as they are natural, must depend upon the fruits of earth and animals, and not on that kind of trade, which enriches one party at the expense of the other." [2]

We have evidence here as in Plato's City of Pigs [3] that "the beauty of primitive life—that fair abstraction of religion and philosophy—was beginning to exercise a fascination over the Greeks in the days of Aristotle and Plato, as it afterwards did over the minds of modern Europe, when it was again made

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[1] I. 9, 17.

[2] I. I. 10. 1-4.

[3] See Essay I, below, on Republic of Plato, § 14.

attractive by the genius of Sir Thomas Moore, and of Rousseau." [1]

The attempt to state the relation of chrematistik to oikonomik, is really the last problem of the first book of The Politics.[2] The one thing emphasized above all others in working out their likeness and differences is that wealth is not the true end of life, that in oikonomik wealth and all the arts of acquiring wealth must be subordinated to man, and that in the life of man, right living rather than mere living, is the only aim worthy of a man; and further, that in this life every one has a destiny, a fitness for a place and a function, meeting which is his duty and constitutes his virtue. Hence we have as the conclusion of this study of oikonomik detailed statement concerning the virtue of each member of the house or family as that was organized in the time of Aristotle. It may be remarked that while Aristotle gives a separate treatment to the principles of conduct in a separate treatise which he calls ethics, he nowhere assumes that those principles can be ignored in the other social sciences.

§ 17. *On the Theory of Right or Virtue in the House.* "As to slaves the first question which arises is whether a slave is capable of any virtue beyond that of a mere instrument or menial, that is of any more honorable virtue, such as temperance, courage or any similar moral habit; or whether on the

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[1] Jowett, The Politics. Introduction, p. XXIV.

[2] "The sciences or subjects of knowledge which are concerned with man run into one another, and in the age of Aristotle were not easily distinguished. As we say that Political Economy is not the whole of Politics, so Aristotle says that money-making [*χρηματιστικη*] is not the whole of household management [*οἰκονομική*] or of family life. But in either case there is a difficulty in separating them. Aristotle perceives that the art of wealth-getting is both narrower and wider than household management [that is oikonomik]; he would like to establish its purely subordinate relation. He does not consider that the property of individuals becomes in time of need the property of the state; or that one of his favorite virtues, magnificence, depends upon the accumulation of wealth; or that Athens could not have been the home of the arts unless the fruits of the whole earth had flowed in upon her; and unless gold and silver treasure had been stored up in the Parthenon. And altho' he constantly insists that leisure is necessary to a cultivated class, he does not observe that a certain amount of accumulated wealth is a condition of leisure." Jowett, The Politics, Vol. I. p. XXIII–XXIV.

contrary there is no virtue of which he is capable apart from acts of bodily service. Whichever view we take we are met by a difficulty. If we affirm the capacity of a slave for the higher virtues, we may be asked wherein the difference between slaves and free persons consists; if we deny it, the denial is a paradox because slaves are human and rational beings.

"The same question or one very similar can be asked about women and children. Are they capable of virtues (or excellence)? Is a woman bound to be temperate, brave and just? May a child be called licentious or temperate?

"[To ask these questions in regard to slaves, and women and children, is to ask] the general question whether the virtue of natural rulers and of natural subjects is identical or different? For if we say that both rulers and subjects are to possess high moral qualities, why should there be this absolute distinction of ruler and subject?"[1] Aristotle's answer is that both rulers and subjects possess virtues but these virtues are of different kinds.[2] He falls back upon his psychology to illustrate his meaning: "In the soul (ψυχή) there is by nature an element that rules and also an element to be ruled; and in these we recognize distinction of virtue (ἀρετή)—the excellence or virtue, namely, of that which possesses reason, and the excellence or virtue of that which lacks reason."[3] That is the intellect and the passions are here contrasted; and the office of rule is assigned to the former.[4] "The slave, speaking generally, has not the deliberative faculty, but the woman has it, tho' without power to be effective; the child has it, but in an imperfectly developed form. * * * In the same way the moral virtues must be present in all but not in the same

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[1] I. 13. 2—4, Welldon's translation, p. 33.

[2] Cp. I. 13. 4—9.

[3] I. 13. 6.

[4] A. C. Bradley in his essay on Aristotle's Conception of the State (published in Hellenica, edited by Evelyn Abbott, London, 1880) makes some interesting observations on the Aristotelian doctrine of ἀρετή, and its importance in his conception of citizenship, and on the question of bearing rule in a state. See especially p. 212f.

manner, but each in the degree essential to the discharge of his function. * * * The ruler must have moral excellence in the perfect form."

Why Aristotle should hold that the virtues in slaves, freemen, women, and children, are not only different in degree, but in kind, is not clear from his own reasoning. But he criticises Plato for attempting to comprehend all virtues within a single definition. "For people merely deceive themselves" he says, who give such general definitions [as Plato does] of virtue, saying that 'to keep the soul (ψυχη) in sound condition is virtue,' or that 'right action,' or anything of that sort, is virtue; it is far more sensible to follow Gorgias in drawing up catalogues of the virtues appropriate to each class." It may, however, fairly be said that modern thinkers agree with the reasoning of Plato, touching the unity of virtue rather than with Aristotle, although classifications of the virtues are not unattempted by modern moralists.[1] The virtue of the child is not the virtue or excellence of an independent being, but it has reference to one in whom the child finds development and guidance, namely his father. So, too, the virtue of a slave has reference to the excellence of his master. And further because the slave is useful only in providing the bare necessaries of life, Aristotle reasons that he does not need much virtue—only just so much as will keep him from failing in his duty on account of licentiousness or timidity. But shall we say of artisans (Βαναυσοι)? They are even less moral than slaves; they are, so to speak, unattached slaves; and unlike slaves they are not the products of nature—"cobblers and all other artisans, unlike slaves, are in no sense creations of nature." It is against Βαναυσοι that the reproach of ignobleness is especially directed; and we are left in doubt what virtues, if any, are conceded to them. The language of Aristotle marks the extraordinary prejudice of his time against mechanical pursuits of all kinds.[2] Alluding to Plato's Laws, Aristotle says of

[1] See such manuals on ethics as that of Muirhead, Mackenzie, and others.

[2] See pp. 214–8 of A. C. Bradley's Essay noted above on p. 47 of this study.

slaves: "They are wrong, therefore, who deny reason to slaves and effect to employ commands only in dealing with them; for advice is more suitable to slaves than to children * * *"[1]

In conclusion Aristotle tells us that when we come to discuss the different forms of polity *i. e.* the different forms of government, it will be necessary to consider "the relations of husband and wife, father and children, and the moral laws determining the virtue of each, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape the evil. For in as much as every family is a part of the state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole; and therefore women and children must be trained by education[2] with an eye to the state, if the virtues of each of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference; for the children grow up to be citizens, and half of the free persons in a state are women."

"Regarding then our present inquiry as completed, we will take up another subject; and first let us examine the various theories regarding the ideally best polity (constitution), that is, we shall first study the History of Politics."

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[1] I. 13. 14. Cp. Plato's Laws, 777 E, (Jowett's Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 5. p. 159), where Plato says: "Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited."

[2] V. 9. 11–15; VIII. 1. 1.

II.

A HISTORY OF POLITICS.

§ 1. *A Study in Political Literature.* Even in Aristotle's time this was possible. There was already created and still in process of creation, in the time of Aristotle and Plato, a literature, which, in its extent and quality, shows that the Greeks were making brilliant beginnings in the fundamentals of political science, and which today merits the attention of thoughtful students of the science of politics.

Not only were express treatises written on the theory of the state, such as are preserved to us in Aristotle's Politics and the Republic of Plato, but political history of a high order had already begun in the immortal work of Thucydides and the brilliant recital of episode and adventure by Xenophon. The sophists were discussing on every hand the principles of legislation, the best methods of procedure in courts at law, the tricks of the barrister and the arts of the rhetorician. The dialogues of Plato, for example, are full of allusions to the mental life of the times along these lines. A very notable example of such discussion, and one also of a high order, is the Gorgias of Plato. Moreover also in the general literature of that same period [1], in the work of the tragic and the comic poets, political and social life of that time is reflected in powerful description, sober allusion, and rollicking satire.

Examples of an incidental description of the state and of the social life of the Greeks, of their political ideals and of the controlling motives in the lives of public men are found in a very definite form in the Comedies of Aristophanes, *e. g.* in

[1] For an excellent essay on the general literature of the period, see Zeller in his introductory Essay in his volume on Socrates.

The Clouds, The Birds, The Frogs, and other comedies still extant. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, also make their contributions.

In the second book of the Politics we have in the first part of that book what may be called the special introduction to the study of polities, that is of constitutions. Aristotle passes in review what he regards as the most able efforts of his time and before his time, describing the fundamental principles of the government of men in states, the principles upon which such associations are founded, and the plans in accordance with which these principles should gain expression in the organization and administration of government. He gives the honor of a formal review to Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamus, besides giving honorable mention to certain other writers and such great legislators as Solon and Lycurgus.

The preface to this second book of The Politics in Aristotle's own words is as follows: "As our purpose is to investigate what is the best of all forms of political association for persons whose life is capable of approximating most nearly to an ideal, we are bound to examine all other forms of polity, not only such as exist in individual states, which are reputed to be well ordered, but such others also as have been proposed by individual thinkers, and are held in esteem.

"In this way we shall be likely to discover what is right and what is expedient; and instead of our endeavor to find some new form of polity, seeming to indicate a desire to display our own cleverness, it will be seen that the inquiry is needed on account of the imperfection of all polities, existing or proposed.[1]

§ 2. *Criticism of Plato; His Doctrine of the Unity of the State.* Apparently having Plato in mind, Aristotle says: "We must begin with the natural beginning of an investigation like the present. The collective citizens of a state must of necessity either have (1) everything in common, or (2) nothing in

[1] II. 1. 1. Welldon, p. 38.

common, or (3) some things in common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for a city-state is a community, and must at any rate have a common place, and its citizens must live in a common locality * * But is it desirable that in a state which is to be rightly ordered, the citizens should have the greatest possible number of things in common, or only some things and not others? It is possible for citizens to have children, wives, and property in common, as is proposed in the Republic of Plato * * * but is it better to follow the existing system in this respect or the order of things described in the *Republic?*"[1] It is in this way that Aristotle puts before us the Platonic doctrine of communism. In his criticsm of Plato he submits first that the end for the furtherance of which Plato advocates the community of wives and of children, and of property, is not in itself desirable. This end, he explained, is the greatest possible unity of the state.

Now the extent to which unity in the state is desirable, is limited. Plato makes Socrates say that the greater the unity of the state, the better. This Aristotle denies. Unity may be carried to excess. Pushed too far it will end in the destruction of the state. The desirable kind of unity in a state is a relative unity. The city-state is made up of parts. It does not consist simply of a number of individuals, but even individuals are different in kind and grouped into varying groups to complete their life. The city-state is unlike a tribal-state, the members of which are scattered and do not live in villages; nor is the city-state like a military alliance, which counts upon mere numbers, through an increase of mass. The parts which are to constitute a single organic whole must be of different kinds. The principle of unity in states, which makes for their preservation, is the principle of reciprocal equality as shown in the ethics.[2] By this principle unity is secured when each of the parts is enabled to perform unhampered and unhindered its own proper functions. Aris-

[1] II. 1. 2–3. Welldon, p. 38–39.

[2] Nicom. Eth. V. ch. 5.

totle seems to have had a sense of the importance of what we call decentralization. The state must be composed of parts, villages and families, corresponding to provinces and communes in states of a later growth.

The principle of reciprocal equality is applied also to the relation of the individual members of a state to each other under conditions of freedom and equality. In a free state, that is in a republic, the citizens can not all rule at one and the same time and for all time; they must therefore follow a system of rotation in office, either annual or some other order of succession or period of office. While one trade for one man is good policy and applies also to political association from the point of view of efficiency alone, it is not applicable when judged in the light of the fact, that all citizens have a natural equality. In view of this natural equality, it is Aristotle's contention that justice demands a rotation in office on the ground that if it is a good thing, it ought to be passed around, and if a burden, it ought to be passed around, so that, whether burden or privilege, all may share in it alike.

From still another point of view Aristotle argues that excessive unity or indefinite and unqualified unity in a state is undesirable. A community does not become self-sufficing until it reaches proportions and differentiations within itself that stand for such a developed division of labor, both industrial and territorial, as will enable its several parts to furnish all the means of life, not only for living, but also for living well. An individual is at greater unity with himself than a family, and a family than a state, but a state is more self-sufficing than a family, and a family is more self-suffering than an individual and so somewhat facetiously runs the conclusion of the last syllogism on this head, "if self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater."[1]

§ 3. *The Platonic Doctrine of Community of Wives and of Children.* Aristotle makes his attack on Plato's doctrine

[1] II. 2. 8.

of family communism without explanation of the special purpose[1] involved in Plato's project, aside from the broad generalization that Plato held it to be desirable for the sake of promoting the unity of the state. That Plato also designed, as he himself tells us in The Republic, to improve the breed of man is a purpose at which Aristotle in his exposition of the Platonic doctrine does not hint. Here, as in other criticisms of Plato, Aristotle shows himself not the sympathetic disciple but the harsh critic and jealous rival. The system of community of wives advocated by Plato as the proper family system for the guardians of the state, was something far removed from an unregulated promiscuity.

The first count against Plato is that his doctrine of family communism would not even make for the unity and harmony of the state. Such an arrangement would sow discord rather than unity. The word all is ambiguous in a community where all simultaneously term the same object mine and not mine. All may mean each individually, or it may mean all collectively. In the latter case it would not be conducive to harmony. To say that all call the same thing mine is virtually a mere quibble, and it is certainly very far from being conducive to harmony.

But there are objections to family communism on its own account. "That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it," and this principle will work itself out in a communistic state to the disadvantage of children and family life—"In the state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will not say 'my son' or the son 'my father.'"[2] Again the system can not be realized for the simple reason that family resemblances would be so strong as to lead to the recognition of close kin. "Children are born like their parents. * * * Geographers declare this to be the fact; they say that in Upper Libya, where

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[1] Plato, The Republic, Book V. 457f. See below § 3 of Essay II. on The Republic of Plato.

[2] II. 4. 7.

the women are common, the children who are born are nevertheless assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness."[1] In some cases these resemblances would of course be more striking than in others. And again, certain unnatural crimes would follow communistic family organization.

"And finally," so runs a striking passage in the fourth chapter of the second book of The Politics, "it would seem to be more expedient for the state, that this community of wives and children should exist among the husbandmen or subjects in Plato's Republic rather than among his guardians or rulers; for such a community will tend to weaken mutual affection, and the affection existing among the members of the subject class ought to be weak, if they are to be obedient and not revolutionary." This view of family communism and its advantages for purposes of subjection is happily compared by Jowett to the desire to suppress education and family life among slaves in slave-holding countries in modern times.

The result then of communism in wives and children would, in the opinion of Aristotle, "be just the opposite of that state of things which should be produced by a wisely ordered legislation and the object which Plato had in view in regulating lating the status of the children and wives would not be secured. Mutual affection, as we hold, is the greatest of all blessings of a state, as it affords the best guarantee against sedition. * * * * * But of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection that a thing is your own and that you love it, neither can exist in a communistic state."[2]

To carry out the policy of a transposition of classes[3] as advocated in the Republic would likewise meet with special difficulties of its own in a system of family communism.

§ 4. *The Platonic Doctrine of the Community of Property.* Of the community of property as distinguished from the community of wives and children Aristotle speaks with

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[1] II. 3. 9. Cp. Herod. IV. 180.

[2] II. 4. 5-9.

[3] See below §38 of Essay I on the Republic.

more sympathy. He holds that community of property may be wisely encouraged. His exposition of the subject of common property is still one of the best. Modern discussions of property have made little advance on the positions of Aristotle.

Our present question may be separated from the former. "Assuming that the separate possession of wives and children *is the correct principle of the best polity*, we may still ask whether there may be any advantage in having and using property in common."[1]

Three forms or systems of common property are possible, Aristotle tells us in very few words: (1) Common property of products leaving raw material or land *i. e.* natural agents, as private property; (2) Common property of raw material or land and private property of products; or (3) Both land and products may be common. None of these will answer in an absolute and unqualified sense, but Aristotle seems to hold that the first two of these three plans may in a measure be adopted if properly guarded and qualified; he evidently understands Plato to accept the third or absolute form of common property and it is against this form of common property that he directs his arguments. It is worthy of remark that Aristotle recognizes the second form as "a sort of community which is reported to obtain among some non-Greek peoples" —an observation which shows that he was a thoughtful and exact observer of social institutions in his own time. We know at present perfectly well that the second form is common in early stages of agricultural communities, while of the first form we have no notable historical examples.

The principles upon which community of property, speaking generally, and with special reference to the third form above noted, should be condemned, may be summarized thus: (1) Common property fails to stimulate individual exertion and economy of effort—"Nothing is so well cared for as that which is cared for for one's self." (2) Common property

[1] II. 5. 1-2.

fosters dissension—this is illustrated in many directions, for example, in an agricultural community where the joint owners are also the cultivators. If the shares of enjoyment or labor are unequal, those who get less and work more are sure to raise complaints against those who enjoy or get much and labor little." Aristotle might have added that in a system of communism there is no standard by which an equitable award of labor and its rewards may be made. "In fact, as a general rule, there is likely to be difficulty in men living together and having things in common, but especially in their having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out by the way and quarrel about any trifle which turns up." [1] (3) Common property destroys the sense of pleasure arising from private property. Of course this implies loss of motive, and from this point of view this principle has already been stated, as the first in this summary, and we can count it separately only if we distinguish it from motive, as loss of pleasure in itself. "If we take account of personal gratification, there is an unspeakable advantage in the sense of private property." [2] (4) Common property does away with two virtues of man, namely, temperance or continence, and liberality. Aristotle's thought in speaking of the effacement of continence in a system of communism seems to be that property as well as affection is a factor in the development of the family, even in the monogamous family—a thought, which in our time is the more thoroughly grasped on account of our attention in modern economics to the law of population in its relation to food supply. In a civilized country the checks to an excessive growth of population are chiefly institutional. The laws of property and the laws of marriage have many points of contact and interdependence.[3] How common property involves the effacement of liberality is easily seen: "The exer-

[1] II. 5. 4; Jowett, V. 2. p. 33.

[2] II. 5. 8; Welldon, p. 50.

[3] Compare Hadley's exposition of the Malthusian theory in his Economics, §§ 54-60.

cise of liberality consists in the use a person makes of his own possessions."

Aristotle states his own views in positive terms. Alluding to the system which has been just passed under review, he says: "There are then these and other similar inconveniences inherent in a community of property. The existing system, if embellished by the moral tone of those who live under it, and by a code of wise laws, would be far superior, as it would combine the advantages of both principles, namely, of common and individual possession. For property ought to be common in a certain sense, altho' in its general character it should be private. For when every one has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business; while in practice, virtue will render 'friends goods common goods' according to the proverb. The outlines of such a system are actually found in some states, so that it is not wholly chimerical, and in well-ordered states especially it is in some respects already realized * * * where every citizen, altho' he holds his property in private possession, uses part of it for the benefit of his friends. * * * Plainly it is desirable that the tenure of property should be private, but that practically it should be common. To produce in the citizens a disposition to make this use of their property is a task proper to the legislator."[1] Jowett in commenting on this paragraph says: "The sentiment might be thrown into a modern form:—More good will be done by cultivating in rich men a sense of the duties of property, than by a violation of its rights."

"Legislation then, of the kind proposed in Plato's Republic," this is the bold and hard-headed conclusion of Aristotle, "has a specious and philanthropic appearance; it is eagerly embraced by people at the first hearing under the impression that a sort of marvellous universal love will be its result, especially if one inveighs against the actual evils of existing polities

[1] II. 5. 5-8.

as arising from the want of a community of property—such evils, I mean, as civil law-suits, trials for false witness, and the habit of toadying to the rich."[1] These sentiments are modern both in what they affirm and in what they deny. The logic of the scientific thinker and of the superficial reasoner of our time and of Aristotle's time had each respectively much in common with the other.

Aristotle concludes his criticism of communism by observing: (1) That the fundamental mistake of Plato and the one upon which he bases his advocacy of communism, is an incorrect theory respecting the unity of the state. His concept of unity was mechanical, whereas it should have been moral, and we are naturally surprised that he should have erred on this point, especially when we note the importance which he attached to education. We may well be surprised that the author of a system of education which he thought would make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by schemes of communism rather than by moral discipline, intellectual culture, and legislation. [2]

(2) The evidence of history is an argument against the Platonic doctrine of community of wives, children, and property, for "we can not rightly shut our eyes to the duty of paying regard to history, to all the ages of the past in which the system, were it a wise one, would not fail to have been discovered."

(3) The attempt to create a polity of the Socratic type were it once made would demonstrate the impossibility of complete unification. "It would be found impossible to create the state without immediately making divisions and separations whether into common tables, *as at Sparta*, or into clans and tribes, *as at Athens*. But this legislation will result only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedæmonians are even under existing conditions trying to effect."[3]

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[1] II. 5. 11–12; Welldon, p. 501.

[2] Cp. II. 5. 15.

[3] II. 5, 17; Welldon, p. 52, and Jowett, vol. 4, p. 35.

§ 5 *The Incompleteness of Plato's Polity as Proposed in The Republic.* Plato's polity is fragmentary, and it is for this reason that in the arrangement of these studies the formal consideration of The Republic is placed last, altho' in the order of time The Republic comes before the Politics. But to say that Plato's polity is fragmentary or incomplete without recognizing that his primary aim was to discuss problems that lie back of the formal organization of government, is to play the role of a partial or unjust critic. Plato discussed policy rather than polity.

Professor Jowett says of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato that they are "not those of an admiring pupil who seeks to enter into the spirit of his master, but of a teacher who has revolted against his authority. The clouds and dreams of the Republic have many heavy blows dealt against them by the weapons of common sense, but like 'the air invulnerable' they come together again and are unharmed by the spear of criticism. For they can never be brought down to earth, and while remaining in their own element they are beyond the reach of attack."[1]

By far the most valuable and just part of Aristotle's criticism of Plato is that part which we have just passed under review, Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic doctrine of the unity of the state, and of communism in the family relations and in the possessions of wealth. The doctrine of community of wives and children, and of property is so conspicuous a feature in the Republic, that it has come to be very widely and popularly accepted as standing for the whole; whereas the truth is, that it is not even one of the two or three greatest features or largest subdivisions of Plato's polity. In the Republic itself the doctrine of communism is distinctly subordinated, for example, to the theory that in a perfect state the philosopher must bear rule.

The central portion of The Republic,[2] Books V., VI. and VII., are devoted to an exposition of this broad proposition,

[1] Jowett, The Politics of Aristotle, V. I., p. 27.
[2] See below Essay II. on The Republic.

and subordinate thereto we have a treatment of the family relations, not of the entire citizenship, and it is with this that Aristotle finds fault, but of that body of citizens at first called guardians and later differentiated into guardians and soldiers. Another main feature of the second or central portion of The Republic is the exposition of a system of higher education for the guardians from the body of which the philosophers destined to bear rule are to be selected. A third feature of this second part of The Republic deals with the problem of making possible or practicable the rule of the philosopher in the state. It is this second or central portion of The Republic that Aristotle seems to have chiefly in mind when he makes his criticisms of Plato's polity, and it is in this portion of The Republic that we find Plato's boldest and most original doctrines of public policy.[1]

If now we add to this description of the central portion of The Republic, a hint concerning the subject matter of the other main parts, namely, Books I. to IV.[2] which deal with the nature of justice or the nature of the state and elementary education, and the last three books,[3] Books VIII. to X. which discuss existing forms of policy and problems of policy, we shall be prepared to see that Aristotle's criticisms of the Republic, viewed as a whole, are very partial and scattering. Nor is there any reason for believing, judging from the ancient literature extant, that the art of fair and sympathetic criticism in the time of Plato or Aristotle was in any sense an advanced art.

Aristotle objects to the incompleteness of Plato's polity, but he contents himself with apparently random criticism in which there is more or less reference to what has already been presented. His main objection seems to be that Plato has failed to make clear what is to be the general form of his commonwealth, he has spoken exclusively of the rulers, *i. e.* of the

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[1] See below Essay II. on The Republic.

[2] See below Essay I. on The Republic.

[3] See below Essay III. on The Republic.

guardians, and not sufficiently of the subjects in his state. This objection is well taken, but it holds also to a certain extent against Aristotle himself.[1] "The main body of *Plato's* state consists *not in the guardians*, *but* in the mass of other citizens about whom nothing is determined, *e. g.* whether property is to be held in common by the husbandmen as well as by the guardians, or to be separate and individual, and in like manner whether the community of wives and children is to be extended to the other classes also, as well as to the guardians." [2]

Plato does indeed make the guardians into a sort of garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest who are the real body of the state receive comparatively little mention and still less consideration. Aristotle is of the opinion that if these subject-classes were to be allowed to have property rights on the basis of private ownership, they would be hard to manage and could not be permanently held in subjection, a remark distinctively supported by the evidence of history. Plato seems to give his husbandmen an absolute ownership of their estates on condition of paying a fixed rent to the guardians. "But, *if they are absolute owners*," Aristotle quietly remarks with his eyes on contemporary conditions which he well understood, "they are likely to be far more intractable and arrogant than the classes of helots, penestæ, or serfs which exist in some countries."

Aristotle is disposed to make light of the housekeeping which farmers would have with a family system, based on communism! Suppose we have private ownership of land combined with community of wives, who will look after the house or where will be the women that would give the same attention to the house that their husbands would give to the fields?

Moreover Plato has said nothing about "the form of gov-

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[1] For Aristotle's treatment of the subject-classes in the ancient city-states, see below Essay III. § 5, and Essay V. §§ 6—8.

[2] II. 5. 18; Welldon, p. 52–3; cp. Jowett, V. 1. p. 36, and note to 5.20 V. 2, p. 56.

ernment, education, and laws of the husbandmen, and other subject-classes; and yet these are questions of considerable difficulty. * * * It is strange too, that Socrates [in whose mouth Plato puts the argument], when he is arguing that the pursuits of women should be the same as those of men,[1] should draw his illustration from the lower animals, among whom no such thing as domestic economy exists." [2]

Finally Aristotle objects that Plato establishes a system of fixed rulers, and that while denying happiness to these, he yet teaches that it is the legislators' duty to make the state as a whole happy. Neither of these points can, however, be fairly urged. The first point can not be sustained as it stands, because a careful reading of The Republic shows clearly that the 'high-spirited warriors' when they are qualified by age and have passed the tests imposed upon them, shall take their turn at ruling. Nor is it correct to say that the rulers come from one class or caste only, for Plato provides expressly for the transposition of classes, conceding that the son of a father of brass or iron, to use the Platonic figure which is borrowed by Aristotle, may be of gold.[3] The validity of the second contention turns entirely upon the definition of happiness we accept, as Socrates in the dialogue replies to Adeimantus, who interposes this very objection at the opening of the fourth book of The Republic.

§ 6. *Criticism of Plato's Laws.* Aristotle refers to the Laws as Plato's later work. "In the Laws," says Aristotle, accurately enough, "there is hardly anything but laws; very little is said about the polity, *i. e.* about the constitution," and yet this description with what follows is insufficient to give the reader any real knowledge of the scope and the subject-matter of the Laws. "And altho' the purpose of Plato in *the Laws*, is to create such a polity as shall have more affinity to

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[1] See below Essay II. (§ 2) on The Republic.

[2] II. 5. 23–24.

[3] See below Essay I., § 38, on The Republic. See also § 36 of the same Essay on the selection of rulers.

existing states, he gradually brings it round again to the ideal polity *described in the Republic.* For with the exception of community of women and property, everything is the same in both states; the education is to be the same; and the citizens in each are to be free from servile or mechanical occupations and there are to be common meals. The only difference is that in the Laws the common meals are extended to the women as well as men, and the warriors number five thousand instead of one thousand."[1]

There has been much discussion respecting the relation of the Laws of Plato to the Republic of Plato. The modern traditional view tends to an exaggerated estimate of the differences between them. Professor Jowett finds fault with Aristotle's observation that in Plato's discussion of polity there is a gradual return to the polity of the republic, because there is in both the same education, the same abstention from menial labor, the same common meals. Such an account of the reasons for the conclusion that the two are after all much alike, is, of course, very meagre; but the conclusion will be born out, or at any rate it will be found to have reasonable grounds, by any one who takes the pains to examine both, not by a single reading or cursory examination, but by securing through patient and painstaking study, familiarity with the detail and spirit of each.

Some have even pretended, Oncken, for example, that the copy of the Laws of Plato, known to Aristotle, must have been different from the treatise now extant under that name, as if the differences in the arts of interpretation and controversy in that day and our day were not sufficient to account readily enough for such discrepancies as we find.

The Laws, as it is well known, are a later composition than the Republic, and not as finished in style and not as definite in conception of plan and execution. They are nevertheless a monumental contribution to formal thought in the philosophy of law.

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[1] II. 6. 4–5.

As commonly received, the Laws are divided into twelve books, of which the first four constitute the introduction or preamble in which the aims of the state are discussed, pleasure and pain, education, peace and war, and the ideal polity or constitution. Education, the subject of the second book, is first taken up in a general way and later elaborated in the seventh book. Polity, or constitutional law, is discussed at the end of Book IV., and in Book V. and Book XII. The remaining portions of the introduction are chiefly concerned with the aims of life and the nature of virtue and of happiness. Peace, we are told, and not war, is the true end of the law.

Joined with some discussion of polity in Book V. there is the higher preamble on the duties of man; ethics and politics are inseparably blended in the first five books of the Laws, and not sharply differentiated in the books that follow. Parts of Book VI., Books VII. and VIII., are taken up with administrative laws, laws concerning appointment of magistrates, territorial subdivisions of the state, courts of law, public schools, public festivals, and the like. Books IX. and X. deal with criminal law. Book IX. defines crimes, sacrilege, conspiracy, treason, theft, and murder. Book X. is on misdemeanors, acts of violence, and the theory of punishment. Parts of Book VI. and Book XI. deal with private law—the law of family relations and the law of property. Finally, in the twelfth and last book, constitutional law, political theory, foreign relations, internal administration, psychology and theology, criminal law, and private law, all blend with one another in kaleidoscopic variety.

With this modern sketch of the content of the Laws before us *we may now notice* Aristotle's criticisms of the Laws, and we may be prepared to find that these criticisms give but a faint suggestion of the real nature and scope of Plato's treatise, as we know it today. We have already noticed Aristotle's comparison of the Laws and the Republic.

First, Aristotle objects to the contemplated size of the city-state of the Laws, apologetically saying that a genius cannot always be equally strong on all points. Time has shown

Aristotle to have been even more in the wrong than Plato himself, respecting the possible size of cities or city-states. Aristotle protested that cities with a full citizenship of five thousand, was an impossible number on account of the enormous extent of territory which would be required to support five thousand citizens in idleness, and with them a host of women and attendants many times as numerous as themselves.

It seems difficult to reconcile this objection with what Aristotle must himself have known concerning the population of his own city. At the time of his writing the citizens of Athens numbered very considerably above five thousand. He must have considered Athens too large for a permanent existence on the basis of her territory.[1]

His second charge is that Plato omits the consideration of foreign relations; this is a subject constantly present to the thought of Aristotle, but is not very fully or satisfactorily treated by either Aristotle or Plato. But Plato, like Aristotle, has allusions to international relations, international communications and agreements.

The third criticism relates to the maximum amount of property, which citizens may hold. Plato provides that "the amount of property should be 'large enough for living temperately' which is like saying 'large enough for living well.' The definition is too vague, not to say that a person may 'live temperately, when he is living penuriously.' A better definition would be 'temperately and liberally;" [2] for, if the two are separated, liberality of life may be compatible with luxury and temperance with hardship. *The reason for naming liberality and temperance*, is that these are the only moral habits which have to do with the use of property." [3] The fourth criticism is connected with the preceding, and urges that Plato should

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[1] On the authority of Xenophon, Memorabilia, III. 6. 14, Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, Poste's translation, 2d Ed., p. 42. f, and other sources, the total population of Athens in the time of Aristotle is estimated at over half a million—30,000 freemen (including metoikoi), 110,000 women and children, 400,000 slaves, making a total of 540,000.

[2] II. 6. 8–9; Welldon, p. 58.

[3] The Laws of Plato, V. 740; Jowett's Dialogues of Plato, V. 5, p. 122.

have discussed the ways and means for the regulation of population. In our extant copies of the Laws, we have such a discussion, altho' very brief in Book V., where he provides that the number of houses shall always be the same, inheritance passing to one child only, and that all houses shall have owners and heirs through adoption in case of the failure of natural heirs, marriage laws are to be framed with the same end in view, if beyond this there shall be need of devices, the matter shall be referred to the magistrates with power, and as a last resort "there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony." [1] Aristotle cites Pheidon the Corinthian, as one of the most ancient legislators who gave attention to this subject, and promises to give his own views later; this he does very imperfectly in the seventh book of the Politics.[2]

A fifth objection is made that Plato does not distinguish rulers and subjects; "he only says that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools."[3] Again Aristotle does not see why property in land should be rigorously limited, while property in other forms of wealth may be permitted to increase even five times the amount of the value of the lot *i. e.* of the property in land. And lastly he objects to Plato's assignment of two homesteads, one for the city and one for the country, as inexpedient and against the interests of domestic economy; but it is not at all clear that Plato has in mind anything differing from the plan which Aristotle himself recommends in the tenth chapter of the seventh book of The Politics, where he says: "Of the private land, half should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that each citizen having two lots, they may all of them have land in both places. There is justice and fairness in such a division."[4]

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[1] The Laws of Plato, V. 740.

[2] See below § 3 of Essay V.

[3] Laws V. 739A., and Statesman, 309A; Jowett's Dialogues V. 5, p. 117, and V. 4, p. 515 respectively.

[4] The Politics, II., 10, 11.

The passage in the Laws above noted, in which Plato sets a limit to wealth is worth quoting; it has a surprising likeness to some original suggestions which we often hear in our day as the most suitable method of curing the ills of society: "Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth [as if the whole matter were perfectly simple and could readily be disposed of by the legislator]. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. [Something like this in principle has been accepted as a valid basis of legislation in our homestead exemption laws]. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this. [Aristotle has it five times; in fixing a maximum amount of property which may be held by any one individual we do not follow Plato in our modern legislation]. But, if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune, that which is in excess of this measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys thus our law, any one who likes may inform against him, and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to half the value of the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy and quite simple." (Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, V. 5, p. 127).

§ 7. *Criticism of the Polity of the Laws; Politics Classified.* "As a whole the constitution *of the Laws*, purports to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but it tends to be an intermediate form which is usually called a polity, as the citi-

zens are all who serve as heavy armed soldiers."[1] Something like this, or the suggestion of it, occurs in the sixth book of the Laws (757; Jowett V. 5, p. 137), but Plato nowhere says distinctly that the best state is composed of democracy and tyranny.

Aristotle praises the Lacedæmonian constitution as superior to the constitution of the Laws, and advances the opinion that the larger the number of polities blended into one, the better will be the polity so composed. "Further it is evident that there is no monarchical element at all in the polity of the Laws, but only oligarchical and democratical elements." The method of electing officers reveals this fact, and shows the strong leaning of the polity of the Laws towards oligarchy. Aristotle objects specifically to the manner of electing the council as proposed in the Laws, and to the method of electing the general officers of state. In the former the voters are classified according to wealth, in the latter they are elected by a commission previously elected for that purpose. The wealthier classes only are compelled to vote. It is interesting to note the devise of indirect popular election through a commission created for that purpose. We have here a question similar in kind for example to the question whether our United States senators should be elected by a direct popular vote or through the legislative assemblies of the states, or whether the president of the United States should be elected by direct vote or through an electoral college. Of course the parallel fails when we compare the size of a great modern state and the ancient city-state. Aristotle believed that the election of officers "by suffrage from a body previously elected in the same manner is a dangerous feature *of the polity described in the Laws*, as even a comparatively small knot of people, if they choose to combine, will always be able to control the election."[2]

Plato as well as Aristotle was perfectly familiar with the still

[1] II. 6. 16.
[2] II. 6. 22.

common current classification of polities, as monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, but neither in the Republic nor in the Laws does he treat the question of forms of polity didactically. But in the Statesman (291; Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, V. 4, p. 493) Plato does speak didactically of these forms of government or polity. "These three [after having named them] expand into five, producing out of themselves two other names * * * There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny. * * * And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and oligarchy. * * * Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name." The only advance Aristotle makes on Plato is in his clearer analysis of the true and the perverted form of democracy.

The truth is, the views of Aristotle and Plato respecting the kinds or degrees of government, are not as divergent as Aristotle seems to be constantly making it appear that they are. In the very opening chapters of The Politics attention is called to this opposition of views. But Aristotle really agreed with Plato, or accepted essentially the same view on more than one point on which he apparently believed himself to differ from Plato. It might have been a surprise to himself, if he could have seen how near he approached to some of the very conceptions upon which he was making war. [1]

§ 8. *Criticism of the Polity of Phaleas.* The polity proposed by Phaleas, lays chief stress upon a right system of property, Phaleas holding that questions of property are the occasion of all civil disturbance. He advocated accordingly equality of property. This he allowed in old states was no

[1] Cp. Jowett, The Politics Vol. I. p. xix.

longer attainable; but he believed that by a carefully planned system of dowries it would be possible to restore a tendency to equilibrium and equality in the possession of property; dowries were to be given, but not received, by the rich, and to be received and not given by the poor. We are not told at what point the line is to be drawn between the rich and the poor!

Plato, he admits, has been the most original and fertile genius among those who have proposed politics, but he begins with a criticism against Phaleas on a defect which he shared with Plato, namely, a failure to reckon with the problem of population, the tendency for population to outgrow the growth of property. Aristotle insisted on the positive connection of of problems of property and problems of population. A consideration of laws to regulate property implied also a consideration of the laws for regulating population. Solon is quoted as favoring a limitation of private property; and the example of those states which forbid the acquisition and sale of property at pleasure, is endorsed.

Not only should property be equal; it should also be limited in amount. Nor will it be sufficient to fix this limit in general terms such as a moderate amount. As a remedy mere equalization of property is defective: (1) because it does not reach the desires of men—men's desires need to be levelled as much as their properties, or even more, and this is impossible except by the right education; (2) it does not equalize the distribution of honors—it is the cravings for honor, the ambitions of life that tempt to the gravest crimes; and (3) it does not dispense with labor; the craving for pleasure without pain has two sides, lust and indolence.

The true remedies for these evils are moral remedies: for want, moderate possessions and occupation; for false love of honor, ambition; and for unsafe love of pleasure, philosophy. Aristotle thus expresses the feeling which is familiar to us in modern times "that want of morality, which is, in fact, weakness, lies at the root of corruption in a state." Men are always

crying out give, give, and are for dividing and subdividing the property of the rich. "But

> 'How small of all that human hearts endure
> That part, which laws or kings can cause or cure.'

This is the spirit which Aristotle here expresses, tho' an opposite thesis might well be maintained with equal truth. For the miseries which arise from bad, and the blessings of good government, in which the blessings of peace are generally included, can hardly be exaggerated." [1]

Phaleas is also criticised for omitting the treatment of foreign relations; and for aiming to equalize property in land only; and Aristotle imagines that he must be legislating for a small city, as he assumes that all artisans are public slaves. "From these observations," Aristotle concludes, "any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his proposed polity."[2] We must take Aristotle's criticisms of Phaleas as they are given, for we can not counter-check them by an examination of his works as in the case of Plato, for these are no longer extant.

§ 9. *The Polity of Hippodamus.* "Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the Piræus, a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; and yet he dressed himself in the same cheap, warm garment both in winter and summer."[3]

The leading features of his system prove him no less a remarkable man than this sketch suggests. The great features of his system were: (1) A threefold division of citizens, artisans, husbandmen, and soldiers; of land—sacred, public, and private, for the support, respectively, of the worship, the soldiers, and the rest of the population; of Laws—insult, injury,

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1 Jowett, Introduction to The Politics, p. XI.

2 II. 7.

3 II. 8. 1.

and homicide. (2) He instituted a court of appeal, consisting of chosen elders. (3) He favored a qualified verdict to be written on a tablet, to replace the simple yes or no verdict signified by use of the pebble, in order that a juror might not be compelled to perjure himself, when he partly condemned and partly acquitted. (4) He advocated rewards for political informers and inventions—"he proposed a law to confer honor on any one who had made a discovery beneficial to the state." (5) He advocated support of soldiers' orphans at the public expense—a fact from which we may infer that no such custom had as yet been legally instituted in other countries, although at the present time this law exists both at Athens and in other countries as well." (6) Popular election of magistrates to guard the interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans.

Of these points Aristotle criticises the threefold division of citizens, the qualified verdict, and the rewarding of discoveries beneficial to the state. To the first of these three he replies that artisans and husbandmen can have no full right to citizenship. The city-state of Hippodamus was to have ten thousand citizens. The argument of Aristotle in reply to the proposal for a qualified verdict is strong and simple: it is that it would turn the juror into an arbitrator. The question before the juror is not *e. g.* whether the accused owes twenty minæ, more or less, but whether he owes twenty minæ. The simple verdict of yes or no must be maintained in order to compel the exact specification of the charge.

On the question of encouragement for political informers or inventors, Aristotle goes off into a digression concerning the question whether laws should be changed. The analogy of the arts is misleading. In the arts improvements are always in order. But improvements in the laws must not be lightly undertaken, for our laws rest on use, and frequent change would impair their force. But there must sometimes be changes, else there could be no progress from barbarism. The remains of the ancient laws, which have come down to us, he admits, are quite absurd. The question whether the

laws ought ever to be changed, and, if so, how, and by whom, Aristotle promises to take up at a later time, but the promise is nowhere very well fulfilled; but he does not leave it in this place, without some wise and strong words. "Great caution," he says, "would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of law-givers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain so much by the change as he will lose."

From this digression we may return to note that Hippodamus was undoubtedly a strong and original thinker on questions of polity. This ends our review of literary constitutions.

§ 10. *On the Study of Existing Polities.* From the study of literary constitutions, Aristotle passes to a study of historical constitutions. To the Greeks themselves, in the age of Aristotle and Plato, the constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Athens, were favorite examples upon which to draw for illustrations of Greek polity. These are the three constitutions brought forward as types of polity in the Laws of Plato, and we know they were also carefully and admiringly studied by Aristotle. In antiquity Aristotle was credited with having made an elaborate collection of existing constitutions in his time or known to his time. One of his most extensive constitutional studies was the constitution of Athens itself, a study which, after it had been given up for many years as lost, was unexpectedly recovered about a decade since. We are surprised to find almost no special mention of the constitution of Athens in the brief sketch of the existing constitutions found in the latterpart of the second book of The Politics. The constitution of Sparta is most elaborately reviewed, followed by a briefer notice of the constitution of Crete and of Carthage.

Two questions must be asked in examining polities: (1) Whether a particular polity is good or bad when compared with the best polity? (2) Whether it is consistent with its own end or purpose? In the sketches which follow there is apparently no formal effort to apply these tests.

§ 11. *Criticism of the Constitution of Sparta.* "In every good polity the citizens must have leisure; they should be relieved from all anxiety about the bare necessaries of life. But there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure should be obtained." [1] The natural suggestion is that there should be a large subject population. And this brings us to the first weakness of the Lacædemonian constitution. The Helots have been a constant source of trouble to the Spartans, and it is evident that the Spartans have not hit upon the best system of governing subject races.

A second criticism upon Spartan institutions is the excessive freedom accorded to women. Aristotle intimates that the women ruled the men to such an extent that they were the practical rulers of the Spartan state itself. A third criticism is on the excessive concentration of property, and the absence of marriage laws by which dowries should be controlled in the interest of a fairer and more general distribution of wealth; neither are the laws designed to restrict and regulate the increase of population satisfactory.

A fourth defect is found in the ephoralty. The ephors are not carefully chosen and have too much power; they should be subordinated to written laws. Under existing circumstances their irresponsibility tends to their corruption. Fifthly, the council of elders is unwisely constituted. The elders are irresponsible, therefore corrupt; and the manner of their election is a foolish one—they are permitted to seek office, whereas the office should seek the man. The Spartan constitution overstimulates ambition. Sixthly, the kingship being double, leads to quarrels; the kings should be selected in a different manner and the distrust discouraged by suitable changes in the laws. Seventhly, the Spartan common meals are not well regulated, they are too expensive; eighthly, the admiralty is in effect a third kingship and only adds to the causes of dissension.

A ninth criticism is that the Spartan polity rests on a defec-

[1] II. 9. 1.

tive ethical basis. The Lecædemonians have organized too exclusively for war, as even Plato pointed out in his Laws. They regard virtue as a means, whereas it should be an end —"altho' they truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them." [1]

"Once more: The revenues of the state are illmanaged; there is no money in the treasury, altho' they are obliged to carry on great wars, they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another's contributions. The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy!"

§ 12. *The Cretan Constitution.* It is in some points quite as good as the Spartan, but for the most part it is less perfect. It is older, and said to be the constitution from which the Spartan is derived. Unlike Sparta, Crete has had little difficulty with her subject classes; this is due to her favorable situation. Her geographical position marks her out as the ruling state among the Greeks "The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas."[2]

The common meals of Crete are better managed than those of Sparta; they are not as expensive, and are supported out of a general fund. "Of all the fruits of the earth, of the cattle, of the public revenues, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods, and to the service of the state, and another to the common meals." * * * The heedless increase of population is discouraged.

The Cosmi of Crete, corresponding to the Ephors of Sparta, have many of the faults of the latter, some even worse; and they are unwisely elected out of certain families only. Likewise are the irresponsibility and life-tenure of the elders disapproved; "their arbitrary power of acting upon their own

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[1] II. 9. 35.
[2] II. 10. 3.

judgment, and dispensing with written law is dangerous." The Cretans lack all legal means for reforming abuses; consequently they are much given to riot and revolution. But the Cretans are protected from the natural results of their political weakness, by their insular position. The weakness of their constitution has not been tested by foreign invasion.

§ 13. *On the Carthaginian Constitution.* "The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, which differs from that of any other state in several important respects, tho' it is in some very like the Lacedæmonian * * * the Carthaginians have never had a rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant."[1]

The Carthaginians have their kings and their council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of the Spartans. They have common tables also. Their kings and elders may at their option refer certain matters "before the people to be not only heard, but to be determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose." There is thus a democratic element in this constitution, but upon the whole it leans strongly to oligarchy; in all elections to office there is attention to merit, but there seems to be even more attention conceded to wealth —they say: "A man who is poor can not rule well, he has not the leisure."

The Carthaginians suffer from two very grave abuses: (1) The sale of offices which prevails among them; and (2) pluralism, or the habit of allowing one man to hold several or indeed many offices.

Emigration is common in the Carthaginian state; they establish colonies. This is something of a safeguard against revolutions. "It is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state." They are without legal means of effecting reforms in the state, and yet in every well-ordered state there should be some provision for legal methods of reform.[2]

[1] II. 11. 1–2.
[2] Cp. II. 11. 15–16.

§ 14. *The Athenian Constitution.* The Athenian constitution is not mentioned by name, by the side of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage. But there is a sketch of it, nevertheless, centering chiefly about the legislation of Solon. Solon is defended against Ephialtes and Pericles, who are set down as demagogues. Solon is praised for reforming the constitution. He put an end to the absolute oligarchy, delivered the commons from a state of servitude, and established a democracy by a wise admixture of oligarchy in the supreme court of Areopagus, aristocracy in the elective offices of state, and democracy in the common law courts. In giving supreme power to the common law courts, which were elected by lot, Solon prepared the way for the destruction of all non-democratical elements in the constitution.

"When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people who were now playing the tyrant, the constitution was changed into the existing democracy. It was Ephialtes and Pericles who curtailed the power of the Areopagus; they also instituted the payment of juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy, until it became what we now see. All this is true; it seems, however, to be a result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian war, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues. Solon, himself, appears to have given the Athenians only the power of electing offices, and calling them to account; but this was absolutely necessary, for without it, they would have been in slavery and at enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and men of wealth, that is, from the pentacosiomedimni, or from the class called Zeugitæ (because they kept a yoke of oxen) or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers, who had no share in magistracy," [1]

[1] II. 12. 2-6. The reader who wishes to consult Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens in the treatise recently discovered, alluded to above in § 10, is referred to Poste's Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens, translated and annotated. London, Macmillan. 1892.

In his Constitution of Athens, the separate treatise already noticed, Aristotle enters in detail upon a description of the Athenian constitution as it stood in his own time. This description is preceded by a sketch of the history of Athenian constitution from its very beginning.

§ 15. *On the Distinction Between Polity and Code; Great Legislators.* The distinction between code and polity is recognized by Aristotle, but it is not elaborated by him in any place. Lycurgus and Solon, we are told, were the authors both of a code and of a polity. Two classes of writers are recognized; those who deal with polities only, and those who make laws as well. A polity to Aristotle meant a form of government while a law, or the laws, meant that system or plan by which the standard of conduct was prescribed for the citizens of a city. There was a considerable body of laws of a sumptuary character in the Greek cities.

The principles of Greek legislation were not comparable in logic and clearness to those which controlled, for example, the development of the Roman law, or of the English common law. The Greek genius coped much more successfully with the philosophy of public law than with the detail or spirit of private law.

The second book of The Politics closed with a cursory and rambling mention of political writers and legislators. Lycurgus and Solon, of course, receive great praise as writers of code and of polity. Among others, Zaleucus, Charondas, Onomacritus and Thales, as well as Philolaus, Draco, Pittacus and Androdamus are mentioned. Some of these, Draco and Pittacus, for example, were legislators only. Philolaus gave laws to the Thebans.

Our survey of polities, whether actually realized or merely proposed by certain thinkers, may now be regarded as complete. We will next take up the theory of polity.

III.

THE THEORY OF POLITY.

§ 1. *On the Distinction between State and Government.* The distinction implied in the contrast between state and government, is really the distinction between the state and the form of the government of the state, that is, its constitution. The state includes the entire social population and the territory which it occupies, whereas its constitution is only a certain arrangement of that social population with respect to the aggregate and individual relations of its parts.

In the opening chapter of the third book of The Politics Aristotle has consciously before him this distinction between the state and the government. "If we wish to examine polities (πολιτεία), that is, the forms of government, and see to what class each particular case belongs, and what character it possesses, perhaps our first step should be to consider the state (ἡ πόλις) and see what sort of thing after all the state is. For at the present moment different people take different views, some saying it is the state that has done such and such a thing, others saying no, not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant has done it. Now the whole business of the statesman (πολιτικός) and legislator (νομοθέτος) is, we see, concerned with the state *i. e.* the polis; whereas the constitution, the polity, is a particular arrangement or organization of those who inhabit [a given territory, and all the appurtenances thereto appertaining under conditions of civilization]." [1]

Tho' we may not say that Aristotle had vividly before him the distinctions between state and government made in modern

[1] III. 1. 1. Compare Book VII.

scientific discussion, it can not be ignored, and it deserves the thoughtful attention of those modern students of political philosophy who are disposed to make of the state a mere concept of the mind, a figment of the imagination, a mere abstraction, that in the third and seventh books of The Politics respectively, Aristotle places the concept of government and the concept of the state in conscious juxtaposition, with unexcelled sanity and fairness.

In the third book Aristotle discusses the ideal polity, in the seventh the ideal polis (city-state.) In the discussion of the ideal polity (constitution) he asks who should have a share in the government and how should the government be organized, and to what purpose? In the seventh book (the common order followed by Jowett, the fourth—Bekker's order, followed by Welldon) he inquires into the nature of the state, as that lies back of the constitution, he enquires into the conditions of the state and investigates problems of soil, climate, population, situation, and a host of problems, which certain moderns rule out of political science, because, forsooth, the subject of their inquiry is not the state but the government.

The importance of the distinction—here insisted upon, is gaining in recognition. One recent writer [1] on the nature of the state, professes to be dealing with problems that lie outside the sphere of government, and says in so many words that the great writers on politics hitherto most quoted, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Sidgwick, will need comparatively scant mention. In fairness, particularly to Aristotle and Montesquieu, it may be said that they have been most quoted on matters relating to polity and administration, because these are the aspects of politics that modern students have most studied and written about, not because these are the only branches of political science considered by them.

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[1] W. W. Willoughby, An Examination of the Nature of the State. New York. Macmillan. 1896. In the view of this writer, the scope of political science is wider than the scope of his particular treatise to which he assigns the sub-title: A Study in Political Philosophy.

§ 2. *The Definition of a Citizen.* The state is a composite body, and in seeking for the elements of which it is composed we must seek for a definition of the citizen (ὁ πολίτης). In the second chapter of Book I. we were told that the constituent elements of the state are the principles of private property and the family relation; and again that the parts which make up the state are the family and the village. Now we are told here in the first chapter of Book III. that the citizens are the parts (μορία) of the state. The analysis of the state we observe proceeds from different points of view, and there is, perhaps, no special conflict in the several conclusions. We may note simply that the same Greek word μόριον is used in several different senses. "Now the state is an aggregate of citizens (ἡ γάρ πολις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος ἐστιν). But the meaning of the word citizen is often disputed. All do not agree in calling the same person a citizen; one who is a citizen in a democracy would often not be one in an oligarchy." [1]

A citizen is one who shares in office, and office is definite and indefinite, that is, a citizen is one who shares in the administration (ἀρχή) either directly or indirectly. But Aristotle does not come to this conclusion without minute examination of a possible number of definitions. He first defines the citizen negatively, then positively, and then again in a popular way; and we shall get both a notion of his method and of the immense importance which he attaches to the conception of citizenship if we follow him somewhat minutely in the course of his analysis and argument.

And first what does *not* make a citizen? The citizen is not such in virtue of his residence in a particular place, for aliens also, and slaves, have the qualification of residence; nor again, are those persons citizens who have the benefit of law just so far as to be defendants or plaintiffs in a suit; for this right belongs also to those who are associated by commercial treaties; and these privileges belong also to aliens. In many cases, however, the aliens do not possess even these in a full sense, but find a patron to appear for them."[2] That is, neither

[1] III. 1. 2.
[2] III. 1. 3–4.

residence nor civil (legal) rights, constitute a sufficient basis for citizenship, and those possessing these qualifications, "do but imperfectly participate in citizenship and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children, who are too young to be on the Register (*i. e.* under eighteen) or to old men who are superannuated (*i. e.* past the age of sixty) * * * in a similar way difficulties may be raised and explained in regard to persons who have lost their citizenship, by exile, or otherwise." [1]

What then does make a citizen? "The citizen in the full sense is defined by nothing so well as by the fact that he shares in the administration of justice and in office. Now of offices, some are definite in point of time, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval, and others are indefinite without a limit of time, as the office of dicast (juryman and judge in one) or ecclesiast (member of the assembly of citizens). Perhaps it might be said that this latter class are not officials (ἄρχοντες) at all, and have no share of office; but it is absurd to say that those who are most powerful have no share of office, *i. e.* no share in the administration of the government. But all this discussion turns merely on a name; what we want is a common term for dicast and ecclesiast; as this common term does not exist, we must use a descriptive; therefore, for distinction sake we will say indefinite office, and consider those citizens who thus share in the government. [2]

A modern version of the Aristotelian test of citizenship would be that those who have the right of suffrage and can sit on juries are citizens. Aristotle concedes that the man with this qualification will be most truly a citizen in a democracy (III. 1. 10); and he intimates that he is attempting to satisfy the conditions about him by seeking a definition that will apply to all who are now called citizens (cp. III. 1. 8). But he urges that general terms having different meanings in them, have often nothing, or scarcely anything in common.

[1] III. 1. 5.

[2] III. 1. 6-7.

The conditions of citizenship vary, it is true, with the forms of the constitution. For in some forms of constitution the demos is not recognized at all, nor a regular assembly, but only extraordinary or called assemblies are recognized and justice is administered by special boards. In such polities the holders of definite office only may be called citizens. But it will still be true that "we call the man who has a right to take his part in the office of counsellor, or judge a citizen of that city wherein he has such right; and an aggregate of such, sufficient for the purposes, of life, is roughly speaking, a city;" [1] but they are not strictly speaking the city, *i. e.* the state; they are only, so to speak, the city or the state, they are the city or the state *par excellence;* they are the city exactly, and only, in the sense in which Louis XIV. thought of himself as the state in his famous l'etat c'est moi.

§ 3. *The Ultimate Basis of Citizenship.* The current popular opinion, Aristotle observes, regards parentage as the basis of citizenship. This is a practical conclusion, but its accuracy can easily be disputed by asking: How did the citizen-ancestors, say the third or fourth generation, or however far back we may have to go, how did they become citizens? This will have to be answered by our more accurate definition—if these ancestors were members of a given polity, constituent and self-directing parts of a constitution in the sense of our definition, namely, that they were eligible to office in the administration of the government, they were citizens (III. 2. 3.)

An interesting question arises with regard to the real basis of citizenship in the case of those who become citizens after a revolution. Are citizens *de facto* likewise citizens *de jure*? The doubt is not who is, but whether he is, of right, a citizen. Aristotle does not rise to the discussion of the right of revolution. So far as he has a theory of revolution, it is merely an analysis of facts, a history and perhaps a criticism of adminis-

[1] III. 1. 12.

tration; he rather assumes the permanence of once adopted forms of government as a fundamental good, without very special reference to the character of such forms of government, altho' something of a preference for a well regulated democracy may always be detected in his analysis of polities.

Aristotle saw clearly that we must reckon with resolutions as with facts; for the question of legality or illegality applies to the highest offices; and the whole matter connects itself with the difficulty which was mentioned at the beginning of this book, the difficulty of determining when an act is the act of the state, and when it is the act of the government merely, of the oligarchy or of the despot in power, and this next receives attention.

§ 4. *On the Identity of States.* The question which Aristotle puts to himself, is whether the identity of states depends upon the continuous identity of their form of government or constitution, and he seems disposed to answer this question affirmativety, but with a feeling that the answer is unsatisfactory.

On the occasion of a transition, for example, from a monarchy or tyranny to a democracy, there is a disposition to refuse to fulfill contracts for the state on the ground that they were entered upon, not by the state, but by the despot or oligarchy, or on the ground that the prior form of constitution rested upon mere force and not on the common good. The same may, of course, also be said of some forms of democracy.

By what rule then are we to call the state the same or different? The most obvious view is to consider the place and population (ἄνθρωποι) as the basis of identity, but the population may be separated from their present place and remove to different places. In such case the population would be the determining factor in settling the question of identity. But even if the population remain in the same place, the question of identity remains. Shall we say the state is the same, when a certain population is occupying a certain territory, enclosed by a wall? This answer would be hardly satisfactory for the whole

of the Peloponnesus might be inclosed by a wall, even as Babylon was walled. Now such an enclosure would embrace a race (ἔθνος) rather than a state (πόλις). Therefore neither place alone, nor population alone, can be the criterion of identity. [1]

Assuming that the population is the same and that the site is the same, shall we say the city-state is the same, notwithstanding that some are dying at every moment and others coming into life, as we speak of rivers and fountains as the same, altho' the waters thereof are continually changing. This would present no difficulty.

It would seem that the essential characteristic of the state is that it is a certain association, and that it is an association of citizens on the basis of certain relations which constitute a polity. And when this relation or association of citizens becomes distinctly other than it is, that is, when its constitution or society changes, it also changes, becomes other than it was —"just as a tragic chorus differs from a comic chorus, altho' the members of both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements when the form of their composition alters. * * * And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution." [2]

Modern international law insists upon a different criterion of identity. Aristotle's own distinction between the state and the government of the state, should have led him to a different view without embarrassment. In one respect he declined to follow the conclusion of his own reasoning, for notwithstanding that he affirms that the continuation of the established polity is the test of identity, he holds it to be "quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements, when the form of government changes." In modern international law much weight is given the two obvious characteristics mentioned above, namely identity of place and identity of population, to which we commonly add that

[1] Cp. III. 3. 1—6.
[2] III. 3. 7–9.

the population shall possess some form of government and a definite body of laws; and each independent population-group is held to unquestioned responsibility for all the acts of its agents, *i. e.*, for the acts of its government.

§ 5. *The Relation of Politics to Ethics.* What are the principles of political obligation? This is the way in which a great teacher [1] of our time has formulated Aristotle's next question. "Is the virtue of a good citizen and a good man the same?" First, we must determine what constitutes the virtue or excellence of the citizen. Now each citizen ought to have certain excellence as a man, but all citizens, although individually dissimilar, must have this in common, that they devote themselves to the good of the community. Now their community (κοινωνία) is their polity (πολιτεία). The virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the polity or constitution of the state, of which he is a citizen. Since then there are several forms of constitution, it is impossible that there should be one complete excellence to mark the good citizen.

But a good citizen will not necessarily possess all the virtues of a good man. The virtue of a good man is an end in itself, whereas, the end of the virtue of a good citizen is the good of the constitution. Had Aristotle been able to rise to the higher conception of the state itself as the end of the virtue of the citizen, he might have recognized a wider coincidence in the virtue of the citizen and a good man. To this higher conception he rises, when he contemplates the virtue of the ruler. In the good ruler, he says, the virtue of the good man and of the good citizen do coincide; we can speak of the good ruler (ἄρχοντος) *i. e.* the good administrator, and of the statesman (πολιτικός) *i. e.* of the maker of constitutions and the authority on questions of public policy, as morally good and practically wise.

The reason for supposing that there is coincidence of virtue

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[1] Thomas Hill Green, works, vol. 3, pp. 307–553; also published separately under the title, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, London, Longmans, 1895.

in the latter case, tho' not in the former, seems to be that public men in the latter situation have a complete sphere of free action in the light of their best reason, whereas, the ordinary citizen has no such prerogative, inasmuch as his simple duty is one of obedience. But praise is given both for the capacity of ruling and of being ruled. Each of these virtues must be exercised in turn in the relatively best polity, because, as an old proverb has it, he who would command must first learn to obey. That form of polity, therefore, in which the citizens are in turn rulers and being ruled, is the best calculated to bring the virtue of the citizen into coincidence also with the virtue of the good man.[1]

§ 6. *On the Distinction between Citizen and Subject; the Position of the Mechanic.* In the fifth chapter of the third book we have a striking picture of the Greek view of the several social classes in respect to their capacity for citizenship. It is in sharp contrast to our modern view, and is in substance as follows: Is it strictly true that he alone is a citizen who can take part in the administration of the government, or must we admit artisans as citizens? If so, we must change our definition of citizen as one who shares in office as definite and indefinite, because artisans would have no leisure, no time to take office.

But, if the mechanic can not be admitted to office, that is, to citizenship, what place has he in the state? He is neither a resident alien, nor a foreigner. But this presents no real difficulty, for neither slaves nor freedmen belong to either of these classes, and yet they are not citizens. We cannot regard all who are indispensable to the existence of the state as citizens.

"In ancient days the mechanic population in many states was composed of slaves and foreigners, a large portion of mechanics still belong to these classes." There are, however, some forms of polity, into which mechanics are admitted; in ex-

[1] Cp. III. 4.

treme democracies even some of the poorer mechanics and hired laborers have been admitted to citizenship, while in oligarchies only the wealthy could qualify, for "artisans are sometimes persons of great wealth.[1] There was a law in Thebes that no one should be eligible to office who had not abstained for ten years from business in the market."

It is towards the end of chapter five in the third book that we have one of those interesting hints that the Greeks counted descent through the mother in primitive times, and that traces of metronymic kinship persisted; "any one whose mother was a citizen is a citizen in some democracies."

A dearth of population at times results in extraordinary rules for admission to citizenship.

§ 7. *On the Definition of a Polity* (*Constitution*). "A constitution," says Aristotle, "is the arrangement in a state of all the offices of administration, and especially of that office which is sovereign over all, namely the office of government; for the government (*πολίτευμα*) is everywhere sovereign in the state, the government is par excellence the constitution." Aristotle is here struggling for exact definition and distinctions. He uses five important words: *πολίς*, *πολιτεία*, *κύριον*, *πολίτευμα*, and *ἀρχή*. They may be translated respectively: state, constitution, government, and administration; of course, it would be practically impossible to give these English equivalents with anything like uniformity and unvarying regularity in translating the text of The Politics into English, for these Greek words themselves are not by any means always used in the same sense. It is, however, noteworthy that there is in Aristotle's Politics a really wide and fairly exact terminology.

Now the first problem in the framing of an ideal polity, or in the analysis of an existing one, is to determine the location of

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[1] Kleophon, the musical instrument maker, is mentioned by Aristotle, Constitution of Athens (Poste's Transl. 2d ed., p. 50) as a one time autocrat of Athens. "He was the first to present the populace with two obols a day for a seat at the theatre."

legal sovereignty, and it is by this criterion that we classify the various forms of polity. To determine the location of sovereignty in the state after the manner of Aristotle is not the whole of the constitution, it is only its principal part. The offices of administration may also be more or less distinctly established; but it is possible to leave the subordinate offices of administration in a large measure to the creation of a definitely recognized authority, the government par excellence, such as an absolute monarch, a general assembly, or a collective vote of all the adult male population, or a considerable number of such population; that is, sovereignty or lordship within the meaning of Aristotle, may be vested in a definite one, in many, or in few.

Now a form of polity in which lordship is vested in one is a monarchy, if vested in few it is an oligarchy, if vested in many it is a democracy.

There are many kinds of rule (ἀρχή) in a state, but only one lordship or sovereignty (κύριον). Examples of rule aside from that of magistrates in the state, are those we discussed in our first book as parts of oikonomik.

"In the government of a state, when it is based on the principle of equality and similarity of citizens, all claim a right to be in the offices of administration in turn. At first, and naturally, each thinks it right to perform his duty in his turn, and that another should afterwards consider his good, just as he himself when in office considered that person's good. But at the present day, owing to the advantage which arises from public authority and office, men want to be always in office." [1]

§ 8. *The Departments of Polity.* We pass now from the sixth chapter of the third book to the fourteenth chapter of the fourth book in the common order (the sixth in Bekker's order) for Aristotle's description of the departments of polity.

"Every polity comprises three departments, and a good maker of constitutions is bound to consider what is suitable in

[1] III. 6. 9. Bolland and Lang, p. 178.

a polity in each of these three particulars. Now the excellence of a polity depends upon the correctness of organization in these several departments. The first of the three is the deliberative department, which passes on all questions of public policy; the second is the executive department which is concerned with the magistrates and determines what they should be, over whom they should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of electing them; the third is the judicial department which shall have charge of all cases at law."

Of these three the deliberative body is sovereign; to use a modern phrase it exercises legal sovereignty, and according as one, many, or few, take part in it, we have the forms of polity already noted: monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy.

§ 9. *The Classification of Polities.* Returning now to the end of the sixth and to the seventh chapter of the third book, we may examine Aristotle's classification of polities.

The fundamental test of a polity is, that its end should be right, in modern phrase that government should exist for the good of the governed, or as Aristotle so often says, government should be for the common good. By this criterion governments are classified as normal and abnormal.

"Inasmuch as in any given state the polity and the governing class are virtually the same (*i. e.* the polity is determined by the governing class), as the governing class (πολίτευμα) is the supreme authority (κύριον) in the state, and as supreme power must be vested either in an individual or in a Few, or in the Many, it follows that when the rule of the individual or the Few or the Many is exercised for the benefit of the community at large, the polities are normal, whereas the polities, which subserve the private interest either of the individual, the few or the demos (the masses, the many) are perversions."[1]

The normal forms are by preference named (but this use of names is not consistently adhered to throughout The Politics): Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity *par excellence* (Politeia, which we may perhaps best translate Republic); the

[1] III. 7. Welldon, p. 119.

abnormal forms: Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy. This exact classification is more than once abandoned, and monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, accepted as the types of the dominant polities. The latter simple classification is the most satisfactory as a working basis in scientific discussion, and it is the one which has gained a practically universal acceptance. It is readily recognized that each of his forms is susceptible of more minute sub-classification and they are treated in detail by Aristotle in the fourth and sixth books of The Politics (the sixth and seventh in Bekker's order).

"But we must specify at rather greater length what each of these forms of constitution really is. For there are some difficulties; but it is the peculiar duty of those who make a philosophical enquiry in any line, and do not simply look at practical results, not to pass over or omit a single point, but to make the truth clear in each case."[1] In the sketches of the several forms of polity, Aristotle makes himself all sorts of difficulties by showing how in practice the several elements or principles of polity come into apparent contradiction or mixture; and how under certain circumstances it may be difficult to distinguish the varying forms under the commonly received names.

§ 10. *Wealth and Liberty Considered as Principles of Polity; Definitions of Justice.* In order to analyze more exactly the several forms of polity we need to know more exactly the elements of polity, those principles respectively upon which the one, the few, or the many, base their claims to power or supremacy in the state. We have classified polities on the basis of number, but possibly number is only an accidental distinction. Are not poverty and wealth the really distinctive characteristics of democracy and oligarchy? True, but on a closer view we see that there is an almost exact correspondence, if not positive identity, between the two sets of principles, between few and many, on the one hand and poverty and wealth on the other hand, for only

[1] III. 8. 1.

the few are rich, whereas the many are poor, altho free; wealth and liberty are thus the grounds upon which the few and many respectively base their claims to power in the state. [1]

A matter of importance in considering the relation of the several forms of polity to each other is the definition of justice which varies under the different forms of polity.

"Thus oligarchs and democrats, for example, agree in this, that they both adhere to a certain principle of justice; but they do not advance beyond a certain point and put forward a full statement of justice in the proper sense of the word. The democrats hold that justice is equality; and so it is, but not for all the world, but only for equals. The oligarchs hold that inequality is just, as indeed it is, but not for all the world but only for unequals. Both put out of sight one side of the relation, namely, the relation of the other party, and consequently form a wrong judgment * * * we are all poor judges of matters in which we have a personal interest. * * * Thus the oligarchs, if they are superior in a particular point, namely, in wealth, assume themselves to be superior altogether; while the democrats, if they are equal in a particular, point, namely, in liberty or freedom, assume themselves to be equal altogether."[2]

But all definitions of justice given with a view to defending some particular form of polity are likely to omit the capital point; they fail to give proper weight to the true end of the state, which is not merely the protection of property and person, nor is it association for its own sake; but the state, as has been noted,[3] is more than an alliance designed for the protection of life and property. It implies not only intermarriage, division of labor, commercial exchange and industrial cooperation, and a common locality; altho all these are conditions, without which a state cannot exist. But all of them separately do not constitute the true end of the state. "If they are all

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[1] Cp. III. 8.
[2] III. 9. 1—4. Welldon, p. 122—3.
[3] Cp. § 4 above of Essay I.

present, there is not yet on that account a state, but only where there is an association in a higher life for families and aggregations of families to obtain a life perfect and complete in itself." [3] Aristotle seems to insist that a certain stage of civilization and moral purpose is necessary to complete the conception of the state.[4]

§ 11. *The Several Classes; the Theory of Two Polities.* Aristotle concludes the discussion of justice in the ninth chapter of the third book with the remark: "It is clear from what we said, that in the advocacy of the several forms of polity, each party gives a partial, but only a partial, account of justice." It seems expedient at this point in the discussion of polity to pass from the ninth chapter of the third book to the fourth chapter of the fourth book in the common order (the sixth in Bekker's order) to note Aristotle's views of the various elements or classes, which enter into the composition of the state. For it is by securing the proper relative adjustment of these classes with respect to one another, it is by securing an adjustment that will do no violence to the nature and end of any of the several classes, that the end of the perfect state may be realized; and it is only the realization of this end that makes absolute justice possible.

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3 III. 9. 12.

4 In our own time the state is very generally held to be a mere organ of force for the protection of property and life, and "Aristotle's fundamental position that its object is 'noble living' seems to separate his view decisively from ours. * * * * But * * * it is not true that in our own day the state has ceased actively to aim at a positive good. * * * * A state which, in however slight a degree, supports science, art, learning, and religion; which enforces education, and compels the well-to-do to maintain the helpless; which, for the good of the poor and weak, interferes with the 'natural' relation of employer and employed, and regulates, only too laxly, a traffic [the liquor traffic] which joins gigantic evil to its somewhat scanty good; a state which forbids or punishes suicide, self-maiming, the voluntary dissolution of marriage, cruelty to animals, offences against decency, and sexual crimes. * * A state which does all this and much more of the same kind, can not without an unnatural straining of language be denied to exercise in the broad sense, a moral function. It still seeks not merely 'life,' but 'good life.' It is still, within the sphere appropriate to force, a spiritual power,—not only the guardian of the peace and a security for the free pursuit of private ends, but the armed conscience of the community." A. C. Bradley, in Hellenica, Essay on Aristotle's Conception of the State, p. 242–3.

"Every state consists not of one but of many parts. If we were going to speak of the different species of animals, we should first of all determine the organs, which are indispensable to every animal, as for example, some organs of sense and instruments for receiving and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of locomotion, [all this reads like a paragraph from some modern biological sociologist]. Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of organs, but that there are many differences in them—I mean different kinds of mouths and stomachs, and perceptive and locomotive organs—the possible combinations of these differences will necessarily furnish many varieties of animals * * * and when all the combinations are exhausted there will be as many different animals as there are combinations of the necessary organs" [this suggests a large number, but any one who will count the possible forms of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy, enumerated by Aristotle in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth books of The Politics will probably consider that number also large!] "In like manner the forms of government * * * are composed not of one, but of many elements. One element is the food-producing class, who are called husbandmen; a second, the class of mechanics, who practice the arts without which a city cannot exist;—of these arts some are absolutely necessary, others contribute to luxury or to the grace of life. The third class is that of traders, and by traders I mean those who are engaged in buying and selling, whether in commerce or in retail trade. A fourth class is that of the serfs or laborers. The warriors make up the fifth class, and they are as necessary as any of the others, if a country is not to be the slave of every invader." [1]

At this point Aristotle digresses into a criticism of Plato, holding that Plato's minimum of four classes as sketched in

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[1] IV. 4. 9—11. Jowett, v. 1, p. 113—4.

the simplest kind of a state, namely Plato's City of Pigs (for which see below §§ 12—14 of Essay I. on the Republic of Plato) is inadequate, because there is no provision for a military class, the view of Aristotle being that no state worthy of the name can exist without a military class, for otherwise it would be enslaved, and an enslaved state cannot rank as a state; because, in our modern phraseology, independence is an indispensable characteristic of the state.

It may be inferred that Aristotle would consider a minimum of five classes adequate in the rudest form of the state, because he seems to admit that the ruling classes may be selected from these five. But it is very evident that he regards more than five necessary in an advanced state. These first five classes constitute, in the language of Aristotle, the common people, with this reservation that the military class belongs here only in part. The other classes constitute the notables. These are the ruling classes, those who have charge of the state; and hence he enumerates as a sixth class[1] those who conduct the worship of the gods.

"There are also the wealthy who minister to the state with their property," the text proceeds; "these form the seventh class. The eighth class is that of magistrates. There are two others, those who deliberate, *i. e.* members of council or legislative assembly, and those who judge between disputants. In addition to all these another class is needed, a rare class to be sure, but a class nevertheless! If a fair and equitable organization of all these elements is necessary to states, then there must also be persons who have the ability of statesmen *i. e.* persons who can put all these elements together into a harmonious combination."[2]

We come here to Aristotle's fine statement of the theory of two polities, which seems to be presented half in jest, half in

[1] There is a break here in the text and following Welldon, I insert the priest class, who are named in a similar enumeration of classes, chapter eight of Book VII. (Book IV. in the order adopted by Welldon). Jowett reads for the sixth class the judicial and deliberate body, but this seems to me to be in conflict with the text which follows, *i. e.* with IV. 4. 16—17.

[2] IV. 4. 17.

earnest. Adopting substantially the translation of Welldon, we read: "It may be observed that all the functions we have been describing may often be combined in the same individuals. Thus the same persons may constitute the military, agricultural and artisan classes, and also the deliberative and judicial bodies. All classes too claim to possess political ability and consider themselves quite competent to fill most offices. But the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time. And hence it is supposed that these two classes, namely the rich and the poor, are in a pre-eminent sense parts of a state. And further, because the rich are generally few in number and the poor many, they appear to be the really antagonistic classes in the state. The result is that the character of all existing polities is determined by the predominence of the one or the other of these classes; hence arises the common opinion that there are two polities and two only: democracy and oligarchy." [1] Aristotle then explains that there are different forms, both of democracy and oligarchy: For both in the common people and in the notables various classes are included; of the common people one class are husbandmen, another artisans, another traders, who are employed in buying and selling; another are the sea-faring class, whether engaged in war, business, transport service or fishing, for each of these classes is numerous in one place or another, *e. g.*, fishermen at Tarentum, and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant seamen at Aegina and Chios, and ferrymen in Tenedos. To the classes of common people already mentioned may be added day laborers and all who possess so little property as to be incapable of leisure and such as are free but not descended from freemen on both sides, and any other similar class of population. On the other hand the notables differ among themselves according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education, and similar characteristics."[2]

This sketch of the several classes within a state will prepare us for following at a better advantage the discussion of the

[1] IV. 4. 18—19. Welldon, p. 263—4. Jowett, v. 1, p. 115.

[2] IV. 4. 20—22.

claims of the several classes to power in the state and the basis of such claims. By the basis of such claims we should understand: wealth and poverty, freedom, birth, military superiority, virtue, education, and the like.

§ 12. *The Claims of the Several Classes to Power in the State; of the Many and the Few.* Returning now to the tenth chapter of the third book, we ask, who are to have the supreme power in the state? Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? To give any of these supreme power may have awkward consequences. Shall we permit the poor to despoil the rich, or the rich to oppress the poor, saying that those who are in lawful authority, can act only justly? No, for the same argument would inevitably justify all the actions of a tyrant. But this cannot be admitted. Such things are wrong. Aristotle distinguishes between legal justice and natural or absolute justice. [1]

Ought then the good to rule and to have supreme power? Aristotle evidently does not consider their number large. For, he says, in that case everybody else being excluded from power, will be dishonored, because the offices of state are posts of honor.

Then will it be best that the one best man should rule? No, for that would leave the number of the unhonored still larger. It may be objected, too, that the one good man subject to the accidents of human passions, should not have so great a burden imposed on him as sole governor of all, that it would be better to permit the law to have supreme power. But the law itself may be one-sided and unjust.

This is Aristotle's manner of stating the difficulties of the problems of constitutional law.[2] Even the rule of law, he tells us, may represent only a party.

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[1] A distinction made also in our own time by many jurists and politicists—but denied also with a vehemence by many moderns, that reminds one of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic. See below § 3 of Essay I on the Republic.

[2] III. 10.

Justice is the common interest. All men think justice to be a sort of equality, but it is hard for men to agree on the things in which the equality shall consist. But this is best attained by conceding that all the several classes and their characteristic qualities shall have some claim to power in the state. Of course the rival claims of candidates for power in the state can be based only on elements which enter into the composition of the state, such as wealth and virtue. The noble, or freeborn, or rich, may with good reason claim office, for holders of office must be freemen and rich; a state can no more be composed of entirely poor men than entirely of slaves. But, if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, so are virtue and valour, and these common people and the relatively poor possess often in the highest degree. All men then have a claim in a certain sense, but they have not an absolute claim.[1]

Aristotle's conclusion is that the many rather than the few should rule,[2] altho he makes trial of showing that an ideal constitution may also be a kingship or an aristocracy."[3] The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best, is capable of a satisfactory explanation * * * For the many of whom each is but an ordinary person, when they meet together, may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively. * * * For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they become in a manner one man * * * Hence the many are better judges than the few even of music and poetry; for some judge one part, some another, and all collectively the whole."

"But whether the superiority of the many to the few virtuous persons is possible, whatever the character of the commons or masses is another question; in some cases, by heaven, it is plainly impossible; for the argument would equally hold about brutes, and wherein do some men differ from brutes?

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[1] This is the reasoning of chapter 12 and first part of chapter 13 in Book III.

[2] III. 13.

[3] Cp. III. 13; IV. 8.

At the same time there do exist masses of people, in whose case our theory is open to no objection."

And if this is so, it will help us to solve the difficulty which has been raised regarding the supreme authority in the state,[1] and another difficulty similar to it, which we raise now, namely what should be the limits set to the authority of the masses *i. e.* of free citizens, who are not wealthy and do not enjoy any special reputation for virtue? These difficulties are solved thus: "There is a certain danger in allowing them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor are excluded altogether from office, will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way to escape is to assign them some deliberate and some judicial functions [that is in modern phrase the right of suffrage and the right to sit on juries must at least be accorded to them]. It is in accordance with this view that various lawgivers, and Solon among the number, empower the commons to elect officers of state and to hold them responsible, but deny them all individual tenure of office. This may safely be done, because, when they meet together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better class, they subserve the interests of the state."

But should not the expert be chosen by the expert? Even in an art like medicine an intelligent man may be a fair judge of medicines without being an expert practitioner in the art; and so this objection is in great part met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, altho they may not be good individual judges, yet collectively they will be safe * * * just as the master of the house will be a better judge of the house then the builder of the house, and the pilot will be a better judge of the rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook."

But it may be objected that the many should not have authority in the greater matters like the election and calling to

[1] III. 10.

account of magistrates, which is the greatest of all. "Persons of any age and having but a small property qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, altho' for the great officers of state, such as controllers and generals, a high qualification is required. This difficulty may be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of democracies may be defensible. For the power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, or ecclesiast, but in the court and the senate, and the assembly, of which individual senators, or ecclesiats, or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this reason the many may lay claim to greater authority than the few; for the people, and the senate, and the court consist of many persons, and their property collectively is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great offices."

Finally it may be said that the law should be supreme. This is granted with the understanding that "the goodness or badness, justice or injustice of private laws, is of necessity relative to the constitutional law of states. If so, true forms of government will have just laws, and perverse forms will have unjust laws."[1]

The claims of the many and of the few, it is now seen, are both conceded, but with a difference. The highest offices of state and the greatest financial burdens for the support of the state, must go to the few, while the great offices of deliberation and courts of justice shall be conceded to the many. The next thing will be to consider in an especial manner the claims of the one good man.

§ 13. *The Claims of the One Good Man to Supreme Power.* All of the claims to power, as we have seen, are conceded by Aristotle to have some basis[2] but none are absolute. And what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of what is equal; and that which is right in the sense of being equal,

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[1] III. The translations from this eleventh chapter are substantially those of Jowett, v. 1, pp. 85—89.

[2] See above in § 12 of this Essay; and in The Politics, III. 13. 2.

is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state and the common good of the citizen. In the best polity he is a citizen who is able and willing to be governed and to govern in turn.[1]

If there are any who are so pre-eminent in virtue that they are incomparable with the other free-born and notables, they must be more than men. Now ordinary legislation is applicable only to equals. For such persons therefore democratic states have instituted ostracism by which they banish from their state for a time those who seem to predominate too much through wealth or otherwise. Is this defense of ostracism in democracy all made in irony and in bitter allusion to the indefensible practices of existing states in the time of Aristotle? Tyrants and oligarchs, we are told, do the same thing.[2]

"It would be better," so runs the suggestion, "if the legislator would so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy * * * In the perfect state there would be great doubts about the use of it."[3]

Especially may we hold that ostracism should not be applied against some one who is pre-eminent in virtue. Such an one should not be excluded; neither should he be a subject, for that would be like the claim of the other gods to rule over Zeus. "The only alternative seems to be that men should joyfully obey such an one as ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life."[4]

§ 14. *Monarchy; Constitutional Monarchy and the Supremacy of Law.* Five species of monarchy or kingship are reported: (1) The Lacedæmonian kingship which is a limited monarchy; the royal power is not absolute except when on a military expedition; the king also exercises supervision in matters of religion; it is a generalship for life and may be

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1 III. 13. 12.
2 Cp. III. 13. 15—18.
3 III. 13—23 and 24.
4 III. 13. 25.

hereditary or elective. The accuracy of this last statement has been often denied.

(2) The Barbarian kingship. Such royalties resemble tyranny; but they are hereditary and legal.

(3) The Aesymneteia or dictatorship, which might be called an elective tyranny. Like the Barbarian kingship, it is legal but not hereditary.

(4) The heroic kingship, which in its primitive form established the king as priest, judge and soldier. The heroic king in ancient times exercised power over all things whatsoever. Later they relinquished some of their privileges; others were taken from them "until in some of the states nothing was left to them but the sacrifices; and where they retained more of the reality, they had retained only the right of leadership beyond the border."

(5) Absolute royalty. This is a παρέκβασις, altho not so named where it is first introduced; but it is called a kingship where one has the disposal of all.[1]

The first and fifth of these varieties are discussed in chapters fifteen and sixteen of the third book; but only the comments on the relation of royalty to law are here noted: Absolute monarchy is often held to be contrary to nature. Those who are by nature equals, should be so treated, while unequals should not be treated as equals. This brings us to the rule of law; for an order of succession and the adjustment of inequalities on a basis fair to all implies law. "The rule of law is preferable to that of any individual. On the same principle, if there are to be officers, they should be only guardians and ministers of the law."

"There may indeed be cases which the law seems unable to determine, but in such cases can a man?" To this last question the Romans replied by investing the quaestor with power to interpret the laws on taking office, and the English by developing a system of equity jurispendence. Aristotle ans-

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[1] For this classification of Royalty see III. 14, IV. 10. "Tyranny is reckoned by us as a form of government, altho there is not much to be said about it."

wered in these words: "The law itself trains officers for the express purpose of deciding cases, for which it does not expressly provide, and appoints them to determine matters which are left undecided by it, to the best of their judgment. Further it permits them to make any amendments of the existing laws which experience suggests. But still they are only ministers of the law. He who bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule; but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast * * * In seeking for justice, men seek for the mean or neutral, and the law is the mean. Again customary laws have more weight and relate to more important matters than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law."[1]

This remarkable eulogy of law as safeguarding the interests of all, is followed by the contention that the monarch must always have so many assistants that it would be better to let the many have a share in the government from the start. Democracy or even oligarchy on this basis is ordinarily preferable to monarchy, but the latter may be preferable when it alone fits in with the character of the people.[2]

§ 15. *Democracy.* Very much is written of democracy in the middle books of The Politics. It is the one form of government to which Aristotle constantly recurs. A normal democracy approached nearest to ideal polity (except perhaps the vision of government by one perfect man, § 13 above). We find a sympathetic sketch of the varieties of democracies and their historical genesis in the fourth chapter of the fourth book, and still more elaborate treatment in chapters two to five inclusive of Book VI., while quite an elaborate defense of it is worked out in Book III., notably in the eleventh chapter. Briefly stated there are five varieties: (1) A government of equals by equals; equals in priv-

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[1] III. 16, 5, 8—9.

[2] Cp. III. 16. 9—13; 17. 1—3.

ilege and property. (2) A property qualification as a condition of office. (3) Some disqualifications for office, government being conducted according to law. (4) No disqualifications for office; but government is still conducted according to law. (5) No disqualifications for office and no restraints of law upon the whims and will of the multitude. The demos becomes tyrant. The demagogue is to the demos what the flatterer is to the tyrant. Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all.

In the genesis of democracy four steps are noted: (1) The rural or agricultural form; (2) The aristocratic form with a fairly high property qualification approaching oligarchy; (3) When all share again in office but without pay; (4) When owing to the excesses of wealth and the ill-judged council of demagogues, all share in the government and are paid besides for their time, because they have nothing to do. Under such circumstances the idle and do-nothings finally get everything in their hands and play the tyrant. "Indeed when paid the common people have the most leisure, because they are not hindered by the care of their property, which often fetters the rich, who are thereby prevented from taking part in the assembly and the law-courts, and so the state is governed by the poor and not by the laws."

The essential characteristics of democracy and the better types of it, are well discussed in the early chapters of Book VI. To these we shall later give further attention in an essay on The Theory of Administration.[1]

§ 16. *Oligarchy and Aristocracy.* Four kinds of oligarchy are sketched: (1) An oligarchy based on a property qualification high enough to exclude the masses, but open to any one who can reach it. (2) Property qualification and election by those already in power—a close corporation. If the election is based on high qualifications of wealth

[1] Essay IV. below. For the argument in behalf of giving the many power, see § 12 of this Essay.

and virtue, this kind approached an aristocracy. (3) When succession is hereditary, but the government according to law. (4) When the succession is hereditary and the government not according to law, but according to the whims and will of the few in power. This is again a species of tyranny.

The stages in the evolution of oligarchy are these: (1) Based on moderate possessions. (2) The property qualification becomes larger and the rulers fewer. (3) It becomes hereditary, being narrowed to certain families. (4) The more powerful among the families set aside the law and govern by caprice. They now play the role of tyrant. In chapters five to seven of the sixth book in the common order, hints are given on how to organize and administer an oligarchical government. These maxims will be noticed below in our study of administration.

The tolerable forms of oligarchy are so far constitutional that they approach the normal government of the few, and as such they may almost be called aristocracies. Aristocracy considered as a special form of government, receives but slight treatment on its own account considered as an existing form. Three types are recognized: (1) That based on absolute virtue which nowhere exists; (2) that based on wealth and virtue and numbers as at Carthage; (3) on virtue and numbers as in Lacedæmon. As an ideal polity aristocracy receives considerable notice in the discussion of the best polity.

§ 17. *The Best Polity; the Middle Class State.* Some critics of The Politics take the view that Aristotle abandons the principle of his classification of politics, into three normal and three abnormal forms; but this view is not a necessary conclusion from a careful study of The Politics as a whole. It must be noticed in the first place that Aristotle's classification is fundamentally a classification into three forms, not into six; and that we get six forms by sub-classification, just as we get further varieties of the several forms by more minute analysis.

For two of his principal forms Aristotle has a double name, one to express its normal, the other its abnormal aspect; but

for his third main form, democracy, he has no such double term, consequently, we find him often halting between several forms of expression. The definition of the normal aspect of the third form is beset with great difficulties. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that Aristotle should in his search for the best polity come so near to an acceptance of a moderate democracy or a moderate oligarchy as the best polity; for even a scientific writer finds it difficult to follow persistently a terminology, which is artificially evolved by the processes of analytical reasoning.

The main argument for the ideal polity is found in chapters eight, nine, and eleven, of the fourth book in the common order, but similar lines of argument are found also in various other places, *e. g.*, in the eleventh chapter of the third book, where the rule of many is defended with the provision that it is to be counterchecked by successful leadership of the wisest and best.[1] There is no difficulty in seeing that, taking the teaching of Aristotle on polity as a whole, he holds that to be the best constitution in which all the elements of the state are represented, and in which all the elements are held in their places by a system of checking and balancing these elements against one another.

"It remains for us to speak of the form specially called polity;"[2] of Politeia, which, as was suggested in § 9 above, may be translated Republic. "A Polity [or a Republic] may be described in general terms as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy. It is the fashion, however, to assign the name polity only to those forms of the fusion [that is, as we might say in our times, those governments only are constitutional] which incline to democracy; and to give the name of aristocracy to those forms of the fusion which incline to oligarchy."[3]

Aristocracy seems to owe its name to the assumption that culture and ability are more usually the concomitants of wealth,

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[1] See above §§ 11—12 of this Essay.

[2] Just as we speak of the best modern governments as constitutional. Altho' all governments have constitutions of some sort. So all polities are polities, but only one is polity par excellence.

[3] IV. 8. 3. Welldon, p. 274.

and the further assumption that the rich are in possession of the advantages for which crimes are usually committed, and therefore less likely to steal or commit acts of violence; hence they are designated noblemen and gentlemen, or the gentle and upper classes.[1]

In existing states three principles ordinarily contend for dominance in the state, namely: freedom, wealth, and virtue. Nobility does not need to be reckoned separately, for it is simply ancestral wealth and virtue. The dominance of the one or other of these gives rise to democracy, oligarchy and aristocracy respectively, but this is not a necessary relation; it only represents the ordinary facts.

There may be good laws and bad obedience to them; and there may be good obedience of bad laws. The wise exactment of laws may take two forms; they may be either the best laws possible to the citizens in question or the best absolutely. Good laws and the right obedience of them are most likely to be secured through a constitutional government, in which not only the three principles just noted are combined, but certain others also; such as education, military superiority and the like (noted in §§ 10—12 above.) It remains for us to show the possible methods of fusion.

As there are three departments of polity, namely: the deliberative or legislative, the executive and the judicial, so there are these three departments in which we may give the several elements greater or less recognition, according to their respective capacity for discharging the functions required. The council and assembly *i. e.* the machinery for deliberation and legislation must be organized in one way; here come questions of suffrage, of liberty, and legal sovereignty. The executive or magistracy must be organized in another way; here we require tests of high talent and special fitness, here is the place for the expert, and for application of educational qualifications. Finally, in the judiciary we must combine popular elements with exceptional talent and learning, freedom with

[1] Cp. IV. 8. 4. Welldon, p. 274–5.

virtue. This is a free version of the argument of the ninth chapter of the fourth book, and if taken strictly it is undoubtedly too modern; but it proceeds on fairer principles of criticism than those expositions which apparently assume that the great master was devoid of common sense. It presents the trend of the Aristotelian argument rather than its exact form.

One of the many passages in The Politics, which reveal the extraordinary genius of Aristotle for political philosophy is that in which he describes the middle class state. It is a part of his answer to the question, what is the best polity?

"But what is the best polity for most states and the best life for the great majority of men, tested not by the standard of a virtue, which is beyond the attainment of ordinary men, nor of such an education as requires natural advantages and the external resources which fortune alone can give, nor again of an ideal polity which is an aspiration only, but tested by a standard of life in which the majority can share, and a form of government to which states in general can attain?"

"Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich, another very poor, a third is in a middle condition. Those who are in the middle condition of life are most ready to listen to reason; whereas, one who is excessively beautiful, strong, noble or wealthy, or on the contrary, excessively poor or weak, or deeply degraded, cannot easily live a rational life. Such persons are apt in the first case to be guilty of insolence and criminality on a large scale, and in the second, to become rogues and petty criminals. * * *

And further, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength, wealth, friends, and the like, have neither the disposition nor the knowledge necessary for submission to authority, as they are generally spoiled by overindulgence at home and in school, while those who suffer from too great a deficiency in these blessings are reduced to a state of mental degradation. Thus, while the latter do not understand how to rule, but only how to be ruled like slaves, the former do not understand how to submit to any rule, but only to exercise the rule of slave-masters. The result is a state not of

freemen, but of masters and slaves, with sentiments of envy on one side, and of contempt on the other. But such sentiments are the very negation of friendship and good fellowship in states. * * * People do not even want to share the highway with their enemies."

"But a state ought to be composed as far as possible of equals and similars, and this is especially the condition of the middle class. Therefore it follows that the state which has in it a large middle class is likely to be the best governed. Further, it is the middle class of citizens which run the least risk of destruction in a state. For as they do not like paupers lust after the goods of others, nor do others lust after theirs, as paupers after the property of the rich, they pass an existence void of peril, being neither the objects nor the authors of conspiracies.

It is clear then the best polity is one in which the middle class have control, and that the only states capable of a good administration are those in which the middle class are numerically large, and, if not stronger than both of the other classes, at least stronger than either of them, as in that case the addition of its weight turns the scale and prevents the predominance of one extreme or the other." * * "A further proof of the superiority of the middle class is that the best legislators have belonged to the middle class citizens; for example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and almost all legislators."[1]

High praise is also bestowed in various parts of The Politics, for example, at opening of the chapter on the middle class state, from which we have just quoted, on certain forms of kingship and aristocracy; and we are led at times to regard one form and then another form of polity as the best.

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[1] This and the preceding paragraphs on the middle class state are from the eleventh chapter of the fourth book. The translation is partly adopted from Jowett and partly from Welldon. Cp. Jowett, v. 1, pp. 126—9; Welldon, pp. 280—5.

§ 18. *The Relatively Best Polity; The Pathology of States.* Aristotle has a thorough appreciation of the fitness of the several forms of government to varying circumstances. Certain forms of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy are all relatively good, and in certain stages of progress or in certain exigencies of situation they may be relatively the best.

"A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in virtue and royal talent, are fitted for kingly government; a people submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtues render them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy; while a people who are suited for a polity are naturally those among whom there is a warlike multitude, capable of obeying and ruling in turn, by a law which gives office to the capable according to merit."[1]

In discussing the various forms and sub-forms of government, Aristotle calls frequent attention to the historical adaptation of constitutions. He recognizes clearly that stages of civilization, racial instincts, and other conditions, must determine the fitness of the one or another form of government for a given state.

On account of this fact of adaptation, and in the light of principles elucidated from an inductive study of history and a knowledge of existing conditions, Aristotle holds that the statesman should be able to find remedies for the evils of government.[2]

To the problem of diagnosis and remedy, or what might be called the pathology of states, one of the best and most carefully prepared portions of The Politics is devoted. It is really the subject of the fifth book usually quoted as discussing political revolutions. The book does contain a very strong study of political revolutions, but it is also a wider study. In the judgment of the writer, it is one of the first contributions in the order of time and still one of the first in point of merit, to the theory of administration; it discusses the theory of

[1] IV. 17. 4.
[2] Cp. IV. 1. 7.

ἀρχή (of administration) as distinguished from the theory of πολιτεία (polity). In the opinion of the writer of these studies, the fifth book and portions of the fourth, especially from chapter 14 to the end, and portions of the sixth book, may be grouped together. They constitute Aristotle's contribution to The Theory of Administration; and to the study of this subject we now turn.

IV.

THE THEORY OF ADMINISTRATION.

§ 1. *The Theory of Fusion or of a Mixed Constitution.* As we have seen in our study of Polity and particularly in our study of the best Polity under existing conditions, Aristotle lays great stress on the importance of fusing the characteristic features of the three prominent historical polities, namely the characteristic features of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, into one Polity, in such wise as to bring into the organization of each of the three several departments of polity such monarchical, oligarchical, or democratical features, as are best calculated to promote the efficiency of the respective departments of Polity. How this is to be done has already been in part shown; and it is to be a chief consideration also, not only in our study of the correct method of organizing the administration of government, but likewise in our analysis of the causes of failure in administration, and it will be conspicuously emphasized in any statement of the positive principles of administration.

The principle of fusion is applicable not only to the Constitution as a whole, but also to its several parts. Each department of polity may be organized by fusing into it the principles of the several polities.

Those portions of the text of The Politics, which deal more especially with the administration of government, group themselves naturally into three parts: (1) Book IV. chapters 14 to 16, and Book VI. chapters 1, 7, and 8, dealing with the organization of administration; (2) Book V., chapters 1 to 7, dealing with seditious and political resolutions, or the causes of failure in administration; and (3) Book V., chapters

8 to 12, and IV. 13 and VI. 2 to 5, dealing with the positive principles of administration or the preservation of states, commonly spoken of by Aristotle as methods of establishing the several polities and devices for maintaining the same.

The novelty and boldness of grouping these several parts together under a single title, purporting that they contain a theory of administration is recognized by the writer.

For the convenience of the reader and for the purpose of preserving with fidelity the view-points of Aristotle, the sections which follow will be placed under distinct sub-headings. It may be added that the portions of The Politics which we are now studying have hitherto been little appreciated, and scarcely understood, and the treatment of the subject is in many respects partial and fragmentary.

A. THE ORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION

§ 2. *The Relation of the Deliberative or Legislative to the Executive Department of Government.* In the 14th chapter of the fourth book in the common order (the sixth in the order adopted by Welldon) where he tells us he is making a new start, Aristotle recognizes with positive distinctness the separation of the three departments of government as deliberative or legislative, executive, and judicial.[1] He urges moreover that each of these departments may be organized on principles peculiar to itself. But he nowhere argues with the clearness of Montesquieu in his famous eleventh book of the Spirit of Laws, especially in the sixth chapter, that for the sake of the liberty of the subject, these several powers or departments of government should be vested, not in the same but in different persons. Aristotle, however, makes an approach to this view of Montesquieu and other modern publicists in his argument for a diversified structure of these several powers.

Aristotle also accords to the deliberative or legislative department a larger degree of supervision and control of the

[1] This passage has been quoted several times, but notably in § 8 of the preceding Essay.

executive department and the judiciary than we are wont to admit in our time as defensible in theory altho in practice modern states have not departed so very far from the correct boundary lines in the view of Aristotle.[1]

"The deliberative body is supreme upon all questions of war and peace, the formation and dissolution of treaties of alliance and confederation, in the enactment of laws, sentences of death, exile and confiscation."[2]

So far we go with Aristotle readily enough. But he adds: "The deliberative body also elects officers of state and to it they are responsible at the expiration of their terms of office." [3]

This strikes one at first as unfamiliar, but when account is taken of the fact that in the ancient city-states of Greece there was yet no differentiation wrought out between the general legislative assembly and the total or collective body of citizens, it seems clear enough that it represents a doctrine of powers still accepted. In the larger states of modern times this differentiation is thoroughly established; we distinguish between the state behind the constitution and the state as organized in the constitution, between absolute sovereignty which resides in the body politic at large and legal sovereignty which is vested in the machinery of government, usually defined in a more or less definitely written constitution. Now, this general deliberative body itself may be variously organized, and it in turn either remotely or directly controls the organization of the executive department of government.

The organization of the deliberate department has been discussed at some length in the Essay on the Theory of Polity, because it is, as Aristotle clearly saw, the dominant department, the legally sovereign department of government. But in connection with the topic which we are now discussing

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[1] The government of Great Britain furnishes the classical example of a separation of the powers as noticed by Montesquieu. The government of the United States of America is also organized on the theory of a distinct separation of the powers. Yet in each of these governments the several powers overlap in some respects.

[2] IV. 14. 3.

[3] The reading of the text is disputed at this point, but the reading adopted is thoroughly in harmony with the entire context.

there is a strong statement of the manner in which the deliberative body may itself be organized. "There are various modes of ordering this general deliberative body; the first is that it should be exercised by all citizens, not collectively, but by alternation, *i. e.*, by a system of official boards. * * * The citizens assemble collectively under this system to enact laws, to settle constitutional questions and to receive the reports of the officers of state. Another mode is that the citizens collectively assemble to elect officers of state, to enact laws, to determine questions of war and peace, and to hold the audit of officers' accounts, while upon all other matters the power of deliberation is vested in officers appointed for particular duties," *i. e.*, in an executive department. These are the two typical systems of deliberation and legislation, the one by a system of boards with popular assent, the other by direct popular vote with an executive to carry out policies agreed to or concurred in. But these types of legislative bodies range in variety from the caprice of a tyrant or the narrow board of a close oligarchy to the expansive assembly of democracies in which the citizens are themselves above the law, and these varieties are sketched by Aristotle with a painstaking subtlety, resulting in distinctions often of comparatively little importance.[1]

"These are the various forms of the deliberative body; they correspond to the various forms of polity; and the administration of each polity corresponds to the distinctions we have stated.[2] In order to place themselves on a secure footing, oligarchies, for example, should incorporate democratical features into their system of legislation, while democracies should incorporate oligarchical features. It is especially important that there should be a good system of preliminary examination and supervision of measures that are to be passed by the legislative assembly. For this reason the establishment of an inner or preliminary council (probouli) or of guardians of the

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[1] Cp. IV. 14. 3—10.

[2] IV. 14. 11.

law, such as exist in some states is encouraged, so that the whole body of citizens shall take into their consideration such matters only as have already received the preliminary attention of these boards—an ideal practically realized in our modern system of parliamentary government under the leadership of a responsible cabinet of ministers. In an extreme democracy the better classes are to be encouraged to exercise their political privileges, whereas the lower ranks of the commons should be discouraged.[1]

§ 3. *The Organization of The Executive Department.* The direct discussion of the organization of the executixe department of the government is very meagre in The Politics. In the preceding section we have developed Aristotle's general theory of a central supervision or control of the executive, but the doctrine is expressed in rather vague terms, and must be inferred from the tenor of his comments, rather than from explicit statement. Of the entire text of The Politics, as we now have it, only the fifteenth chapter of the fourth, and the eighth of the sixth, are devoted to an express and exclusive consideration of magistrates and magistracies in the state.

In the eighth chapter of the sixth book an enumeration of the offices of state is apparently undertaken, whereas in the fifteenth chapter of the fourth book the theory of their nature, order, and relative importance, seems to be more under consideration. Why, these two chapters should have been separated from one another by the space of two books is one of the problems for the critic of the text of The Politics.

In summing up the list of officers, Aristotle himself divides them into three classes: (1) Those which he calls the political offices, strictly; (2) the religious offices; (3) certain extraordinary offices not found in all the states. Those of the first class we may further group into lesser divisions: (a) Those of great importance, but not of great dignity, such as the controllers of the market, commissioners of public buildings and

[1] Cp. IV. 14. 12—16.

streets with duties of police over private buildings with a view to the preservation and restoration of dilapidated buildings and streets, supervision of boundaries between neighbors to prevent disputes—the office in question is commonly called the commissionership of the city—it embraces, however, various departments, to each of which in the more populous states different officers are appointed, such as constructors of fortifications, superintendents of the water-supply and guardians of the harbour; commissioners of public lands, also called commissioners of woods and forests, who have, as we are told more than once, those duties in the country, which the commissioners just mentioned perform in the city; then certain financial officers, such as receivers of the revenues (ἀποδέκται) and treasurers (ταμίαι), and persons who levy the fines imposed by courts of law (πράκτορες), a class who should be distinct from the ordinary police; and besides legal officers, such as recorders of private contracts and decisions of courts, and presidents "before whom indictments have to be laid and preliminary proceedings in a law suit taken, and others of similar title"—these offices are variously subdivided according to the populousness of the city; and finally the ordinary police who have custody of prisoners, and are guardians of the peace—Aristotle calls special attention to the importance of not obliging the same persons to pronounce sentence and execute it, those who are designated to levy fines, referred to above, are also called executioners, and in some states are identical with the police, particularly with the jailor, but this ought not to be, because the office of jailor carries with it odium enough. "It is desirable to separate the office of jailor from that of the executioner. For the office of jailor is quite as necessary as that of the executioner; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons can not safely be trusted with it for they themselves require a guard and are not fit to guard others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge of

it."[1] Altho the sketch of offices is a brief one, many interesting and suggestive side-lights are thrown upon the ancient as distinguished from the modern system of the administration of government.

(b) Next we may notice the political offices of greater dignity but of less importance, *i. e.* of less practical every day importance; they have functions to discharge which enter only apparently less into the every day life of all the citizens. These offices are the military concerned with the defenses of the city, or for carrying on war. "Warders of the city-gates and walls, reviewing officers and inspectors of the drill of the citizens are equally necessary in time of peace and war * * Such officers are called generals, and members of the council of war. In addition to these, if there is a force of cavalry or light-armed troops, or archers or marines, in the state, there are sometimes distinct officers appointed to command these several departments, and known as generals of cavalry or of infantry and admirals with their subordinate and departmental officers." Besides these military offices there is the office of supervising the finances. Some of the officers of state have much money pass through their hands. "It is indispensable, therefore, that there should be a distinct board of officers whose business it is to receive and audit the account. * *

In addition to all these there is still the supreme office of all, and to it belongs the presidency of the assembly; for there must be some power to convoke the commons to assembly. In oligarchies it is usually called a preliminary council from its function of giving preliminary consideration to measures that are to go before the commons, while in democracies it is called a council," and in aristocracies such a body is usually known as guardians of the law. This early development of ministerial leadership of legislation is one of the noteworthy features of Greek politics.

It remains for us to notice the religious officers and the extraordinary or unusual officers of state. The religious officers

[1] VI. 8. 12–13.

are numerous in large states, and include such as these: guardians of temples and of shrines, superintendents of sacrifices, treasurers of the sacred revenues. "Nearly connected with these are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, such as are not assigned by law to the priesthood, but are solemnly celebrated upon the hearth of the state. These officers in different states are variously termed archons, kings, and presidents."

"Speaking summarily then, we may say that the objects of necessary superintendence are religious services, the science of war, the revenue and expenditure of the state, the market, the city, the harbours and the country, the system of the courts of law, the registration of contracts, the levying of fines, the custody of prisoners, the audit, inspection, and scrutiny of the officers' accounts; and there is lastly the presidency of a deliberative body in the state."[1]

A very interesting picture remains to be drawn: There are certain magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and have at the same time a regard for general decorum, such as censors of women, guardians of the laws, censors of children, and directors of gymnastics. But some of the latter officers are not at all suitable in democracies *e. g.* a censorship of women and children, for where citizens are relatively poor, wives and children must be given leave to appear in the ranks of the workers! We are not told, nor is it in any degree intimated what particular things it was that women and boys were not permitted to do.

It will be readily seen that only the so-called political officers were really officers of state within the current meaning of the word, unless indeed we may infer that the so-called censors of conduct were of the nature of teachers.[2]

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[1] VI. 8. 21. Welldon, p. 336.

[2] For the text upon the basis of which this section was written see VI. 8; Cp. Jowett, v. 1, pp. 201—5; Welldon, pp. 330—7.

§ 4. *On the Distribution of Offices; the Powers of Magistrates.* Having now the departments of the executive before us, through an enumeration of the leading offices of state,[1] we may give our attention to the distribution of these offices among the several elements of the population and similar questions.[2] In the first place here as in the organization of the deliberative body there may be many forms, and many questions arise.

What shall their number be? What shall be the extent of their jurisdiction, and what shall be the duration of their term of service? Shall they serve for life, or for a long or a short term? Shall the same persons hold the same office over and over again or for once only?

And about the appointment of them! From whom and by whom, and how are they to be chosen? These questions are all asked rather than answered. An office we are told implies command on matters which require deliberation and judgment. It is not necessary to regard all functionaries appointed, either by suffrage or by lot, as officers. The priesthood is an obvious case in point; it should be regarded [not as an office in the strict sense, but] as something distinct from and parallel to political offices. Then again there are masters of choruses and heralds, and even certain embassadors that are not officers in the strict sense.

In small states certain offices may be combined, which in larger states should be vested in one man, because division of labor in these respects as in other lines tends to develop aptness and efficiency in the discharge of public duties.

Aristotle also raises the question concerning the expediency of centralization and decentralization. "We can not neglect the question," he says, "over what matters local tribunals should have jurisdiction, over what matters a single officer should have control everywhere; for example, should one person be responsible for order in the market place, and should

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[1] According to VI. 8.

[2] Cp. IV. 15. It will be seen that VI. 8. finds a natural place between IV. 14. and IV. 15; but some things in VI. 8. are repeated in IV. 15.

others be responsible for good order in different places, or should one officer be responsible for good order everywhere?"[1]

"Again should offices be divided according to the subjects with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom they deal; I mean to say, should there be one kind of police for good order in general, another for women, and still another for boys, and so on." One cannot refrain from the wish that this question had been answered!

Another question is whether the offices should be substantially the same for the different forms of polity. Of course, in different polities, officers would have to be elected from different classes. It is also recognized that the qualifications would differ materially under the different polities, *e. g.*, in an aristocracy education would be one of the tests of eligibility for office, in an oligarchy wealth would figure rather more, while in a democracy freedom or free birth would be the main test. In the main certain offices of great importance remain the same for all states, whatever their polity. But there are certain offices peculiar to certain polities and some even important offices disappear under some polities; for example, the preliminary council is an oligarchical institution, while a council existing by the side of a general assembly is democratic. In a moderate democracy or a mild oligarchy the council and preliminary council might exist side by side, while in an extreme democracy both may be swept away. "Even the power of the council disappears when democracy has taken the extreme form in which the people themselves are always meeting and deliberating about everything. This is the case when the members are all wealthy or when they receive pay for meeting in the assembly"[2]

The several methods of appointment and election to office are described with characteristic acuteness and in the spirit of strict logical analysis. A suggestion of the method of description is found in the observation that all may be elected by

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[1] Cp. IV. 15. 9.
[2] IV. 15. 12.

all, or some by all, or all by some, or some by some. This does not tell us much. Noticing now that the some would be determined by the special qualification that might be set up, and that at least five tests might be applied singly or in combination, namely, property, birth, education, wealth, and freedom, it will be seen that the number of possible methods could be developed with paralyzing subtlety.

Election in the Greek city-states was either by suffrage or by lot or by a combination of the two. Rotation of office meant that the office should pass from tribe to tribe, or from clan to clan, according to some definite system, while rotation in office meant that citizens should follow one another in brief intervals of time, the term of office often being as brief as the space of six months. Appointment by lot alone was extremely democratic, appointment by suffrage alone oligarchical. It was customary to combine the two methods resorting to lot for certain offices, which it was supposed any one could fill, while suffrage was more likely to be employed, if at all, for those offices which most obviously required special ability or peculiar fitness, like generals for command in war.

§ 5. *The Organization of the Law Courts.* Three questions are raised with regard to law courts: (1) How many kinds of courts are there? (2) Who are the judges? (3) How are the judges selected?

There are eight kinds of law courts: (1) courts of audit or scrutiny, courts before which the controversies concerning the public finances were settled; (2) courts to try offences committed against the state; (3) for the trial of treason; (4) for the settlement of disputes that arise between officers of state and individuals respecting fines; (5) courts for the trial of important civil suits; (6) of murder and homicide; (7) of disputes with and among aliens, one division for cases between two aliens, and another for cases between an alien and a citizen; and (8) a sort of justice court for the trial of petty contracts to the amount of a drachma (nineteen cents) or at most five drachma or a little more—"cases like these must also be

decided, although it is not necessary to bring them before a number of judges."

Who are the judges? Either some or all of the citizens. In some of the courts all the citizens are judges; in others only some. The rules in this respect differ according to the form of government. In cases where only some are judges, appointments are made by suffrage or by lot, or by a combination of suffrage and lot. In democracies courts are organized on the principles of universal eligibility and universal jurisdiction; in oligarchies and monarchies on limited eligibility and universal jurisdiction; in aristocracies and moderate democracies limited and universal eligibility are combined and jurisdiction is defined by a system of courts.

B. CAUSES OF FAILURE IN ADMINISTRATION

§ 6. *Political Revolutions; The Theory of Equality, Arithmetical and Geometrical.* "The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed.[1] Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states." These causes of revolution as sketched by Aristotle, are in the opinion of the writer chiefly, tho' not exclusively, administrative; some are constitutional, but as a rule, it is the failure of administration which occasions reorganization of the constitution.

Aristotle proposes to inquire "how many are the causes of revolution in states, and of what nature they are; and also what are the elements of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state may be best preserved?"[2] "In the first place we must assume as our

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[1] This is the announcement at the opening of the fifth book. Cp. IV. 2. 2—4. See also closing paragraph of The Ethics, quoted on p. 11 of the introduction to these studies. The first of these references connect the fourth and fifth book. The reference to the closing paragraph of The Ethics suggests that the fifth book (with such parts of the sixth as are probably a part of it) is also the closing part of the first great general division of The Politics. If this view is correct, then the common order of the books, which places the study of the ideal state and the principles of education last, must be the correct order of the books.

[2] V. 1. 1. Jowett, v. 1, p. 144.

starting point, that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgment of justice as proportional equality, altho there has been a failure to realize this equality, as we have already explained."[1]

All the forms of government have a kind of justice, but whenever one party or another fails to realize its own conception of justice, it is ready for revolt. "But the class of persons who would have the strongest justification for seditious conduct, although they are the least guilty of sedition, is the class distinguished by pre-eminent virtue; for it is such persons and such only who may be supposed to be unequal or superior to others in an absolute sense."[2] Others claim superiority on account of wealth or birth. Those whose only claim of power is their freedom, lay stress upon equality.

"Here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other * *; the other not affecting the constitution, when without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their own hands. Further, there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. Or, the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only, *e. g.* the establishment or overthrow of a particular office * * * Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolt, but an inequality in which there is no proportion, for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals."[3]

"Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional (or arithmetical and geometrical); by the first I mean same-

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[1] V. 1. 2. Cp. III. 9. 1—4; see also § 10 of this Essay.
[2] V. 1. 6. Welldon, p. 339.
[3] V. 1. 8—12. Jowett, v. 1, p. 145.

ness or equality in number or size; by the second equality of ratios. * * * That a state should be ordered simply and wholly according to either kind of equality, is not a good thing; the proof is that such forms of government never last. They are orginally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, they cannot fail to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed; numerical in some cases and proportionate in others."[1] Our modern way of saying all this would be that governments should be established on principles of quality as well as quantity.

If a choice has to be made between democracy and oligarchy, Aristotle believed democracy to be the safer form. Oligarchy has foes within and without; democracy only from without, for the people rarely, if ever, quarrel among themselves. But he was thoroughly aware of the weaknesses of democracies and desired to impose checks and limitations; the citizen should have power and the franchise only in proportion to his wealth, virtue, education, and capacity.

§ 7. *The Causes of Sedition.* An attempt is made to distinguish between subjective and objective causes of revolution; the distinction amounts to looking at the same thing in four different ways. The subjective causes are merged in a desire for equality or dislike of superiority, while objective causes are held to be the specific ends coveted by those who are dissatisfied at such ends or objects as the honors and emoluments of office. There is no systematic effort to bring the several causes mentioned under these heads. There is in fact an apparent disposition to recognize a distinction between motives and causes: a distinction which may involve a consideration of subjective conditions of temperament as distinguished from objective conditions of fact, but whatever its purpose, it is not clearly made.[2]

[1] V. 1. 12—16. Jowett, v. 1, p. 146. The distinction between mere numerical and proportional equality is analogous to the geometrical and arithmetical ratios upon which justice is based in the ethics, The Nichomacheean Ethics, Book V. This use of mathematical expressions was a most important aid in the clarification of early concepts of justice, and of governments.

[2] Cp. V. 1.

After this preliminary consideration of the causes of sedition they are noted by formal enumeration as follows: (1) The insolence and (2) the avarice of persons in official position—this avarice is gratified sometimes at the expense of private property and at other times at the expense of public property; (3) the disregard of merit in the distribution of honors is another cause of sedition; (4) the predominant or excessive influence of one or of several individuals, an influence inconsistent with the polity—it usually ends in the creation of a monarchical or dynastic form of government, hence some democracies resort to ostracism; (5) fear of punishment or fear of oppression, either men have committed wrong and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and desire to prevent their enemies as when at Rhodes the notables combined to put down the democracy in order to end the suits that were brought against themselves; (6) contempt of authority, *e. g.* when in an oligarchy the many become or are powerful, or when in a democracy the rich despising the disorder of the many and conscious of their strength usurp the government; (7) disproportionate increase in some part of the state, which happens sometimes by slow changes and again by accident as *e. g.* when at Tarentum the government became democratic on account of a defeat in battle, in which many of the notables were slain. These are the seven causes of sedition and revolution to which Aristotle apparently attaches the chief importance. Of the other causes mentioned in the formal enumeration of causes at least three are concerned with the manner of affecting revolutions, and the revolutions so effected are chiefly of an administrative character; they are: (8) election intrigues *e. g.* at Heraea for the election of magistrates they substituted election by lot for the usual method that prevailed there, because the electors had gotten into the habit of choosing their own partisans; (9) carelessness, through which persons disloyal to the existing polity sometimes find their way into offices; (10) neglect of trifles by which the administration is first changed and finally the constitution itself, *e. g.* by a failure to insist on the legal

qualifications for office; (11) incompatible elements in the state.

The last of these causes deserves separate notice. It is resolved into four phases, two of which are new, namely (a) ethnological differences and (b) geographical or territorial configuration; the remaining two, namely (c) the antagonisms of virtue and vice, and (d) of wealth and poverty, have been practically named, or are implied in some of the causes before enumerated. The action of ethnological or race differences is best exemplified in the history of colonies, and a number of examples are given of struggles between races for the mastery of cities, as at Sybaris, Thurii, Byzantium, and Antissa. "Again the situation of cities is a cause of sedition, when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of a state. * * * Even at Athens the inhabitants of the Piræus are more democratic than those who live in the city. For as in war the passage of streams, however small, breaks up a regiment, so it seems that every distinction in a state is a cause of division."[1]

§ 8. *The Occasions of Revolt and the Manner of Affecting Revolutions.* The causes of sedition and revolution are deep-seated and far-reaching, but the occasions of sedition and even of successful revolt are often trifling in themselves. When the conditions for riot or rebellion are rife, the merest incident or accident often is sufficient to unloose the chained feelings of a subject population or of an oppressed party.

The effects of even quite unimportant quarrels are serious, when the parties to them are among the powerful people of the state. Thus, at Syracuse, a political revolution resulted from a love-quarrel of two young men in the governing class. So at Hestiæa the division of an inheritance, at Delphi a breach of promise case, at Mitylene a dispute about heiresses, and similar cases in other places, have led to no end of trouble. "It is necessary to be on our guard against dangers of this

[1] V. 3. 15—16.

kind at their commencement, and to put a speedy end to the feuds of leading and influential people in the state. For it is at the beginning that a mistake is committed in these cases, and as the beginning, according to the proverb, is half the whole, *i. e.* as important as all the rest, it follows that even a small mistake at the beginning of any affair, bears the same proportion, *i. e.* is equivalent, to the mistakes made at all the other points."[1] Unfortunately for the perpetuity of the little Greek republics, they were never able to cope with these beginnings of difficulty.

Important changes in administration and even revolutions in polity are sometimes accomplished on account of the distinguished services of some branch of the administration or of a class within the state by which they draw new power and added prerogatives to themselves. Thus, for example, the services of the Areopagus in the Persian wars, rendered the Athenian polity for the time more oligarchical, while by the victory at Salamis, to which the seafaring population so eminently contributed, the polity was again made more democratical. "It is indeed a general rule of which we must not lose sight, that, all who have been instrumental in augmenting the power of a state, whether private individuals or executive officers, or social classes, whether tribal, *i. e.* groups of kinsfolk, or any other class whatsoever, are bound to assert their claim to a share of power in the state, and when opportunity offers, this claim will make itself felt."[2] We have here a bit of political wisdom essentially similar in tenor to Harrington's maxim, that political power follows the purse.[3] Revolt is likely to become open, whenever owing to the absence of a large middle class, there is an unstable equilibrium of parties. When one of the parties is in a decided minority, as the good almost always are, there is no great probability of revolt.

Revolutions in brief are effected in two ways, by force or by fraud. Force may be employed at the time of making the

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1 V. 4. 3. Welldon, p. 351.

2 V. 4. 10. Welldon, p. 353.

3 See J. W. Burgess on Harrington in Political Science Quarterly. V. I.

revolution or afterward in order to maintain it. Fraud also may be used in two ways, either to secure the initiation of change, or to maintain a change once secured.[1]

§ 9. *Sedition and Revolution in Democracies.* The causes of sedition in democracies are not considered apart from the forms which revolutions are likely to take in democracies in case of successful revolt.

In democracies the demagogue is the great source of danger both to the state itself and to the permanence of its polity. In the time of Aristotle changes in democratic polity were chiefly of two kinds, either to a more extreme democracy or to an oligarchy. The former would result from a successful attempt of the demagogues to augment their power, the latter from a successful revolt against it, led generally by the property classes, who were compelled from time to time to unite notwithstanding their animosities and frequent quarrelling.

The usual method of the demagogues in their procedure against the rich is to lay information against them in private suits, or by coming forward in public to stir up the people against them. "Sometimes the demagogues in order to carry favor with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine; either they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate."[2]

The modern demagogue, we are told, is an orator, a rhetorician; in ancient times he was a military leader. Consequently in those former times a revolution in a democracy usually meant the establishment of a tyranny. Our modern rhetoricians are too ignorant of military matters to attempt a coup d'etat. Not only were official positions of greater importance intrusted to individuals in those former days, but the people themselves were more pre-occupied, cities were small,

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[1] Cp. V. 4. 12—13.

[2] V. 5. 5. Jowett v. 1, p. 154.

and the people lived in the country busily employed in the fields, their chiefs, if they possessed military talent, could easily vault into power, on winning the confidence of the commons by professing dislike of the wealthy.

As one method of curbing the power of demagogues in democracy, election of magistrates by tribes instead of popular election in common assembly is recommended, *i. e.*, a system of voting in sections instead of voting in mass.

§ 10. *Sedition and Revolution in Oligarchies and in Democracies.* Here again sedition is considered only in connection with the course successful uprisings may take place. Revolutions in oligarchies come from without or from within the administration. They come from without, when in consequence of bad laws or an unfair exercise of power the people not having part in the government consider themselves oppressed. At such a time the people look for a champion. A leader may be found inside or outside of the governing class. Administrative changes and even complete revolutions in polity sometimes come from within the oligarchical government itself, owing to the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, their ambitions or their extravagance. Oligarchies also have their demagogues who practice either upon the other oligarchs or upon the people. The oligarchical demagogue has his special opportunity in those oligarchies in which all the important magistrates are elected by classes below that from which the list eligible to office is made up, and in those oligarchies in which the law courts are popular, *i. e.* in the control of the mass of the citizens.

Other causes of sedition apart from the jealousy or rivalry, of the oligarchs themselves are: attempts to further narrow the oligarchy; and bankruptcy of the oligarchs through riotous living and misuse of public funds. The introduction of mercenary troops common in oligarchies, which may be connected more or less with any of the causes of sedition enumerated, is usually fraught with danger to the oligarchy, because it is so easy for the general of these troops to make

himself a tyrant on the outbreak of sedition. The organization of military forces is therefore one of the special problems of administration in an oligarchy, and receives special attention in the consideration of positive principles of administration in § 16 below.

It is also noticed that an oligarchy which is based on a low property qualification may in an era of great prosperity, such as Athens at one time experienced, be converted into an expansive oligarchy, shading gradually into a democracy. Moreover, it may be observed, that any form of polity does not, in case of revolution, necessarily pass into an opposite form, as Plato argued in The Statesman; it may also pass into one of the varieties of its own form. In the latter event the revolution should be considered administrative rather than constitutional. Aristocracies fail in the main for the same reasons as ordinary oligarchies; they may be too exclusive and attacked by proud and powerful disfranchised classes, or they may fail from the rivalry of its great men. The disposition of superior officers, at times, to dishonor men of merit under their command, the too often great extremes of wealth and poverty, and the inordinate ambition of great men are a constant menace to the permanence of aristocracies. In this connection Aristotle again comments on his favorite doctrine of checks and balances. He did not see that the oppositions of the parties and the powers within in the state were due not so much to the wisdom of legislators as to the natural growth of institutions.

§ 11. *Sedition and Revolution in Monarchy.* This topic does not receive a separate treatment in connection with the topics of the two preceding sections. It is possible that a portion of the original text has been transposed. General statements are repeatedly made that reaction and revolution in all forms of government spring from real or supposed inequalities, from the jealousies and ambitions of men in office or desiring to be in places of power; or from a fail-

ure to administer equitably and with promptitude existing laws; or from motives of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the poor or the many. These general causes of sedition and revolution account for most of the disturbances which may occur in monarchies, and they are more or less distinctly recognized in the discussion of royalty, near the close of the third book and in the tenth chapter of the fourth book.[1] In the tenth chapter of the fifth book, there is a fairly exhaustive treatment of the subject now under consideration. The origin of tyranny is contrasted with that of kingship in a good sense; "these two forms of monarchy, kingship, and tyranny, differ in their very origin. The appointment of a king is the resource of the better classes against the masses, and he is elected by them out of their own number, either because he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions, whereas a tyrant is chosen from the masses of the people to be their protector against the notables. History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues, who gained the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables. * * * Others which were older, originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, long tenure. Others again arose out of the way oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest office."[2] A tyranny, it is observed, is like an oligarchy in its love of wealth, and like a democracy in its hatred of the notables. The object of the tyrant is his personal pleasure, (τὸ ἡδύ), that of the king, moral elevation (τὸ καλόν). A king loves honor, a tyrant riches. The guards of a king are citizens, those of a tyrant mercenaries.

"The beginnings of change in monarchies are the same as in other forms of governments; subjects attack their sover-

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[1] Cp. § 14 of Essay III.

[2] V. 10. 3—5. Jowett v. 1, p. 169—70.

eigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. Of injustice the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of property."[1]

Attacks against monarchs are made sometimes against their lives and sometimes against their office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Insult (ὕβρις) may be either direct or indirect *e. g.* an invasion of the sanctity of the family. Fear is sometimes a motive; again contempt may be a motive, "as in the case of Sardanapalus, whom some one saw carding wool with his women," or because the monarch is a debauchee, or too familiar, or weak and effeminate. Sometimes the life of a monarch is attacked from sheer love of notoriety by those who desire not a kingdom but a name.

Tyrannies are destroyed from without by opposite forms of government *i. e.* by an uprising of the notables or of the commons, or of both in combination, and from within by a division in the reigning family. Hatred and contempt are the usual motives. Tyrants, who have secured their power by their own efforts, have usually retained it. Those who have come to it by inheritance have generally lost it almost at once; "for, living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible."

Kingships fall generally in one of two ways: through quarrels in the royal family, or through attempts to extend the royal power contrary to law. "There are no kingships now," says Aristotle reflectively. "Monarchies, where they exist, are tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters, but in our own day men are more upon an equality and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and the dignity of the office."[2]

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[1] V. 10. 13.
[2] V. 10. 37.

C. *PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATION.*

§ 12. *General Principles of Administration.* The best preservative of states is a fair and honest administration of government; the particular form of government is of less importance than its integrity and efficiency.

Aristotle studied seriously the conditions of past political experience, and pointed out with minute care the disorders common to the Greek city-states. His treatment of political revolutions does not discuss with any prominence what modern political philosophers call the right of revolution. His treatise is rather in the nature of an analysis of revolutions as to their nature, their causes and occasions, the manner of accomplishing them, their results, and the means of avoiding them. It is in fact a study in the theory of administration by an analysis first of the causes that lead to a failure of existing polities, through a collapse of the administrative machinery and its replacement on the basis of a new constitution, or on the basis of the old or only slightly modified constitution; this is followed in the second place by an elaborate effort to state positively those principles which should guide on the one hand in the just exercise of all governmental functions, and make on the other hand for the perpetuity of states favored by such just exercise of public powers. It is these positive principles that we now propose to examine. Following the enumeration[1] of Aristotle we may state them thus:

(1) The first condition of wise administration is a knowledge of what causes the failure of administrations. To know what to do is first to know what not to do. But Aristotle thought perhaps not deeply enough when he said, when we know the causes of the ruin of states, we know the remedies.

(2) Maintain a spirit of strict obedience to law, "more especially in small matters; for transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of

[1] V. 8.

small expenses in time eats up a fortune." Guard against the beginnings of change.

(3) Do not trust to mere devices to deceive the people,[1] devices that have been invented by oligarchs, such as these: Throwing the assembly open to all the citizens, but fining the rich for non-attendance while the poor are exempt; excusing the poor while compelling the rich to accept office; obliging the rich only to serve in the law courts; discouraging the poor in the possession of arms and exempting them from all calls for gymnastics or military drill. Democracies have certain counter devices, such as paying the poor for attending the public assemblies and the law courts.[2]

(4) Let magistrates treat the people with consideration. Oligarchies as well as aristocracies may be made to last long because the rulers keep on good terms with the people, both voters and non-voters; and always see to it that people of consequence, leading spirits, are admitted to suffrage. Treat all with consideration; never wrong the ambitions in a matter of honor, nor the common people in matters of money. Aristotle seems to have observed that different classes can represent one another and think for one another.

(5) Some rotation in office is expedient to prevent abuse of power. Aristotle to our astonishment recommends six months as a term of sufficient duration; such a term would be brief enough to prevent the development of an official class. But in Chapter 14 of Book VII he expresses a different and more conservative view of rotation in office.[3]

(6) Emphasize constantly the importance of unity in the state as a bulwark against enemies who may invade the state from without for purposes of conquest. "Invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near."

(7) Check, whenever and wherever possible, the feuds and quarrels among the upper classes.

(8) The census should be taken periodically and the stand-

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[1] Cp. V. 8. 4.

[2] These devices are recounted in IV. 13.

[3] Cp. § 12 of Essay V.

ard of the property qualification so adjusted from time to time as to give the suffrage *i. e.* citizenship to a number large enough, to keep the proportion of citizens relatively the same.

(9) No individual should be allowed to become too powerful. "Men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity."

(10) Establish a censorship of manners and morals. With this dictum few now accord; and yet we have at present in our public teachings of the press, the platform, the home, and the pulpit, powerful agencies for the control of morals public and private; but the plane of action is voluntary, not compulsory.

(11) Do not permit any one class in the state to monopolize all the offices of state. Combine the poor and the rich into one body; increase the middle class.

(12) Public office should not be lucrative. Let the great magistrates be the rich, but let the comparatively poor, that is the commons, have the power of choosing those who are to serve as magistrates. In this way democracy and oligarchy can be combined into a Polity, a Republic. The rich may then fill positions of trust and honor, while the mass of the citizens, the commons, may have leisure to go about their private business. "If office brings no profit, then, and then only, can aristocracy and democracy be combined."

(13) Insist on a strict system of public accounts for all expenditures incurred in behalf of the state. Audit public accounts. Honor the incorruptible.

(14) Spare the rich. Avoid display. Even if they are willing the rich should not be permitted to give gratuitous entertainment to the public, a very correct and eminently scientific view.

(15) Reverence the commons; give them their share of office, especially of indefinite office—let them share the right of suffrage and a place on the jury—let them be ecclesiasts and dicasts. Let there be a heavy penalty for insult to the poor.

(16) Insist on a law that estates pass by inheritance and

not by gift; and let no one have more than one inheritance so that estates may be distributed and as far as possible equalized, and the poor rise to competency.

(17) Eligibility to office should be as comprehensive as possible.

§ 13. *The Qualifications for Office; the Principle of Moderation.* Three qualifications are required especially in those who fill the highest offices; loyalty to the established constitution; administrative capacity; virtue and justice, such as are demanded by each particular polity and office. It is frankly recognized that the choice of a general for command in war must rest upon criteria of virtue different from those which would control in the selection of a public treasurer.

The keynote of Aristotle's positive theory of administrative organization is moderation. "The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own."[1] "The great preservative is * * to have a care that loyal citizens should outnumber the disloyal. * * * Those who think that virtue is to be found only in their own party principles push matters to extremes."[2] Seek the mean. Oligarchy and democracy in a moderate form may each be good enough, but when pushed to an extreme will end in being no government at all *i. e.* in tyranny. Liberty is not license.

§ 14, *The Relation of Education to the Permanence of States.* "But of all things which I have mentioned, that which most contributes to the permanence of states is the adaptation of education to the form of government. * * * The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen in the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution."[3]

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[1] V. 7. 8.

[2] V. 9. 5—7.

[3] V. 9. 11—12. Cp. end of Book VII. and Book VIII. See below Essay V.

This does not mean education in what the advocates of the several forms of government like, but it means an education in those principles which really make for the perpetuity of given constitutions.

§ 15. *Principles of Administration for Monarchies; the Benevolent Despot.* The chief preservative of monarchies as indeed of other forms of government is moderation or limitation in the exercise of its powers. "The more restricted the function of kings [*i. e.* the more supreme law is, and the more subordinate mere caprice], the longer their power will last unimpaired."[1] But tyranny must follow special methods. There is the ancient or Persian way: "The tyrant must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs, education and the like; he must be on his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prevent literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion;"[2] and further, he must compel his people to live open lives, terrify them by spies, weaken them by quarrels, oppress them by public works, "the pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy;" he must burden them with taxes and preoccupy them with wars.

But on the other hand there is a more excellent way. The tyrant may turn into a benevolent despot; he may be like a king, like a father to his people. He must then save the public money, keep accounts, levy taxes only for state purposes, assume the character of a statesman, adorn his city, be modest and reverence the gods, or at any rate seem to do so, and honor men of merit, but not make one man alone great.[3]

§ 16. *Principles of Administration for Oligarchies and Democracies.* These have already been in part reviewed. Indeed they have been completely presented in § 12 above, so far as they are discussed in the fifth book. But special atten-

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1 V. 11. 1.
2 V. 11. 5.
3 Cp. V. 11. 17—34.

tion may be directed to certain maxims, and expressions of general doctrine worked out in the sixth book, most of which forms a natural part of the discussion of the fifth book. The political devices for the preservation of oligarchies sketched in the thirteenth chapter of the fourth book were repudiated as not substantial in the eighth chapter of the fifth book as we saw in § 12 above. The most important parts of the sixth book in this connection are the sketches of the several forms of democracy and their peculiar fitness under certain conditions, chapters two to five, and the sketch of the proper military organization for oligarchies, chapter seven. The characteristic principles of democracy are: (1) That all should rule and be ruled in turn; the principle of rotation in office is pre-eminently democratic; (2) The largest possible freedom for each citizen to do as he likes; this freedom is to be limited by the law of proportion; liberty must be limited lest it be turned into license to sanction anything and any act; (3) Numerical equality—everybody shall count for one and no one for more than one; (4) Government by vote or will of the majority. The best forms of democracy are the rural or agricultural communities of a primitive grade of culture; next to these come the nomadic democracies; these are followed by the democracies of the city-states, which shade in some cases into mere mob-rule. Finally we have a repetition of the positive principles exalting moderation and honesty.

One of the gravest dangers to which an oligarchy is exposed is the danger of faithless and disloyal soldiery. Oligarchs must therefore give the utmost care to military organization. The military service has four branches: the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light infantry, and the marines. It is the first two branches of the service that lend themselves to development of oligarchy, while the last two are more suitable to democracy. The property qualification for citizenship in an oligarchy should be sufficiently moderate to embrace the knights. The heavy infantry should be assiduously encouraged, and as far as possible, given a share in the government. Besides as they may be compelled to fight with light

infantry, the oligarch's should also train their children to the use of the light arms, so they will not be entirely dependent on mercenaries to meet attacks from democracies. In an oligarchy the duties of the public offices should be so burdensome that poor men will not crave them. Those, for example, who have amassed a fortune by trade may be admitted into the ranks of the oligarchs, after they have withdrawn from business for a certain term of years.[1]

§ 17. *Criticism of Plato's Theory of Political Revolutions.* It is Plato's theory that by means of political revolutions the forms of polity pass through a certain cycle of change from kingship to oligarchy, from oligarchy to democracy, from democracy into tyranny. This doctrine with certain fanciful views respecting number as lying at the foundation of political phenomena is presented in the eighth and ninth books of The Republic. Aristotle holds that the Platonic doctrine does not accord with the facts; he shows by historical examples that changes from one form of government to another do not follow any definite order, and even that changes from a variety of one form to other varieties of the same form are repeatedly occurring. Aristotle further observes, among other particulars, that Plato misunderstands the causes which underlie the development of oligarchy, and in general that he fails to recognize with clearness the manifold and complex motives which foster sedition and lead to revolution.[2]

We will next consider Aristotle's conceptions of the Ideal City-State and Education.

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[1] Cp. VI. 7.

[2] For a further study of the views of Plato on this subject, see below Essay III. on The Republic.

V.

THE IDEAL CITY-STATE AND EDUCATION.

A. INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. *The Best Life; the Nature of Happiness.* He who would determine what constitutes an ideal city-state must first determine what the best life is. Now it would seem that those who live under the best form of government possible to them under their circumstances must enjoy the conditions most favorable to a good life.[1]

The conditions most favorable to a good life are reducible to three classes of goods; wealth, health, and virtue. Most persons want the first two in an unlimited degree, while "of virtue they think any small amount that they have is sufficient." But this popular estimate of the relative importance of the three classes of goods is erroneous, because virtue is the fundamental good. "Men do not acquire and preserve their virtue by means of external goods, but external goods by means of their virtues." The virtues are the supreme goods for another reason; they are the goods of the soul and are higher than the body and external goods as the soul is higher than these. Aristotle puts into another form our modern maxim that honesty is the best policy; "it is impossible for those to be prosperous who do not act honorably."[2] But in saying this he takes a broad view of prosperity.

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[1] Attention is here called to § 1 of Essay III. above, especially p. 82, where the subject-matter of the seventh (fourth) book, is contrasted with that of the third. In emphasizing this contrast the writer has departed from the traditional view respecting the content of these books; but this contrast taken in connection with the subject-matter of the intervening books, especially of the fourth, which very naturally follows the third, is presumptive evidence in favor of regarding the present commonly received order of the books as being also, in the main, their original order. Cp. § 1 of Essay IV.

[2] VII. 1. 11.

That man therefore alone is happy who possesses indeed the three classes of goods, but who subordinates wealth and health to virtue. Virtue is an essential condition of happiness.—"For no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance, or justice, or prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of a quarter-obol, and is as foolish and full of error as a child or a madman. * * * A happy life, no matter what the definition of happiness, whether pleasure or virtue, or both, belongs more truly to those who possess the highest adornments of character and intellect, while their wishes are moderate with regard to the outward possession of good things, than to those who possess the latter to a degree beyond utility, but have too little share of virtue."[1]

The happiness of a man is in fact proportional to his wisdom and virtue. "God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature.[2] Moreover for the same reason good-luck is necessarily different from happiness, for the spontaneous results of chance can produce the goods external to the soul, but no man is just or temperate by the gift of fortune, or on the ground of good fortune. By the same line of argument it can be shown that the happy and prosperous state is that which is morally best and acts rightly. * * * Our conclusion then is that the best life, whether for individuals or for states, is a life of virtue furnished with an amount of external goods sufficient for the performance of virtuous actions."[3]

§ 2. *The Best Life for the State.* The discussion concerning the identity of the happiness of the individual and of the state, and what constitutes the best life for each is made in

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1 VII. 7. 4—6.

2 Cp. Nich. Eth. X. 8. 7; Met. X. 11. 7.

3 VII. 1. 10—11.

both cases to turn on the question of preference for wealth or virtue. The state craving conquest is like the rich man seeking to augment his possessions. The state content with a moderate and temperate life within itself, is like the virtuous man who finds the satisfaction of living in himself. As the virtuous man is better than the avaricious man, so the state organized to promote its own welfare within itself is better than the state in quest of more words. We have here some evidence of a wish to make the state an organism to subserve the happiness of the individual. "That [state is the best which has a] form of government under which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily."[1]

States making wealth or conquest their end, frame their constitution and their laws so that they may gain empire over their neighbors. For instance in Lacedaemon and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view to war, and in many nations there are laws which stimulate the warlike virtues by conferring special marks of distinction on those who have seen campaigns and slain foes. But to make war the sole end of government is monstrous and yet many are so infatuated with this view that they regard even despotism as a proper form of government. Such states and such individuals live for conquest only or for riches, and thus find their end outside of themselves.

But a state may find its end in itself; it may live well without war. It should stand somewhat alone and enjoy good laws. The end of law is the good of the citizens and of the state as a whole. A good lawgiver must ask not only how the city may share in a good life and the happiness attainable by it, but also how clans and other communities may do so. His enactments will not always be the same. Such a state has also international relations; it has duties towards others, and the legislature should, in such cases, deal with their neighbors according to their character and determine what duties are to be performed toward each.[2]

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[1] VII. 7. 5.

[2] Cp. VII. 2. 16—18.

§ 3. *The Claims of Politics and Philosophy on the Man of Leisure.* Some, while granting that the life of virtue is the best life, renounce political power and think that the life of the freeman *i. e.* of the contemplative philosopher, is different from the life of a statesman and the best of all; but others think the life of the statesman is best, because, as they say, he who does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous action and happiness are synonymous. Both are partly right and partly wrong. The life of the philosopher is better than that of some rulers—it is better for example, than that of the despot. But every sort of rule is not despotic. The life of the statesman on the other hand is better than a life of inaction; inactivity must not be placed above action.

Those are wrong, too, who argue that he who has most power can do the most good. This would make robbers and tyrants virtuous, but we can never do evil that good may come. Only the supremely best man has a right to absolute power.[1] Other rulers can have only relative power, such as good laws may confer. The contemplative philosopher may himself lead a life of activity. "A life of action does not necessarily have to take the form of rule over others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more indeed are those thoughts practical which are independent and have an end in themselves and exist for their own sake. For a state of well-doing (*εὐπραξια*) is their end, and this implies an action. We go so far as to say that those men are the most powerful agents, even in external matters, whose thoughts mould and master the world."[2]

In like manner states placed apart by themselves may lead an active life not through wars nor even merely by international trade; for activity can be found in the relation of its own parts, which may have many points of communication with each other. In a similar manner this same sort of activ-

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[1] Essay III. § 13.

[2] VII. 3. 8.

ity may be found in an individual man. Else hardly could God and the universe have a perfect life since they have no actions to perform outside and beyond those of their own sphere." An individual and a state may have their ends therefore in themselves, and philosopher and statesman may each share in the perfect life.

B. THE IDEAL CITY-STATE.

§ 4. *On the Scope of the Seventh Book.* Having concluded the preliminary discussion with respect to the best life, we ask now what fundamental principles we must lay down if we would have a city-state according to wish (κατ' εὐχήν)?[1] These fundamental principles developed in the seventh book, beginning with the fourth chapter, to which the first three chapters are introductory, may be grouped under seven heads: (1) Material conditions including a discussion of the population and the territory, chapters 4 to 7; (2) The economic constitution or social classes, the parts of the state which must not be confused with the material conditions, chapters 8 to 10; (3) The capital city, its site, streets, walls, market-places, building-regulations, public buildings, and other administrative equipment, chapters 11 to 12; (4) The ends of the state, problems of moral purpose and standards of legislation, chapter 13; (5) The framework of government, chapter 14; (6) Domestic institutions, the family, marriage, and education, chapters 15 to 17; (7) Public education, eighth book. The last of these topics will, on account of its importance, be considered separately under the sub-title, "Elements of a Theory of Education," while the remaining six topics will be considered in this essay as the special description of the ideal city-state.

The extraordinary interest and importance of the seventh book of The Politics, may be inferred from this array of the leading subjects considered in this book. The grouping of

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[1] In framing an ideal we should not pass beyond what is possible. See VII. 4. 2; II. 6. 7.

the subject-matter here given, constitutes an overwhelming argument in favor of the position taken in these essays, that the subject of the seventh book is not a discussion of the ideal government, but of the ideal city.[1] The few phrases which appear here and there in the text indicating that the subject under discussion is the ideal polity, are as nothing compared with the cumulative evidence of the book taken as a whole, and yet it is a failure to see this very fact that has given certain critics their main reasons for transposing the traditional order of the books.

As to what would be read into this seventh book of The Politics, if contemporary students of political science were to take up The Politics of Aristotle seriously, would, of course, depend largely on the personal equation of the reader. Some modern students would find here the broad foundations of political theory; others would see in this book rather an intimation of the relations of the science of politics to the other social sciences; while a few perhaps might find nothing here but a description of a somewhat highly drawn model of a Greek city in the best period of Greek history.

§ 5. *The Material Conditions of the Ideal City-State; The Question of Size.* The absolute material conditions of a state are two: (1) an aggregate of men *i. e.* a human population; and (2) a suitable territory for their habitation. Both of these points are considered quantitatively and qualitatively. Now the first element in a statesman's material is population; he will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country.

Most persons think that a state in order to be happy ought to be great; but even if they are bright, they have no idea of what is a great and what is a small state. For they judge the size of a city by the number of inhabitants; whereas they ought not to look to number but to power and capacity. For each state like each individual has a work to do, and the state

[1] Cp. § 1 of Essay III; and the foot note on p. 145.

that is best adapted for the fulfillment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in the same sense of the word in which Hippocrates might be called greater, not as a man but as a physician, than some one else who was taller."[1]

But, if we look at numbers at all, we should do so exclusive of slaves, metics, and strangers, and reckon only citizens *i. e.* such as have part in the government. Artisans alone will not make a great state. "For a great state and a populous one are not by any means the same thing."

States too large, Aristotle thinks, are seldom well governed. This experience clearly proves. He no doubt had in mind the massive monarchies of the East and of Egypt. But Aristotle proves the same point to his own satisfaction by deduction: "Law is order, good law is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly; to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of divine power—of such power as holds the universe in harmony."

A state should be large enough to be self-sufficing (*αὐταρκεία*) but it should be small enough to be well governed. There is thus a proper limit; if too small, it cannot be self-sufficing; if too large, though self-sufficing, it will be ungovernable—its army cannot be commanded by a single general! its assembly cannot be addressed by any orator!

Moreover, the state must not be too large, else how could citizens know each other sufficiently well to conduct the elections safely, or to administer the law in the law-courts? Besides, if the numbers are too great, foreigners and resident-aliens may easily assume the place of citizens for "it is not difficult to escape detection on account of the great crowds."

These arguments show strikingly the immense differences between the organization of the government and its administration in our day, and the states familiar to Aristotle. We shall presently return to a study of population in a discussion of the reaction of environment, climate and soil, on the character of the population.

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[1] VII. 4. 1—5.

§ 6. *The Nature of the Country; Location With Reference to Commerce and War.* Fertility and variety of soil are to be desired in order to secure an abundance and diversity of products. "In extent and magnitude the country which will be admired is one which is so large, that the citizens are able to live in the enjoyment of leisure with equal liberality and temperance."[1] But this we shall need to consider more fully below, when we examine the parts of the state and questions of property and wealth.[2]

In Aristotle's opinion it should lie favorably towards the sea, and it should have good harbors to promote commerce. The capital city should have a central position, easy of access from all parts of the country; it should be a military stronghold and favorably located as a base of supplies. It should command as far as possible a view of the entire country.

But in regard to the advantages of nearness to the sea there is a dispute, "for some say it is prejudicial to good order," [3] that it attracts a restless and unstable population. The commercial advantages of communication with the sea appeal strongly to Aristotle. He believes also in its advantage for military purposes, and does not hesitate to recommend the development of a merchant marine and reliance on the seamen in time of war. On this whole question he seems to write from the standpoint of an Athenian.

§ 7. *On the Character of the Population.* We ask next what should be the character of the population? This is a subject on which we can form a reasonably accurate judgment, if we cast our eyes on the more celebrated states of the Hellenes, and on the distribution of races in general in the habitable world. Those races which live in cold regions, those of [northern] Europe among the number, while full of spirit, are wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their freedom, but they are destitute of high political or-

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[1] VII. 5. 1.

[2] Chapters 8 to 11 of the seventh book; see § 8 of this Essay.

[3] VII. 6. 1.

ganization, and incapable of external dominion. The races of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit; and hence remain in a state of subjection and servitude. But the Greek race[1] which is intermediate between these topographically, shares also in the character of both; it is equally high-spirited and intellectual. Hence it continues free and is the best governed; if it could be united under one single government, it has the capacity to rule the world. But unfortunately the Greeks differ among themselves; some have a one-sided nature, and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a happy combination of both qualities. It is evident that a people which is to be easily guided by the lawgiver in the path of virtue, should be at once naturally intelligent and spirited."[2]

Courage and intelligence then are two characteristics required in the population of our ideal state, and according to the reasoning of Aristotle these qualities are racial and seem to be derived at least in part from environment. To these two a third is added, namely, a capacity for friendship or affection. There is an evident effort to connect friendship with passion or spirit, and we are left in doubt whether to class it as an independent characteristic or simply as an exhibition or expression of courage. But of the importance of friendship as a condition of political organization we are not allowed to doubt.[3] There is possibly some approach here to the discovery of the principle of consciousness of kind.

The possession of spirit is almost everything. Passion, *i. e.* spirit, begets love and hate. Spirit inspires men with the love of power and personal liberty; it is something sovereign and independent. But we should not, as Plato does,[4] bid men be gentle to friends and rough to strangers. High-minded men are not savage in nature toward anyone except to those who

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[1] In The Republic, IV. 435—6, Plato attributes passion or spirit to the Thracians and Scythians; love of knowledge to the Greeks; and love of money to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

[2] VII. 7. 1—4.

[3] Cp. VII. 7. 5—8.

[4] Republic II. 375.

do them wrong; and this anger in men is stirred more by the contempt or ingratitude of friends than by the injury of enemies. Cruel is the strife of brethren. They who love in excess also hate in excess.

"We have now said enough of the proper number and natural character of the members of our state as well as of the extent and character of the country."[1]

§ 8. *The Parts of the State.* The parts of a state must not be identified with its material conditions. The distinction between means and ends is made. "States require property (κτῆσις) but property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part of a state; for a city-state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible." It is in the search for this best life that laws arise and different forms of government develop.

"The various qualities of men are clearly the reason, why there are various kinds of states and many forms of government."

As different men pursue happiness in different ways and with different means, they produce for themselves variety in their mode of life and in their forms of government. If now we can enumerate the essential functions of life within a state, we shall have the indispensable conditions of the state, and in these we shall discover the necessary parts of a state.

The essential conditions or functions are these: "In the first place we must support the existence of the means of subsistence; secondly, of arts, for life requires many instruments; of armies, to maintain authority against disobedient subjects and against external assailants; in the next place, of a good revenue, call for which arises for administrative purposes at home and during war; in the fifth place, but really primarily, there must be a care of religion; sixth in order, but most necessary of all, there must be ways and means of determining what is for the best public interest, and what is just in men's dealings with one another, that is there must be a legislature and law

[1] VII. 7. 9.

courts."[1] These then are the indispensable functions of the aggregate population of a city-state, for it is a body not determined by chance, but self-supplying in the wants of life.

These social functions, things to be done, give us social classes devoted to the doing of them. Hence we have: (1) husbandmen; (2) artisians; (3) warriors; (4) capitalists; (5) priests; (6) counselors and judges. We have enumerated now the social functions to be performed, and the social classes that correspond to them; and these social classes are the parts of the state.

"It remains for us to consider whether the citizens must have a part in the performance of all of these functions, for it is possible for the same men in turn to perform all of them, to be both laborers in the fields and artisans, and also to belong to the bodies of counselors and judges, or should we assign [in an ideal state, in which we can make the arrangements we think best] different men to the performance of each of the functions that we have specified, or shall we regard some of these functions necessarily separate and others necessarily common to all [for the achievement of the best possible life.]"[2]

The social classes are the potential parts of the state; but it is not necessary that all the social classes should be admitted to citizenship, that is to a part in the government. The admission of all is characteristic of an extreme democracy, the exclusion of nearly all, of an extreme oligarchy. Aristotle feels himself compelled to exelude those who lead a mechanical or commercial life, because these pursuits in his opinion are ignoble and incompatible with absolute virtue; and for like reasons the tillers of the field because they would be without leisure. By this process three classes are excluded and three retained.

Warrior class, the priestly class, and the counselors and judges are to be admitted to the full and sole prerogatives of

[1] VII. 8. 7.
[2] VII. 9. 1.

citizenship. The consequence is that property in the land must be vested in these classes in the ideal state of Aristotle. Aristotle complains that Plato is not clear in his treatment of the lower and menial classes, but neither is Aristotle himself very explicit. It would seem that he must propose to hold the agricultural, mechanical and commercial classes in subjection, but in what degree of subjection he certainly does not explain.

The three classes which he retains he practically merges into a single class of landed proprietors, and this class becomes each of the three classes in turn; in their youth and young manhood they are the soldiers, the warrior class; in middle life and their old age (after their numbers have been decimated by wars) they become the counselors and judges; and finally in their extreme old age (few then surviving) they become the priests. The warrior, the counselor, judge, and the priest, are so intimately related to each other that the same men should either at the same time or in turn perform the offices for which they severally stand—"each function belongs to the time of life when different qualities are in their prime."[1]

Aristotle's ideal state is far from realizing a like equality for all men; it is an equality only for those at the top. The modern conception of democracy has broken down the lines of distinction between all the classes as Aristotle himself obliterated them between the classes he admitted to power in the state. Only in modern times has the true ideal of democracy been attained; the ancient democracies were at best but expansive oligarchies. No wonder Aristotle remarked: "If we would call a state happy, we must not look at some parts of it."[2]

The several social classes enumerated by Aristotle are coordinate in their development rather than consecutive; in the beginning of the life of states we find them fused, and it is only after states have attained a considerable maturity that we find them so clearly differentiated. But the analysis of

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[1] VII. 9. 5.
[2] VII. 9. 7.

Aristotle is in itself a fine sample of the acuteness of his reasoning and the thoroughgoing empiricism of his observation.

§ 9. *On the Antiquity of Certain Political Institutions; Public and Private Property in Land.* "Apparently it is not today or yesterday that the discovery has been made by these political philosophers that a state should be divided into classes and that the warrior class should be distinct from the agricultural. The system has continued in Egypt and Crete to this day, and was established it is said, by Sesostris in Egypt and by Minos in Crete."[1] The class system has undergone many modifications since Aristotle. An institution of equal antiquity is the syssitia or public meal, by which the several higher classes express and memorialize their unity and common origin.

Such institutions have their origin in the nature of things, and come to be established because the grounds on which they rest, have been repeatedly recognized in the long course of time. They are taught at first by the daily wants of life, and after that by the refinements of life. The development of political institutions proceeds in the same fashion. This is a fine statement of the theory that the initial basis of all institutions is economic.[2]

But some problems remain unsolved. Of these the question of property in land is one. Property in land, Aristotle holds, should be of two kinds; public or common, and private. Of public land there should be enough to constitute a public domain, from which resources for the support of the state might be obtained, for public worship, the administration of justice, public education, public defense, and the like.

Private land should be held in two portions: "one lying on the borders, and the other near the city, so that by giving two alotments to each individual, all would be interested in both parts of the country. * * * Where this method is not adopted, some are too ready to come to blows with their neigh-

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[1] VII. 10. 1.

[2] Cp. VII. 10. 7.

bors, while others are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of honor."[1]

Tillers of the land should be slaves, and there should be public and private slaves corresponding to the two divisions of property in land. But the hope of earning their freedom should be held out to slaves. For the agricultural labor a non-Greek subject population is preferred.

§ 10. *The Capital City.* Four considerations should govern its location: health, convenience, including an abundant water supply, military advantage, and administrative requirements.

"In the first place it should slope toward the east and face the breezes from the quarter of the sunrise, for these are healthier; next in importance it should be sheltered from the north-winds for cities so sheltered have milder winters. It should be readily accessible, both by land and by sea, for the citizens, but hard of approach for enemies. The water supply should be natural and abundant, drawn from springs or fountains in the city, or, if these are wanting, great reservoirs may be established, for the collection of rain-water, such as will not fail the inhabitants when cut off from the country by war."

"Special care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthfulness of the locality, and secondly on the use of good water, this latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. For the elements which we use most, and most frequently, for the support of our body, have the greatest influence upon our health, and among these are water and air. Wherefore in all wisely governed cities, if there is a want of pure water, and the supply is not allequally good, the drinking water should be separated from that which is used for other purposes."[2]

The next point of great importance is the military defenses. These should be constructed in all cases with reference to

[1] VII. 10. 12.
[2] VII. 11. 3–5.

beauty as well as use. This matter may well be considered under three separate heads: strongholds or fortifications, the arrangement of private houses and the walls.

Every city should have its strongholds, and they should be beautiful as well as useful. The stronghold suitable to different polities varies: "Thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or monarchy, but a plain to a democracy; neither of these to an aristocracy, but rather a number of strong positions."

The arrangement of private houses should not leave military advantage out of view. For beauty the system of Hippodamus,[1] namely, laying out cities in squares and blocks, which Aristotle called the modern fashion, is to be preferred; for security in war, the antiquated mode of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get out of a town and for assailants to find their way in, is better. A city should therefore adopt both plans of building.[2]

Our city should have walls, and the walls should be beautiful. The boast that a brave people should be without walls may have been appropriate at one time, but it is foolish now. No amount of valor in an open plain is proof against overwhelming numbers. The best preparation possible should be made for war. All recent inventions should be applied and new ones devised. To be well prepared for war is one way of keeping from war.

Finally certain external requirements for the administration of the government must be provided. There must in the first place be suitable places for the common meals, and the whole city must be portioned into messes. The walls of the city should have guard towers and fortifications at suitable intervals, and these could be used to accomodate the public messes. But certain special buildings will be needed for the more important public messes and others set apart for the worship of

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[1] Cp. II. 8. 1.; § 9 of Essay II.

[2] In our time a favorite plan is to have certain streets, four or more, radiate from a common centre intersecting the block system in order to assist in the rapid mobilization of the army toward any point of the compass in case of attack, *e. g.* Washington, U. S. A.

the gods. Temples and other public buildings should invariably occupy conspicuous positions.

Besides our city must provide an agora for freemen, which should be the meeting-place of citizens, and a sort of school ground where the gymnastic exercises of the elder men and the youths may be held. Then there should be an agora for business, distinct from the former and in a different part of the city; it should occupy a position where imported merchandise and the domestic products of the country can be readily brought together.

Then there must be a place for the law-courts, and a place for the magistrates both urban and rural. The suburban or rural magistrates must have their guard houses and messes when on duty. Religious establishments should also be distributed throughout the country, some in honor of the gods and others in honor of heroes. "But let us spend no more time on details of this sort; the difficulty does not lie in forming plans on matters of this sort, but in carrying them out."[1]

C. THE ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF EDUCATION.

§ 11. *The Conditions of Happiness.* In chapters 4 to 12 of the seventh book, Aristotle has discussed the social constitution of the state, what might be called broadly the political economy of the state. In chapter 13 he turns to an inquiry respecting the true end of the state, and best means of realizing this end. The true end of the state he has repeatedly announced to be a good life. The good life he identifies with happiness. Happiness then, as he defines it, is the end of the state. The means for realizing that end is the practice of virtue, joined with the possession of a moderate amount of external goods *i. e.* of wealth and health. The most important aids to the attainment of these means of a good life are: "a correct plan of government, that is a correct polity, and a body

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[1] VII. 12—9.

of laws framed in harmony with the polity, guaranteeing to the individual freedom and opportunity for attaining a complete life; and (2) a system of education in harmony with the polity and the laws, designed to bring the youth of each generation as they reach manhood to an appreciation of their heritage and opportunities to attain for themselves the measure of a complete life. When Aristotle comes to describe the conditions of realizing happiness in the ideal state, he breaks with the common habit of his age, which merged the individual in the state; he seems indeed to aim to make the state an organism to subserve the happiness of the individual, and "to make the spiritual life of the individual the standard whereby to judge of the commonwealth."[1]

Virtues are relative and absolute. "By relative, I mean what is forced on us by necessity; by absolute, what is intrinsically excellent." Assuming now the possession of a moderate amount of wealth, through what scientific and deliberate choice of measures shall we secure the goodness of the state? By education, is his answer, man becomes good. What makes a good state? Good citizens. How then do men become good? Through the harmonious action of nature, habit and reason; and this can be secured only through a system of education. Therefore, the most important thing now left us is education.

But, we must first determine what should be the form of government for our ideal state, because the form of government, that is the polity, must determine in large measure the form of education. Political organization having been discussed at length under separate title in preceedings books, particulary in the third and the fourth, is not dwelt upon at length in this connection; here questions which lie behind the constitution are mainly considered.

§ 12. *The Form of Government and Education.* The form of government, which presents itself to the mind of Aris-

[1] Cp. Andrew Lang in introduction to Bolland and Lang, Aristotle's Politics, p. 65, and foot-note of same page.

totle as most suitable, may be inferred from his leading question and his answer to it: "Should the rulers and the ruled be different persons or the same for life?"

The answer to this question, as he expressly says, will be of fundamental importance in determining what kind of education shall be given to the rulers and ruled. If they are to be the same, then their education will also be the same at least to a certain extent. Aristotle repeatedly insists that the form of education must correspond to the form of government;[1] and in his ideal-state he would demand a universal education, an education of all men not in our sense, but of all whom he recognized as citizens.

The most suitable form of government for the ideal-state he believed to be a democracy, but a democracy, to use his own forcible words, based on proportion, that is on quality, and not on mere numbers. This ideal form is described in the fourteenth chapter of the seventh book. Jowett and other students have held that Aristotle is describing here an aristocracy, because he puts a different construction upon the principle of rotation in office. Here it is a rotation of office from one set of persons in one generation to another set in a succeeding generation, who rule during a period of years. In the discussion of the principle of rotation in office elsewhere in The Politics, it generally means that offices shall be held for a short term only to be succeeded by others, who would in a short time give way to successors and so on in a series.[2]

"That there should be a distinction between the rulers and the ruled admits of no discussion."[3] And, if we could find as clear a distinction between men and men, as there is between men and gods or demigods, such a distinction should be recognized and the distinctly superior be set apart to rule once and for all time. But such clear distinctions do not exist, and we

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[1] This thought is elaborated by Montesquieu in his Spirit of Laws in the fourth book, which treats of the laws of education in relation to the principles of government.

[2] See § 12 and § 16 of Essay IV.

[3] VII. 14. 4.

must therefore set about to find a working basis upon which to develop the appropriate difference.

Happily "nature has supplied the distinction by making that which is the same in kind at one time younger, at another older. And it is well that the former should be subject and the latter rule. No one grumbles at being in subjection on the ground of age, or thinks that he is superior, more especially when he is going to have this privilege in his turn when he has reached the proper age. The truth is, we must say that in one sense the same and in another different persons are rulers and subjects; so that their education also in one sense must necessarily be the same, in another different. Then we say that the man who is to be a good ruler must first have been a subject. Authority exists, as we said in earlier books, in one form for the benefit of the ruler, in another for the benefit of the subject. The first we call despotic, the second that of a free people."[1] The argument here concerning polity is entirely in harmony with that of preceding books, when allowance is made for the fact that Aristotle is here describing the ideally best; it is in accord with the effort elsewhere made to show that government is for the good of the governed, and that all should share in the government. That an age qualification is established as a condition of taking office is no more than is demanded even yet in the most liberal democracies. When we say that the picture here is of a democracy, it must of course, be understood, that it is that type of democracy which is called a republic, a polity, and not the lawless form in which the many are above the law. Most of the socalled contradictions of polity in The Politics disappear on a close examination, if the rules of interpretation are liberal and scientific rather than rigid and pedantic.

We have just seen that in our ideal-state because the same men rule and are subjects in turn, they ought to have the same education. Education should be the same for yet another reason, a reason adverted to in VII. 13. 10. and restated in 14. 8., namely that the virtue of a citizen when a ruler

[1] VII. 14. 5—7.

is identical with the virtue of the best man. The anxious care of a legislator then must be how to make all men good, and he must inquire what pursuits must be followed as means, and what are the ultimate ends to be kept in view. This leads us to a formal consideration of our next topic.

§ 13. *Education, and the Aims of the State.* The importance attached to the problems of education as a distinctive part of the art and science political is one of the marked features of the political philosophy of Aristotle no less than of Plato. On this subject as on many others, Aristotle borrows largely from Plato, but without quoting Plato except to differ from him.

Certain principles of education and the true aims of the state are deduced from the same philosophical analysis of mind and life, of reality and conduct. Everything is made up of parts, a lower and a higher, and the lower should be subservient to the higher for it is always for the sake of the higher. Thus the soul has two parts, a higher having reason in itself and a lower, not having reason, but obeying reason; reason itself has two parts, the lower or practical, and the higher or speculative, giving sanction to lower and higher actions; so life has two parts, business and pleasure; war and peace; and actions are useful and necessary or honorable.

Likewise there are two kinds of education. And in all things the useful is for the sake of the honorable, the lower for the sake of the higher; "there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable." All these points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all he must consider what is really superior, and the highest end; he should also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and useful, but what is honorable is better.

In such principles and to these aims persons of every age which requires education should be trained."[1]

No existing states, Aristotle contends, keep these fundamental truths sufficiently in the foreground in their institutions and laws. "Even the best governed do not appear to have kept in view either the highest end in the composition of their constitutions, or all the virtues in the arrangement of their laws and education; but have fallen back in a vulgar spirit upon those more useful and more paying."[2]

Even certain political philosophers[3] are short-sighted enough to praise constitutions like the Lacedemonian which makes conquest and war the sole aim of the state. The propriety of this aim which may be refuted by argument, has already been proved fallacious by history, for the Lacedemonians with the loss of their empire cannot be regarded as a happy people. Thimbron and other writers admire the Lacedemonians for their brutal courage. "These writers further err about the sort of government, which the legislators (politicists) should approve."—They approve despotic government, but this is certainly less noble than the government of freemen by freemen. But the lower aim of the state leads to war and conquest for their own sake and these in turn to despotic government. Moreover this low aim of the state cannot be defended on account of the inferences to which it would lead. By a similar line of argument we could show that those individual citizens are greatest and best who rob and steal. Every citizen under the inspiration of the Spartan ideal must needs seek to vault himself upon the back of others; whereas the legislator should instill into men's minds only those sentiments, which are equally the best for individuals and communities."[4]

The proper motives of war are: (1) To escape falling into slavery to others; (2) to seek supremacy only for the interest of the governed and not absolute and universal mastery; (3)

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1 VII. 14. 7.
2 VII. 14. 15.
3 The allusion is again to Plato; Cp. Laws I. 628, 638.
4 Cp. VII. 14. 20—21.

to reduce to subject those who are naturally intended for slaves. Experience confirms the importance of this moderation, for history shows that states which live only for war can live only by war; while engaged in war they are safe, but no sooner have they established their empire then they fall to pieces, "for, like a sword, they lose their temper by being unemployed."[1]

Therefore the virtues requisite for leisure must be found in the ideal-state. Public and private virtue are correlative. As individuals so ought states to be temperate and brave and patient. The lower virtues prepare for the higher. The virtues of business and leisure are alike necessary; and leisure is the crown of toil. Many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. "Courage and endurance are required for business, and philosophy for leisure; temperance and justice for both."[2]

Temperance and justice are specially necessary in time of peace, for war compels men to be just and temperate; they are most of all needed in prosperity, for prosperity has its dangers; and it is peculiarly disgraceful to show excellent qualities in war, and to be no better than a slave in peace and leisure. The leisure class, in the opinion of Aristotle must make it their business to serve the state, to be public servants.

§ 14. *The Importance of Public or Compulsory Education and the Logical Order of Education.* Excellence of character comes in three ways; by nature *i. e.* by natural endowment; by habit and practice; and by intellectual apprehension. The view taken by Aristotle is that it comes in these three ways, and each is an essential condition of high character. First of all there must be a reasonable natural endowment to start with, that is, there must be a certain predisposition to virtue. This germ must be laid hold of by instruction and guidance; and virtue must become established through repeated and continuous exercise of virtuous actions.

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[1] VII. 14. 22.
[2] VII. 15. 3.

"Now for a man to meet with right guidance towards virtue from his youth up, is no easy matter, unless his education is guided by laws which have this same virtue for their type. For to lead a life of temperance and endurance is for most men no pleasant task, and least of all is it so for the young. * * * Therefore the whole life should be ordered by some rational system, and organized in accordance with a perfect moral code, enforced by a sanction of sufficient strength."[1]

The parental rule, Aristotle argues further, in the closing chapter of the Nichomachæan Ethics, has not sufficient strength. Only the commands resting on the united strength of the state carry with them a compelling sanction of their own. Laws are, as it were, the dictates in which abstract prudence and reason are embodied. When a fellowman thwarts us we hate him, but the law which is an abstract command incurs no odium.

Moreover, the state has custom-making power, and "nothing will ever be grievous which custom has made familiar."[2]

In the Ethics, Aristotle says, that but few states except the Lacedæmonian, had concerned themselves about public education; and that they "permitted each man to live as he deemed wise in his own eyes, exercising over spouse and child, a primitive and partriarchal sway like the one-eyed giant in Homer."[3]

Public education, he argues further in the Ethics, should however be supplemented by a system of private education. First, because so many states are indifferent and do not provide a private education; and secondly, even if there is a comparatively complete public system, there still remain a number of things which private effort can alone accomplish.

In any case from the standpoint of public and of private education a legislator should qualify himself for the mastery of these problems by a study of the theory of legislation, which here is equivalent to the theory of the aims and

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[1] Nich. Eth. X. 9.; Williams' translation, p. 321—2.
[2] Williams, p. 321.
[3] Williams, p. 323.

ends of human society and the means of obtaining them. It is from the discussion of education in The Ethics, that Aristotle passes to the study of politics.

The logical order of education may now be examined.[1] We have already determined what natural endowments a people should have, § 7 above. So it now remains for us to consider whether education should proceed first by the help of reason or by the development of habit. He decides, like modern educators in favor of making education at first chiefly disciplinary. But reason and habit, he insisted, should be developed in perfect harmony with each other.

Moreover, as the desires develop before the reason and the understanding, so we must attend to the body before the soul, to the appetitive part before the intelligence; but each lower part is for the next higher.

Seeing then, that the legislator must consider how the bodies of those to be reared as citizens may be of the best quality, he must in the first place consider the union of the parents, and decide at what time and under what personal conditions they should enter into the state of marriage. Hence we must consider

§ 15. *Education and Family.* The state should determine:[2] the conditions of marriage with respect to the age of marriage and the relative ages of husband and wife, competency to provide support for offspring, and physical constitution.

Aristotle's remarks on these subjects are both suggestive and entertaining. The legislator must consider the right times for persons to marry, and who are the proper sort of persons to contract marriage. In considering the relative ages of husband and wife, he must have in view first that they should arrive simultaneously at corresponding periods of life in order that there may be no discrepancy in their powers, from which mutual bickerings and dissensions often arise, and secondly that the marriage should take place at an age suitable for

[1] VII. 15. 7—10.
[2] VII. 16.

rearing children, not too young, lest parents and children be too nearly of an age to insure proper relations of obedience and respect, nor too old lest the children be deprived of the companionship and support of their parents. The bodily condition of parents and children is given much attention.

The state may prescribe regulations for the care and conduct of mothers. Society has a right to insist on its new membership coming into existence under the most favorable conditions. Therefore the mother may be directed to take exercise and nourishing diet; but her mind unlike her body should be comparatively indolent and free from anxiety.[1] (3) The state may prescribe laws designed to regulate the numbers of the population and its quality. The exposure of defective children at birth is recommended. "On the other hand the exposure of children simply on the ground of their number is prevented by the established customs of the state."[2] The problem of limiting the population to the means of subsistence is ever present to the mind of Aristotle. It was a pressing problem for the ancients on account of the stationary character of the arts of production. (4) The state may prescribe laws to guard the sanctity of the family and fix penalties for violations of the same. Infidelity in the relations of husband and wife is held to be disgraceful under any circumstances, but especially so during the period of life devoted to the rearing of children.[3]

§ 16. *On the Care of Young Children.* The last chapter of the seventh book is one of extraordinary excellence; it is devoted in greater part to a consideration of the exercise, clothing, amusements, and moral surroundings of young children, and closes with a discussion of the suitable ages into which the period of childhood and youth may be divided for the purposes of a logical and systematic education. Modern students of education will find much of value in Aristotle's

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1 VII. 16. 14.

2 VII. 16, 15; Welldon, p. 215.

3 VII. 16. 18.

brief treatise on education. Those desiring to study Aristotle's views of education at first hand, should consult especially the seventh book, chapters 13 to 17, and the eighth book and the ninth chapter of the fifth book of The Politics, and the closing chapters of the last book of The Ethics.

When children have been born the character of their diet is at once of great importance. "The example of animals and the experience of nations, that rear soldiers prove, that an abundant milk diet is the one most naturally suited to the body; but the less wine the better, if they would escape diseases."[1]

Constant exercise is desirable, but exercise should be without over-exertion. Motion of every kind is good for children. In some countries mechanical appliances are used to straighten out their limbs. A certain degree of exposure to endure hardship is recommended. "It is best to teach everything that can be taught by habituation at the youngest age possible, and to teach by gradual advances." The custom of Celts to clothe their children with light garments and of some barbarians in dipping them into cold streams is cited apparently with approval.

"Up to the age of five no demand should be made on the child for study or labor, lest its growth be impeded; and there should be sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being inactive. This can be secured among other ways by amusement, but the amusement should not be vulgar or tiring or riotous. The directors of education * * * should be careful what tales or stories the children hear, for the sports of children are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnest. Those are wrong who [like Plato] in The Laws attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, exercise their bodies. * * * The children should be left as little as possible with slaves * * * all that is mean and low

[1] VII. 17. 1.

should be banished from their sight and hearing. * * * And since we banish improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or tales which are indecent."[1]

The young must not go to the theatre until they are old enough to take their place at the common meals. They should see only what is good; for their first impressions color their whole life. "Theodorus, the tragic actor, was quite right in saying that he would not allow any other actor, not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, because the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. And the same principle of association applies universally to things as well as persons, for we always like best whatever comes first."

"When the first five years have passed, during the two following years they must look at the pursuits which they are hereafter to learn. There are two periods of life into which education has to be divided, from seven to the age of pubescence and onwards from that age to the age of one-and-twenty. Those who divide the ages rigidly by sevens are not always right; we should rather adhere to the divisions actually made by nature; for it is the object of art generally, and therefore of education, to fill up what nature leaves incomplete. We must therefore consider whether we should adopt any particular system of education; whether its supervision should be public or private; and what this supervision should be in detail."[2]

It may be observed that Aristotle divides the first seven years into practically three periods: first the very infancy—he does not suggest how long this is, then up to the age of five; and finally the two years from five to seven.

§ 17. *The System of Education; the Proper Aims of Education.* The system of education we are again informed at the opening of the eighth book, which is a continuation of the seventh and not a distinct portion of The Politics at all, should

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[1] VII. 17. 4—9; Jowett, v. 1, p. 241—2.

[2] VII. 17. 13—16.

be relative to the polity. This we are told also in the ninth chapter of the fifth book, and we find it intimated elsewhere.[1] Aristotle thinks education should unquestionably be public. "Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that its supervision should be public and not private; supervision should not be private as at present, when every one looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. The citizens moreover belong to the state, and the education of any one should have in view the welfare of all the rest."[2] Here Aristotle affirms the dependence of the individual on the state; but his conception of the state is that of a living selfconscious personality, a conception very different from that which meets us so often in our own time, by which the state becomes a mere machinery of governments, or what is worse nothing but the interest of a party organization. In § 11 of this Essay attention was called to the liberality and breadth of view with which Aristotle proceeds to find his standards of education by law. "That it should be an affair of the state is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be considered. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral virtue."[3] What should be the aims of education? Should it be the useful in life, or virtue, or the higher knowledge? Occupations are classed as liberal and illiberal, that is, those becoming a free man and those suitable for slaves or dependents. Even the freeman finds it necessary to understand and do certain things. There are some employments and arts entirely suitable for the freeman. Aristotle holds that the useful as well

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1 VIII. 1; Cp. also § 15 of this Essay, and § 14 of Essay IV.

2 VIII. 1. 3—4.

3 VIII. 2. 1.

as the liberal must be taught. He attaches much importance to the question respecting the aims of education, whether the education is undertaken and desired as a means of making a living or for the sake of enhancing one's rational enjoyment of life. The object therefore, which one sets before him, determines whether a given study is liberal or illiberal.

§ 18. *The Usual Subjects of Education.* The customary branches of education are enumerated by Aristotle as four: (1) reading and writing; (2) gymnastic exercises); (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these the first and the last are pre-eminently practical *i. e.* useful; but the other two are not so distintively useful. Music and gymnastics may be made ornamental as well as useful. Of all these subjects music gets by far the most attention in the eighth book.

Aristotle raises the question whether a gentleman may devote himself to music. To this question the answer is a provisional one. In the first place he cannot do so as a professional musician. But men require amusement, relaxation and stimulation. And in this respect it is admirably suited to meet a want. Music indeed is to children of a larger growth what the rattle of Archytas[1] is to very young children; it gives them something to do and keeps them quiet. Music is useful for the rational enjoyment of leisure. "Music in virtue of its power to make glad the heart of man is naturally introduced into social gatherings and festivities. From this fact alone we might infer the propriety of giving the younger citizens an education in music."[2]

Aristotle makes it clear that, in his day as in ours, a musical critic was esteemed more highly than a mere performer on musical instruments. The discussion concerning education in music closes with a rather extended consideration of musical instruments and the melodies in vogue. He decides against the flute and the harp as instruments upon which all should

[1] Cp. VIII. 6. 2.

[2] VIII. 5. 11; Welldon, p. 235.

learn to play; and suggests that they are suitable for some occasions only. Among melodies he expresses a preference for the Dorian which he regarded as manly and moral in its effects. The Phrygian melody is conceded to be appropriate to certain festival occasions; while the gentle Lydian may be employed for the entertainment of young children.

We are surprised that in his treatment of music Aristotle gives so little attention to the literature which accompanies music and which by Plato is treated as the principal part of music. But this omission is likely explained by the fact that Aristotle treated this subject separately in his Poetics, a work of his own to which he makes express reference.[1] Mathematics, a subject so admirably developed by Plato in his theory of education receives almost no mention from Aristotle. This omission along with some others is difficult to explain.

Aristotle seems to have been profoundly impressed by the tendencies to excessive training in athletics, notably among the Spartans. The fall of Lacedæmon added force to his feeling that the bodily training had been carried forward at the expense of the higher parts of man, his sensibilities and his intellect. "Parents who devote their children to gymnastics, while they neglect their necessary education in other respects, in reality vulgarize them. * * * It is an admitted principle that gymnastic exercises should be employed in education, and that for children they should be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful toil, lest the growth of the body be impaired. The evil of excessive training in early years is strikingly proved by the Olympic victors; for not more than two or three of them have gained a prize both as boys and as men; their early training and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. When boyhood is over, the three years which follow, should be spent in other studies; the period of life after that may then be devoted to

[1] VIII. 7. 3. The reader who wishes to consult The Poetics of Aristotle, if referred to S. H. Butcher's edition of the text, with a translation, Macmillan, 1895.

hard exercise and strict regimen. The mind and the body should not be put to severe exertion at the same time."[1]

Plato's treatment of the subject of education viewed as a whole is more complete and exhaustive in point of detail than the treatment of Aristotle. Plato fills out his scheme of education with more precise statement of his purpose and plan; he distinguishes more clearly and more broadly than Aristotle between elementary education and the higher education of youth. The theory of education is easily one of the most attractive features in The Republic of Plato.[2]

§ 19. *The Greek Idea of the State.* With both Plato and Aristotle the construction of an ideal-state merges into a scheme of national education. As Professor Butcher has observed: "To the Greeks as to Burke 'the state is a partnership in all science, in all art, in every virtue, in all perfection.' It is just this partnership in all perfection that practical politicians put out of sight;"[3] and those political philosophers who narrow political science to a theory of the state in that exclusive sense which makes it nothing more than a machinery of government, do the same thing.

The state is not merely an association for the protection of property-rights and nothing more; the state has also a spiritual function, and must look to the higher as well as to the lower needs of society.[4]

Not alone Aristotle, but the Greek political philosophers generally, regarded the state as an organic unity, as a community, and not as a government merely; they held that states as well as individuals should prefer moral before material well-being, and while we should aim at the general welfare of all, we should value none the less the possible perfection of the few. They saw, too, that no state can survive after there ceases to be a common will; consequently they deprecated the

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1 VIII. 4; Jowett, v. 1, p. 248—9; Welldon, p. 231—2.

2 See Essays I and II on The Republic.

3 Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, 2d Edition, p. 81.

4 Cp. § 10 of Essay III., p. 95, with foot note 4.

tendencies to extreme party spirit, and urged the principle of education in harmony with the spirit of the constitution.

The chief defects in the Greek theory of the state were first a failure to mark out a positive sphere of freedom for the individual; there was no consistent exemption of the concerns of private life from the legal interference of the government; and secondly, there was a complete moral effacement of certain classes of the community, democracy even stood for only a small proportion of the entire population, merely the apex of a pyramid representing the total population. Both of these defects are resolvable into an incomplete conception of personality, the independent worth and dignity of all human beings. The higher conceptions of the value of the individual began when Plato made moral virtue the basis of personality, and they were consummated by the stoic philosophy and the teachings of Christianity.

Contemporary states number their members by millions, where in the old days there were thousands; but local government when based on rational principles can do much toward conserving the old unity of the body corporate.

STUDIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

The Republic of Plato and The Laws and other Platonic dialogues, such as the Gorgias, and notably the Statesman, have a great interest to the student of politics understood in its profound and original signification as the science of associated living. In this broad sense the science of politics is in our day being supplanted by the modern science of sociology, and it has as such an equal interest to the moralist and psychologist as well as to the economist and publicist.

The student who turns to Plato for information on the mere details of public law will find little to reward him for his efforts, but he who comes to inquire for fundamental principles upon which the superstructure of a body of public law may rest, and principles upon which large problems of public policy may be determined, will find what he looks for if he has the patience to study Plato. These studies in The Political Philosophy of Plato are designed to aid those who have not time to undertake a study of Plato at first hand to an appreciation of his large points of view and an insight into his analysis of the fundamental laws upon which human associations, and above all, political organization, must rest.

References to the text are made in such a way that the reader may at his option find a passage in the Greek text of Stephanus, or in either of the standard English translations of The Republic. Happily the marginal page references in Jowett's translation (The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English with analysis and introductions in five volumes. Third edition, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892. The Republic being found in volume III.), and in that other well-known and admirable translation of The Republic by Davies and Vaughan (Macmillan & Co., 1893) correspond; in as much as all of these translators used the standard Greek text of Stephanus. The reader may also find his way in the text of Jowett and Campbell.

The reader needs to take some pains at first to find the references in the translations cited, as he will naturally expect to follow the running page of the books, to which he is referred rather than the references back to another text found in the margins of the translations noted.

Upon the other dialogues of Plato, which have an interest to the student of political philosophy, we may add a few comments. Following the order of arrangement by Jowett, we may briefly indicate their character from those points of view which might attract the student of political or social science. The sketch here given is necessarily brief. It calls attention to a side of the dialogues, which might be profitably presented at greater length in a completed study of the political philosophy of Plato.

In the first place we have the three charming sketches supposed to have been written in the early manhood of Plato, the Charmides, the Lysis, and the Laches, which contain respectively discussions of temperance, love, and courage, with some incidental notice of the relations of knowledge and virtue. The Protagoras, the Euthydemus, the Cratylus, which follow have an indirect interest for the light which they throw upon the development of Greek science at the hands of the philosophers and the sophists. The Protagoras is a study in philosophy, the Euthydemus in logic, and the Cratylus in philology, but all of them cast some side-lights on politics.

In the Phædrus, that gem of the dialogues, Plato gives us incidentally a scale on which he ranks men by pursuits, (Jowett, v. 1, p. 454–5): (1) the philosopher; (2) the righteous king or warrior chief; (3) politicists, economists, and capitalists; (4) gymnasts and physicians; (5) prophets and priests; (6) poets and painters, imitative artists; (7) artisans and husbandmen; (8) sophists and demagogues; (9) tyrants. The latter part of the Phædrus is devoted to a discussion of rhetoric, regarded as the art of public discourse. This subject is more fully treated in the Gorgias. Ion is a brief essay in criticism, while the Symposium has its hints on education and similar subjects.

The Meno is an attempt to answer the question whether virtue can be taught. The Euthyphro is a study in religion and a question in law. The Apology is an oration in court. The Crito contains a remarkable passage asserting the majesty and inviolableness of law (Jowett, v. 2, pp. 151—6). The Phædo is on the immortality of the soul. The Gorgias deserves careful study; in his analysis of public discourse, Socrates being the speaker, Plato shows profound insight into the laws underlying the formation of public opinion and the conditions of success in public life. In the I. Alcibiades there is an elaborate plea in behalf of special education for public service. The Timæus contains a brief synopsis of the Republic (Jowett, v. 3, pp. 437—48) and important utterances on education and other subjects. For an admirable description of the effect of the profession of law on character, and for a comparison of the lawyer and the philosopher we may turn to the Theætetus (Jowett, v. 4, pp. 230—4); this dialogue also contains several paragraphs on the double signification of terms like the just and expedient, 236—8, and Socrates again poses as the critic of the orators and lawyers, who are content with and aim at persuasion, make-believe, instead of knowledge. In the introduction of the Sophist there is an analysis of the forms of wealth-getting. This subject is taken up systematically in the Eryxias now generally recognized as not by Plato (Jowett, v. 4, Appendix.)

The Parmenides is almost exclusively devoted to problems in ontology, but in the Philebus and the Theætetus we again return to problems of knowledge and conduct, epistemology and ethics. The Statesman and The Laws are, of course, as distinctively political treatises as The Republic itself.

I.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE AND ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.[1]

A. PROVISIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF JUSTICE.[2]

§ 1. *Introduction.* Plato in his characteristic and best style describes in detail the incidents, which unexpectedly led to the dialogue which is now known as The Republic (ἡ πολιτεία). The chief disputants are Socrates and two disciples of the Socratic school, Glaucon and Adeimantus, brothers of Plato. There is a larger company present, most of whom are silent listeners except at the opening of the dialogue.

The conversation takes place in the house of Cephalus, in the Piræus, where Socrates and a friend had gone in the morning to witness the celebration of a religious festival. As they were about to return to Athens, the son of Cephalus, Polemarchus, by a messenger urges them to join other friends and remain in the Piræus for the rest of the day to witness some horse races in the evening.

The conversation, as Platonic conversations always did, turned at once to a theme appropriate to the name and fame of the guests. Cephalus, the host, is an aged man who has reached the evening of life in possession of a moderate fortune and a degree of culture that enables him to enjoy converse with the poets and philosophers. Men's characters and tempers, Cephalus tells his friends, are at bottom the real ex-

[1] The Republic Bks. I.–IV.

[2] The Republic I, II, 357–68.

planation of the complaints, which accompany old age and not old age itself; "for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition, youth and age are equally a burden." Wealth, it is conceded by Cephalus, is a great blessing to a good man, because it relieved him from all temptation to deceive or defraud others. When in old age, as he nears his end, and the day of his judgment approaches, a man "finds that the sum of his transgressions is great, he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forbodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin (ἀδίκημα) sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age."

But, what is justice—What is it to be without sin?

§ 2. *Preliminary Definitions of Justice.* "Speak the truth and pay your debts, satisfies Cephalus as a definition of justice. Cephalus is the type of a prosperous Athenian and a representative of the ancient traditions and the older civilization. But Socrates presses the definition to some tests, and Cephalus disliking argument, hands it over to his son, Polemarchus, and the company. Like Cephalus, as Jowett observes,[1] Polemarchus is limited in his point of view, and represents the proverbial stage of morality, which has rules of life rather than principles. Polemarchus, quoting Simonides as Cephalus quoted Pindar, approves the first definition, but states it in a new form. The repayment of a debt is just. Socrates analyzes this proposition and shows casuistically that there may be circumstances under which it would not be right to return a debt, when, for example it would injure the depositor. This correction Polemarchus accepts in the name of Simonides, because, as he says, the latter thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil. Socrates, who never misses an opportunity to show that the poets are not exact thinkers, suggests that Simonides, after the manner of poets,

[1] Jowett's Plato v. 3, Introduction to The Republic p. X.

has spoken darkly of justice. Corrected the definition would stand thus: Justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

But Socrates is not yet done with the definition. In what way does justice do good to friends and harm to enemies? In making alliance with friends and war against enemies. Then in time of peace justice will be of no use. No; it is useful also in peace *e. g.* in contracts, *i. e.* in money partnerships—particularly when you want a deposit safely kept. Again Socrates argues facetiously, that he who is good at keeping money is also good at stealing it, quoting Homer. Polemarchus, who is unused to dialectic, a mere child in the hands of the master, makes the admission that the just man is also a thief.

But who are friends and enemies? To appearance we must add the test of reality! "Many a man who is ignorant of human nature, has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit," 334.

But, finally, ought the just to injure any one at all? No! and by this test the definition must fail. Justice cannot produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or the musician by his art men unmusical. The injuring of another can in no case be just. Our definition therefore cannot be a true one, and it can not have been given by a sage or poet, but must first have been uttered by some rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his power, like Periander or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias the Theban.

Thus the morality, which rests on maxims and proceeds by rule is shown to be inadequate. The authority of the poets is set aside, "and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries."[1] This explanation of justice as the art of doing good

[1] Jowett, the Dialogues of Plato, 3d Ed. v. 3, p. XIX.—Compare the words of a Persian quoted by Jowett on the same page: "If, because I do evil, Thou punishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me?"

to seeming and real friends, and evil to seeming and real enemies having failed, another trial definition is introduced.

§ 3. *That Justice is the Interest of the Stronger.* This point of view is championed by Thrasymachus, a Sophist. From Aristotle (Rhetoric iii. I. 7; ii. 23. 29), and later from Cicero and Quintilian, we learn that Thrasymachus was a man of note whose writings were preserved for some centuries.

Might is right. Justice is the interest of the stronger, *i. e.* of the ruler. This view has still many champions both among practical politicians and in academic circles. In fact we may speak of a contemporary reaction in favor of this view. There are, explains Thrasymachus, different forms of government: tyrannies, democracies, aristocracies. The government is the ruling power in each state. * * * And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean, when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government, and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger."[1] "I understand you," says Socrates.

§ 4. *Objections to this Definition.* But Socrates urges certain objections against the position of Thrasymachus: The ruler or stronger may make a mistake; then the supposed interest of ruler or stronger is not his real interest. This is first admitted, but later retracted on the ground that a ruler as ruler, like an artist as artist, cannot make a mistake. Socrates accepts this position and then shows that an artist as artist, so a ruler as ruler, always finds the interest of his art outside of himself and in his art, *e. g.* medicine does not con-

[1] I. 338-9.

sider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body; and no true physician considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient. Every art and every science has an interest or end quite apart from the accidental relation of the artist to his art. Justice is the interest of those who come under the sway of the ruler and government, it is for the sake of the governed, not merely for the sake of the governing.

Thrasymachus sees the force of this distinction and replies with abusive invective: "Have you a nurse? * * * She leaves you to snivel and never wipes your nose; she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. * * You fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas as not to know about the just and unjust, as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, they are the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and that injustice is the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just; he is the stronger and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness which is very far from being their own.

Consider further * * that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts; wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the state; when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received, the one gains nothing, the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing

out of the public, because he is just; moreover, he is hated by his friends and acquaintances for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal, *i. e.*, the tyrant, is the happiest of men, and the sufferers, or those who refuse to do injustice, are the most miserable—the tyrant who by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public, for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace. They who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, menstealers, swindlers, and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of citizens, has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens, but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For men censure injustice fearing that they may be the victims of it, and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown * * * injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest."[1]

The excuse which may be offered for so long an extract from an argument sophistical lies in its startling modernness, the out-and-out contemporary ring of the argument; one might suppose it to have been urged within a year by some of our own politicians. But thank heaven, as Socrates might have said, politicians of our own day are not all of this faith, altho their class is still by far too numerous. Our better public sentiment in democratic republics like the United States and France, let us hope, is nevertheless in sympathy with the crit-

[1] I. 343-4.

icism which Plato urges by the mouth of Socrates against this view.

Following the contention that every art and every science has its end or interest distinct from and apart from its artist or professor, Thrasymachus is told that he does not use terms in the same and exact sense. "Altho' you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep, not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd as such is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied."

§ 5. *The Reward of Ruler Distinguished from his Function.* The reward of the governor can be distinguished from the art or science of ruling or governing. The several arts, then, are distinguished from one another by their several functions. Each art has a special and not merely a general function. Moreover, there is one art common to all the arts [in consequence of the division of labor by which the services rendered in the several arts must be exchanged against each other][1] and that art is the art of payment. "The art of payment has the special function of giving pay; but we do not confuse this with other arts any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. * * Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay, you would not say that art of payment is medicine. Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay, because a

[1] I have read in this explanation. It does not appear in the dialogue either expressly or in the immediate context. The reason for the common connection of pay or reward with all arts in distinction from the ends of art is not hinted at, but may be regarded as an anticipation of Plato's theory of the fundamental nature and importance of the division of labor, discussed in Bk. II.

man takes fees when he is engaged in healing," 346. When the artist is benefitted by receiving pay, the advantage is gained by the added art of pay, which, however, is not the art professed by the artist, and we cannot say that the artist confers no benefit when he works for nothing. There is therefore "no room for doubt that neither arts nor governments as such provide for their own interests; but they provide for the interest of their subjects, who are the weaker and not the stronger." Exactly this is the reason why good men so often are unwilling to govern especially in connection with the smaller or humbler offices of state.

No one likes to take in hand the performance of duties which are not his concern without remuneration; and in order to make men willing to rule they must be paid either in money or in honor, or in penalty for refusing. It is the last mode of payment that appeals to the best men. Money and honor do not appeal to them; they "do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. * * * There is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present."[1]

The definition of justice as the interest of the stronger is set aside as having been proved inaccurate. But the praise of injustice is taken as a new statement, and is next given dialectic attention.

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[1] Plato might have added that in such case it would become expedient to pay men reasonable salaries for serving in public office.

§ 6. *Is Injustice a Virtue?* "Would you call justice vice?" No, I would rather say it is sublime simplicity. "Then would you call injustice, malignity? No, I would rather say it is discretion. And do the just appear to you to be wise and good? Yes; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cut-purses. Even this profession, if undetected, has its advantages," 348. There is no limit to the boldness with which injustice is extolled.

Plato again resorts to the arts for his argument and his illustrations, and he makes Socrates turn the tables upon Thrasymachus, who can not cope with the master in dialectical skill. Socrates begins his reply by flattering Thrasymachus. He tells him that he has put himself upon "almost unanswerable ground; for, if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable, had been admitted by you to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles." Socrates proceeds to extort from him a reversal of his position, which is that injustice, if not a virtue, is at any rate discretion, and that the unjust are wise and good. The argument of Socrates is that injustice is not discretion, that it is not wise. Justice is like the arts, he says, in not aiming at excess. This is his second step in the argument from the analogy of the arts. His first argument was, § 5 above, that justice is like the arts in having an end in and for itself apart from the artist and apart from the one doing justly; while a third argument from the analogy of the arts will be introduced below, § 7. The just man seeks to gain an advantage over the unjust only;[1] while the unjust man would gain advantage over the just and unjust alike. Now a skilled artist of any sort does not seek to gain more than the skilled, that is, he works to realize some ideal, to bring his work to

[1] This is not the Christian ethics. The just man really seeks only his own and not an advantage even of the unjust. Plato teaches this Christian ethical principle. See § 2 above. But here he loses sight of his higher vision.

some standard, rule or law; whereas, the unskilled or ignorant works without such rule, law, standard, or ideal—he works at random and aims at excess. The just man is therefore like the skilled and wise artist, the unjust like the unskilled and ignorant. Plato announces the victory of Socrates triumphantly. Thrasymachus was perspiring and seen to blush for the first time when he discovered himself caught in the net which had been woven for him. But a modern reader follows the argument only haltingly; but after he apprehends it he sees in it much that is still current in the language of moralists.[1] The mathematical or logical notion of limit is with us as it was with the Greeks, also an ethical notion.

The demolition of the contention that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, now follows as a corollary, for justice having been identified with wisdom and virtue, it can easily be shown that it is stronger than injustice if injustice is ignorance. Injustice breeds divisions, animosities, and broils. Justice imparts harmony and frieneship. The strength of injustice is a remnant of justice. The utterly unjust destroy themselves; they are incapable of combined action. There must be honor among thieves. Even in the individual man injustice is a principle of weakness, the cause of discord and dissolution; he who is unjust is not at unity with himself and an enemy of himself and the just. Evil, whether in the individual or the state, is self-destructive.[2]

§ 7. *Is the Unjust Man Happy?* What are the comparative advantages of the just and the unjust? In this inquiry Socrates undertakes to show that the soul like the eye and the ear or a carpenter's tool has a special function to perform and possesses an excellence by which alone it can perform this function. This excellence in the case of the soul is justice, and therefore without virtue the soul's work can not be well done, and the soul itself cannot be happy.

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[1] "When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness."
King John, Act IV. sc. 2.

[2] Cp. X. 610.

This is the third argument from the analogy of the arts—but it is more narrow; it proceeds from a concept of organisms or of particular tools in the arts rather than from the large view of the arts as viewed in the two preceding sections. In this last argument we may recognize the germ of the Aristotelian doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards that end which also seems to have been suggested by the arts.

In our own time we distrust arguments from analogy. To the early inquirers into the nature of human action the analogy of the arts and the virtues afforded a starting-point for their analysis. They saw the points of agreement between them. The points of difference were observed later. We still employ many figures of speech based on the analogy of art to morals, and probably we always shall. Aristotle was perhaps the first to make a clear distinction between the arts and virtues: "Virtue is concerned with action, art with production," said Aristotle, Nich. Eth. VI. 4; and again: "Virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose * * art requires knowledge only." Nich. Eth. II. 3.

Plato also seems to have felt that virtue is more than an art. He admits that his arguments are inconclusive and Socrates assumes the character of a know-nothing: "As a gourmand, who seizes upon every dish as it goes round, and tastes its contents before he has had a reasonable portion of its predecessor, so I seem to myself to have left the question concerning the real nature of justice,which we were first examining, before we had found an answer to that, in order to hasten to the inquiry whether this unknown thing is a vice or an ignorance, or a virtue and a wisdom, and when the question arose about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice I could not refrain from passing on to that. The result of our conversation is that I know nothing; for as long as I do not know what justice is, I am little likely to know whether it is a virtue or not, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy," 354.

The question as to the nature of virtue must therefore be

further examined. This is the end of the first book, as the dialogue is now commonly divided. At the opening of the second book the same questions are continued in new forms, Glaucon and Adeimantus continuing the argument of Thrasymachus.

§ 8. *The Threefold Classification of Goods.* In order to continue the argument of Thrasymachus, Glaucon suggests that goods may be divided into three classes: (1) those which are good, *i. e.* desirable, in themselves; (2) those which are good or desirable in themselves and for their results; and (3) those which are good, *i. e.* desirable for their results only. Socrates holds that justice belongs to the middle class, which he calls the highest.

Thrasymachus discussed both justice and injustice from the point of view of the third class. Glaucon and Adeimantus urge that Thrasymachus gave up the argument too easily. They want to say something more, Glaucon urging further considerations, concerning the origin, nature, and reasonableness of justice and Adeimantus concerning the motives commonly urged for just or unjust action. When the disciples of the Socratic school are through with their argument for the sake of the argument—they profess to agree with Socrates—they beg Socrates to justify his position, that justice is good both in itself and on account of its results.

§ 9. *Popular Views Respecting Justice.* The popular views respecting the origin, nature, and reasonableness of justice and injustice are recounted with thoroughness. (1) Concerning the origin and nature of justice: "To commit injustice," Thrasymachus and a thousand others tell us, "is a good thing, and to suffer it an evil thing; but the evil of the latter exceeds the good of the former; and so, after the two-fold experience of both doing and suffering injustice, those who cannot avoid the latter and compass the former, find it expedient to make a compact of mutual abstinence from injustice. Hence arose legislation and contracts between man and man, and hence it

became the custom to call that which the law enjoined just as well as lawful. Such, they tell us, is justice and so it came into being; and it stands midway between that which is best, namely to commit injustice with impunity, and that which is worst, to suffer injustice without any power of retaliating. And being a mean between these two extremes, the principle of justice is regarded with satisfaction, not as a positive good, but because the inability to commit injustice has rendered it valuable. For no one who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist it; he would be mad if he did. This is the current account of the origin and nature of justice."[1]

This current account still finds wide acceptance not only in public opinion, but in the reasoned opinions of the schools. Much of the learning of the modern historical school of political science points undoubtedly in the direction of this view of justice. It is substantially the position of Thrasymachus, but in a somewhat different form. Might is still right, but it is the might of the weaker many who compel the few strong to a compromise by which a rule of conduct is established which prescribes the mean between the interest of the one and that of the other. It may be pointed out, that this view of justice lends itself to explain admirably the progressive steps and the changing and widening points of view which underlie what is called the just in the succeeding ages of human development.

(2) This current account is further characterized by the doctrine that all just action is involuntary, that it is a necessity to be submitted to, but not a good to be sought after; if under no constraint, the just and unjust will follow the same course of conduct, *i. e.* each will pursue solely his own interest. Under the shelter of two such rings as that of Gyges, which would render their possessors invisible, one ring for the just, the other for the unjust, both would follow the same general course of conduct.

(3) The reasonableness of this view may be inferred from

[1] II. 358—9.

the generality of its acceptance by mankind and the unanimity and promptness with which the appearance of justice or seeming justice is accepted for its reality.

§ 9. *Concerning the Motives Commonly Urged for Just and Unjust Action.* The teaching of parents, poets and priests, is all to the effect that just conduct is desirable only on account of its results, and not because of any inherent excellence in just action which makes it worth while on its own account.

And even in respect to the consequences which follow from unjust action, the case does not lie wholly with the just. Because forsooth the gods may be propitiated by sacrifices which have been obtained through injustice. There is a host of books which teach how expiation and atonement may be made for crimes. "If we are just, altho' we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated and we shall not be punished."[1] Besides, both poets and writers of prose teach constantly that the path of vice is easy, and that of virtue difficult. No wonder young men of talent often choose the ways of injustice, depending upon the arts of rhetoric, the trick of courts and the machinations of secret clubs to extricate them from difficulties into which perchance they may fall. "With much respect be it spoken," says Adeimantus, who fore-shadows the repudiation of the authority, alike of priests and poets, "you, who profess to be admirers of justice, beginning with the heroes of old, of whom accounts have descended to present generations, you have, every one of you without exception, made the praise of justice and the condemnation of injustice turn solely upon the reputation and honor and gifts resulting from them; but what each is itself, by its own peculiar force, as it resides in the soul of its possessor, unseen either by gods or men, has never in poetry or in prose been adequately discussed so as to show

[1] II. 366.

that injustice is the greatest bane[1] that a soul can receive into itself, and justice the greatest blessing. Had this been the language held by you all from the first, and had you tried to persuade us of this from our childhood, we should not be on the watch to check one another in the commission of injustice; because every one would be his own watchman, fearful lest by committing injustice he might attach to himself the greatest evil."[2]

This is the high thesis the two brothers join in urging Socrates to establish. Socrates praises the godlike sons of Ariston for not being convinced even by their own reasoning; but he explains that before entering upon this task from which they will not excuse him, he must adopt a new method of inquiry: the new method of inquiry is adopted in order to ascertain the true nature of justice, and it consists in a careful examination of the nature and origin of the state.

B. CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE STATE.[3]

§ 10. *The New Method of Inquiry Stated.* Socrates explains that owing to the weakness of his eyes, he must first look for justice where it is written in larger letters than in the individual man; this writing he finds in the state, or as we might in our time say, in the structure of society. He proposes to examine therefore first the origin and nature of the state, then the counterpart of the state, the psychology of the individual man in order to get a premiss or a set of premisses from which he may infer the true nature of justice. If then we were to trace in thought the gradual formation of a city, should we also see the growth of its justice or injustice?

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[1] Cp. Picture of the tyrant, type of the unjust, as wholly miserable, Book IX.

[2] II. 366—7, Davies and Vaughan.

[3] The Republic, II. 368—76; The Laws, II.

§ 11. *The Origin of the State.* The state is here considered as a social organism. There are two principles which lie at the basis of all forms of social organization, and with these we may begin our account of the origin of the state; they are: (1) the insufficiency or incompleteness of the individual to provide the conditions for a comfortable life, or the principle of the composition of labor; and (2) its counterpart, the division of labor. In a very important sense the latter may be taken as the most far-reaching and all-embracing norm of social grouping, especially if our conception of the division of labor be so enlarged as to include also its composition.

A state arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; then when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation, the body of inhabitants is called a state (πόλις). * * * And they exchange with one another, and one gives, another takes, under the idea that exchange will be for their good."

That Plato appreciated that in the study of human society and human institutions allowance must be made for an enormous lapse of time, during which such institutions may have developed is shown by the allowance he makes for the slow and invisible changes which time works in language.[1]

§ 12. *The Division of Labor.* The preceding account is regarded, apparently, as too speculative a statement of the origin of the state. It is therefore submitted to a further analysis playing about the principle of division of labor.

Starting with a recognition of the fundamental wants of man we inquire first, what are the necessary conditions of a state? To this we answer (1) the greatest of all necessities is food, a condition of light itself; (2) dwellings and dwelling places; and (3) clothing, shoes, etc.

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[1] See Jowett's introduction to the Cratylus, p. 297, and the Comments on the Origin of Government, the Laws III, 276.

Corresponding to these fundamental wants are certain occupations and trades designed to supply these wants—classes of workers which are really in an equal sense, necessary conditions and constituent parts of the state.

These classes resulting from the variety of the wants of mankind and the division of labor to facilitate the supply of them, are treated as part of the subject-matter of political science. Their examination constitutes a discipline which has been described as an examination of the state behind the constitution, *i. e.* behind the government—a task now assigned to the student of sociology.

Plato understood thoroughly the nature and benefits of division of labor but he gives only a clumsy account of the real origin and early history of the division of labor in human society. His account is logical rather than historical; the slow and gradual steps in the evolution of human industry could not be appreciated until the beginnings were made of an exhaustive inductive study of all races of man in varying stages of culture by contemporary scholars like Herbert Spencer.

Plato recognized that all exchange resulting from the division of labor implies a mutual advantage to the parties to the exchange, an idea much in advance of what one finds still widely current in popular conception concerning the profit of trade. Moreover, Plato emphasizes the advantages of the division of labor in the spirit of Adam Smith: A man is likely to succeed best, he tells us, when instead of dividing his exertions among many trades, he devotes them especially to one. It is also clear that if a person lets the right moment go by for any work, that moment never returns—the thing to be done does not wait for the doer but the doer must be at the beck of the thing to be done. It follows that all things will be produced in superior quantity and quality and with greater ease when each man works at a single occupation, in accordance with his natural gifts, and at the right moment, without meddling with anything else.[1]

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[1] Cp. II. 370.

§ 13. *The Primary Classes of the State; Deductions from Division of Labor.* Primary wants of man, as has been said, are threefold: food, house and shelter, and clothing. There must, therefore, be at the least three or four classes of artisans to make a state, namely:[1] —the husbandman, the house-builder, the weaver; shall we add to these the shoe-maker, and perhaps some other purveyors to our bodily wants, making four or five classes? But such division of labor implies also the presence of the merchant, who will bring these several classes together through the incidence of exchange.

Besides, these several main lines of industry will need to be specialized and subdivided "for the husbandman will not make his own plow or mattock;" carpenters and smiths will be needed, and a variety of other lesser or greater trades. Domestic trade will expand into foreign trade.

Development of a merchant class follows. Can a city be so located as to be absolutely self-sufficient?[2] Hardly. International division of labor must be recognized. "To find a place where nothing need be imported is well nigh impossible." There must be a special merchant class who will bring the required supply from other places. "And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, we shall want skilfull sailors, even in great numbers; and so indefinitely trades and callings multiply. The origin of the retail trader as distinguished from the wholesale trader, and the origin of coined money receive the attention of Plato. Both are consequences of the division of labor, joined with the purpose to economize time.[3] Hirelings, servants, and slaves come into existence. By way of anticipation of the application of the new course of inquiry concerning justice, we are told that it is in the dealings of these classes with one another, and of the members of these classes among themselves, that justice must be found.

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[1] Cp. the Classif. of Aristotle; see § 11 of Essay III and § 8 of Essay V on The Politics.

[2] Aristotle also raised this question. See §§ 5–6 of Essay V on The Politics.

[3] II. 370–1.

§ 14. *The City of Pigs.* Plato draws a picture of the life of a community, which is in possession of the simplest possible organization consistent with the provision of rude plenty. This picture put in the mouth of Socrates is characterized by Glaucon as a city of pigs. The passage is brief, but very famous and widely known, at any rate by its title: "They will produce corn and wine, and clothes and shoes, and build houses for themselves. And when they are housed they will work, in summer commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making excellent cakes of barley and loaves of wheat; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take care their families do not exceed their means, having an eye to poverty or war." "But you would allow them a relish," said Glaucon interrupting. "Of course," replied Socrates, "they must have a relish—salt and olives and cheese, together with the country fare of boiled onions and cabbage; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns (beech-nuts) at the fire, drinking in moderation. And thus passing their days in tranquility and sound health, they will, in all probability, live to an advanced age, and dying bequeath to their children a life in which their own will be reproduced."[1]

"Though we may seem mean only to look for the laws of plain comfort and simple happiness, yet we must work out that simple case first, before we encounter the incredibly harder additional difficulties of the higher art, morals and religion."[2]

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[1] II. 372.

[2] Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 210.

§ 15. *The City of Luxury.* "Now it appears to me," Socrates is made to say, "that the city which we have been describing is the genuine, and, so to speak, healthy city. But, if you wish us to consider a city that is suffering from inflammation there is nothing to hinder us. Some people will not be satisfied, it seems, with the fare or mode of life which we have described, but must have in addition, couches and tables, as well as dainty viands, and fragrant oils, and perfumes, and courtesans, and confectionery; and all these in plentiful variety. Moreover, we must not limit ourselves now to essentials in those articles which we specified at first, such as houses and clothes and shoes; the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory, and all similar valuables must be procured."[1]

§ 16. *The Extension of Social Classes.* Certain consequences of this higher or wider status of life follow: (1) A city which develops the luxuries as distinguished from that which can content itself with simple fare and rude plenty must have a larger territory than the latter; it must be of greater extent. (2) There is an increasing scale of wants and consequently industrial callings must be greatly multiplied and extended. (3) The appearance of certain professional classes, like the physician and soldier, and the administrator or guardian of the city. The Platonic account of the social classes of a civilized state is fragmentary and suggestive, rather than exhaustive and analytical. Two interests of the complex city-states, such as were familiar to Plato and his contemporaries, impressed him especially: (1) the requirements of defense; the city-states of his time were subject to constant danger of attack from aggressors without, or the lust of conquest from within, prompting to carry the attack against others; and (2) the high requirements of office or rule within the state—nothing less than a philosopher, a stern friend and a courageous foe, a friend to what is good, a foe to all that is evil, will suffice for bearing rule in a state of luxury and selfishness.

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[1] II. 372-3.

§ 17. *The Art of War.* A strong state must have a standing army *i. e.* a professional soldier class, who can, on demand, defend the property and persons of the collective state.

In support of this project Plato appeals to the benefits of the principle of division of labor as recognized in other callings: "As we assigned to every artisan one occupation, namely, that for which he was naturally best fitted, and in which if he let other things alone, and wrought at it all his time without neglecting his opportunities, he was likely to prove a successful workman * * * [So] it is of the greatest moment that the work of war should be well done." In order that it may be well done, those who profess the use of arms must be trained to the art which they profess; the mere handling of the weapons of war will no more make a soldier than the mere handling of any other implement or instrument will make any one a true craftsman or athlete; "nor will such instrument be even useful to one who has neither learned its capabilities nor exercised himself sufficiently in its practical applications."[1]

§ 18. *The High Requirements of Office; The Art of Administration or Bearing Rule.* If the art of the soldier is important, that of the governor and administrator is even more important, and the qualifications for this office must be the highest of all. "In proportion to the importance of the work which these guardians (administrators or rulers) have to do, it will require peculiar freedom from other engagements, as well as extraordinary skill and attention. It will require also natural endowments suited to this particular occupation," 374c. What these endowments are, Plato describes by the analogy of the characteristic qualities of a good dog. The guardians should be "quick to discover an enemy, and swift to overtake him when discovered, and strong also, in case they have to fight when they have come up with him," 375.

We are quaintly told how the dog is like a philosopher, or the philosopher like a good dog. A man who is devoid of

[1] II. 374.

either gentleness or spirit (courage, plus the other virtues, really equal to *strong-will*), cannot possibly make a good guardian," 375b; and we might suppose these opposite qualities could not be found combined in one man, did we not find them in an actual combination in a favorite friend of man, namely in the well-bred dog—"a well-bred dog is perfectly gentle to his friends, but the reverse to strangers. * * * This instinct of the dog is a very clever thing and a genuine philosophic symptom," 376a. Moreover, the dog is fond of learning—the logic of the reasoning is not perfect! the only way in which he can distinguish between friend and enemy, is that he knows the former and does not know the latter. "How, I ask, can the creature be other than fond of learning when he makes knowing and not-knowing, the test of his likes and dislikes? * * * And is not the love of learning, the love of wisdom which is philosophy?

Leaving the argument from this analogy of the dog, the conclusion is, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge. * * * And the "man whose natural gifts promise to make him a perfect guardian of the state, will be philosophical, high-spirited, swift-footed, and strong." 376b.

§ 19. *The Importance of Education.* Having described the original character of the guardian, we must next inquire "how we shall rear and educate him; and whether the investigation of this point will help us to determine the specific object of our speculation, namely, how justice and injustice grow up in a state? We must neither omit what is useful nor occupy ourselves with what is redundant, in our inquiry. * * * Let us pass a leisure-hour, describing the education of our men.

What, then, is to be their education? Can we find a better system than that which the experience of the past has already discovered, which consists, I believe, in gymnastics for the body, and music (including literature, and later science and philosophy) for the mind?" 376c. Plato discusses the educa-

tion of his guardians in two parts: the first, which is introduced at this point, deals with the elements of education, elementary education—covering the periods of childhood and youth; while part second deals with an advanced education or the higher education covering the periods of early manhood and middle life; it widens from the elements of mathematics and natural science into the broad domain of philosophy and morals. This second part of the discussion is taken up separately and in an extensive manner in Book VI.[1]

C. *ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.*

§ 20. *The Scope of Elementary Education.* The outline following shows the scope and method with which the whole subject of primary education is taken up by Plato in the Republic. There are passing allusions to education in other dialogues of Plato, but nowhere else, except in The Laws,[2] which may be regarded as a supplement to The Republic, does he enter upon a systematic discussion such as we have here.

Outline of Elementary Education:

A. Music (including literature).
- 1. The Story or Myth.
  - *a.* As to Subject Matter, II. 376.
  - *b.* As to Form or Style, III. 392.
- 2. Melody and Song.
  - *a.* Melodies, 398.
    - (*1*) The Objectionable.
    - (*2*) The Permissible.
  - *b.* Metres, 400.
- 3. Further reflections on the value of music (including poetry and other literature) and its places in education, 401.

B. Gymnastic, 403.

[1] See below in Essay II.

[2] In Book II. of The Laws, special attention is given to the uses of the song and dance, while in Book VII. the whole subject is again taken up and treated with great thoroughness and liberality of spirit.

The discussion of elementary education in the second book of The Republic, is more definite and technical, and less general than the discussion of the same subject in the seventh book of The Laws. In the latter more attention is given to what might be called the social aspects of education as distinguished from its distinctively moral and intellectual aspects —questions of the family and heredity. The relations of the morals and the amusements of a people are treated with special consideration apart from poetry and song.

§ 21. *The Use of the Story or Myth.* "You know," Socrates is made to say, alluding to the customary beginnings of education in his time, "that we begin the education of our children by telling them stories, which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics." The beginning is also recognized as the most important part of education. "Shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales, which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they have grown up? * * * Then the first thing is to establish a censorship of writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to repeat to their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded."[1]

With Plato it was a first principle of education that all false and all immoral stories must be excluded. Lying of all forms, especially lying about the gods, who are examplars, is incalculably mischievous in its effect on the character of the young. Teachers as well as mothers and nurses must recite good stories only.

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[1] II. 377b.

In as much as the myths regarding the character and achievements of the gods form the chief subject-matter of the ancient Greek story or myth, Plato enters first upon a criticism of these. He lays down certain outlines of theology therefore, which makers of stories must not transgress. His position may be stated thus: (1) That God is, and that He is the author of good only; (2) That God in Himself is unchangeable and true. "The primitive conception of the deity as the simple embodiment of power," as Nettleship remarks, in commenting on the theology of Plato, "readily leads in one direction to the belief that he sends good and evil upon man according to his caprice, and in another to the idea that he is jealous of human success. To these deep-rooted tenets of the Greek popular religion Plato opposes the simple logical position that what is in its essence good cannot produce what is not good."[1] To the defense set up that the tales of the quarrels and immoralities of the gods are to receive an allegorical interpretation, he interposes the objection: "A young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and, therefore, it is most important that the tales which he first hears should be models of virtuous thoughts," 378c. It is Plato's contention that both Homer and Hesiod misrepresent the true nature of the gods.

The high philosophic conception of religion in Greek antiquity is well stated in the doubtful Platonic dialogue known as the II. Alcibiades, where Socrates in the spirit of a Hebrew prophet, says: "The idea is inconceivable that the gods have regard not to the justice and purity of our souls, but to costly processions and sacrifices, which men may celebrate year after year, although they have committed innumerable crimes against the gods or against their fellowmen or the state. For the gods, as Ammon and his prophet declare, are no receivers

[1] Nettleship, p. 95-96 Essay in Hellenica. Edited by Evelyn Abbott, London, 1880.

of gifts, and they scorn such unworthy service. Wherefore also it would seem that wisdom and justice are specially honored both by gods and by men of sense," II. Alcibiades, doubtfully attributed to Plato, Jowett's Transl., 3d ed. v. 2, p. 553.

§ 21. *Negative Rules for the Form of the Story or Myth.*[1] As founders of a state "we ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and from which they must not be suffered to deviate, but to compose the tales is not the business of founders or governors of states. The following rules are prescribed for the guidance of the poets:

(a) God is always to be represented as He truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric, or tragic, in which the representation is given;" and in as much as He is truly good, he can be represented as the author of good only. The lines of Homer and Hesiod, and even those of Aeschylus, which are to the contrary, must be suppressed. "We must not listen to Homer or to any other poet, who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

> Lie at the threshold of Zeus,
> full of lots, the one of good, the other of evil,[2]

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two,

> "Sometimes meets with evil
> fortune, at other times with good;"

but that to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

> 'Him wild hunger drives oe'r
> the beauteous earth.'

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandorus,[3] was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that

> God plants guilt among men, when he desires utterly
> to destroy a house."[4]

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1 II. 379f.
2 Iliad, XXIV, 527.
3 Iliad, II. 69.
4 II. 379.

One evil may be attributed to gods and one only, namely, that which is in the nature of punishment. The poets may say that the wicked are miserable, because they require to be punished, and are benefitted by receiving punishments from God; but that God being good, is the author of evil to any one, is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in prose or verse, whether by old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth, 380.

(b) God must never be represented as a magician; for He is not "of a nature to appear insiduously now in one shape, and now in another—sometimes Himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations.

"Let none of the poets tell us that 'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms. [1]

* * * Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms; but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods," 381. God (ὁ θεος) has no need of a lie, cf. 382f.

(c) There must be an altered teaching respecting the world below—to be repeating the present customary tales interferes with the proper development of courage.[2]

(d) Dispense with ceremonies of weeping and wailing on the death of famous men; there must be altered funeral ceremonies. Nor must famous men in their own life time be represented in such undignified and unworthy attitudes as Achilles "rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name." For, if our youth seriously listen to unworthy representations of the gods instead of laughing at them as they ought, will any of them deem that he himself, being but a

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[1] Hom., Od. XVII. 485.

[2] Examples of such tales, III. 386f.

man, can be dishonored by similar actions," p. 388. Nor must gods or heroes be represented as subject to excessive laughter. An approved edition of Homer would appear without the lines:

> "Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods,
> when they saw Hephæstus bustling about the mansion."[1]

§ 22. *Positive Rules to be Followed by the Poets; and the Virtues to be Inculcated in Verse and Prose.* Our school literature must extoll and inculcate the positive virtues: truthfulness; temperance, including obedience and self-control; courage, including endurance; and highmindness—that high sense of honor discarding flattery or bribes.

(a) Truthfulness. "A high value must be set upon truth, for if we are right in what we said just now, and falsehood is really useless to the gods, and only useful to men in the way of a medicine, it is plain that such an agent as lying must be kept in the hands of physicians, and that unprofessional men must not meddle with it."[2]

At the close of the second book when discussing the impropriety of attributing the arts of deception to the gods, it was pointed out that lying might be allowable when dealing with enemies, and near the opening of the first book it was said that in dealing with friends who in a fit of madness or lunacy are about to do something mischievous, a lie, at such a time, like medicine, would be useful to turn them from their purpose. This question of casuistry is still sometimes argued in our modern text-books on ethics.

Plato allows the use of falsehood in war and in diplomacy rather more freely than our modern moralists; but such allowances as he makes are always carefully guarded. He raises the question in a number of places, but the following paragraph contains a fair statement of his position: "To the rulers of the state then, if to any, it belongs of right to use falsehood, to deceive either enemies or their own citizens for the

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[1] Iliad, I. 599.

[2] III. 389. (Davies and Vaughan.)

public good; but no one else may have this privilege; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private person to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for a patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew and how things are going with himself or his fellow-sailors," 389. Lying on the part of private persons must therefore be declared a punishable offense.

(b) Temperance and courage. "Temperance, as commonly understood, implies the following principal elements: first, that men be obedient to their governors; and secondly, that they be themselves able to govern the pleasures which are gratified in eating, drinking, and love."[1]

Then we shall approve such language as this in Homer:

'Friend, sit still and obey my word.[2]

* * * * *

'The Greeks marched breathing prowess,[3]

* * * in silent awe of their leaders. [4]

* * * * *

'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart;
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured.[5]

(c) High-mindedness. We must cultivate in our children and youth a high sense of honor and a magnanimous spirit. To this end we must not permit them to be "receivers of gifts or lovers of money." Neither must we sing to them of

'Gifts persuading gods, and gifts persuading
reverend kings.'[6]

Plato excludes from his school-room all recital of the gift-motived actions, in which the Homeric poems abound, as founded on too low a plane of moral action.

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[1] III. 389c. Davies and Vaughan.
[2] Il. IV. 412.
[3] Od. III. 8.
[4] Ib. IV. 431.
[5] Ib. XX. 17.
[6] Attributed to Hesiod.

(d) All tales of impiety, licentiousness and indecencies, are to be condemned, not only because they cannot be true of the gods, demi-gods and heroes; but they must also be condemned and repudiated on account of the evil effect which the narration of them will have "on those who hear them; for everbody will begin to excuse his own vices, when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—

> 'The kindred of the gods, the relatives
> of Zeus, whose ancestral altar,
> the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air
> on the peak of Ida;'

and who have

> 'the blood of deities yet flowing
> in their veins.'[1]

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young," 391c.

§ 24. *The Ethical Teaching Concerning the Happiness of Men.* This Plato regards as the proper sequel to his exhaustive examination or inquiry respecting the subject-matter of poetry in so far as it relates to "gods, demi-gods and heroes," 392a.

"And what shall we say about [the happiness of] men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject." "If I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men, poets and story-tellers, are guilty of the gravest misstatements, when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when not detected, but that justice is a man's own loss, and another's gain—I imagine we shall forbid the use of such language, and lay our commands on all writers to express the very opposite sentiments in their songs and their legends. * * * But we cannot complete this subject till we determine what justice is." Hence we shall have to return to this question, while for the present we must postpone coming to an agreement concerning the terms to be employed respecting what men are truly happy and who are

[1] From the Niobe of Aeschylus.

the miserable. To this subject Plato does recur again at various places, but quite notably in the tenth and last book of The Republic.[1]

"Enough of the subjects of poetry, let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been treated," 392c.

§ 24. *On the Form or Style of the Story or Myth.* "All mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come. * * * And narration is either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two.

In simple narration the writer or poet speaks in his own person; in imitation he speaks in the person of another—he conceals himself and assimilates his style to that of the person, who, as he informs you, is going to speak. * * * And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes."[2]

Epic poetry consists of a simple narrative combined with imitation; while tragedy and comedy are wholly imitative.

§ 25. *Shall the drama, i. e., the theatre, be permitted in the State?* Plato informs us that he proposes to discuss the style of poetry with a view to coming to an understanding whether the mimetic art, against which he surely had a profound bias, that is, "whether poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?" 394.

This is really Plato's form of raising the question whether the drama, that is, whether the theatre, shall be permitted in the state. This question, together with the question of the preceding section, what shall be taught concerning the happiness of men? is treated finally in the tenth book of The Republic. With Plato the test question is whether our guardians

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[1] See below Essay III.

[2] Cp. III. 392–3.

—our citizens—should be imitaters. He answers that the principle of division of labor applies here, and presents this dilemma: "The same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time be an imitator and imitate many parts well; for even when two species of imitation are closely allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both," 395a. The writers of comedy and tragedy are not the same; nor can one be rhapsodist and actor at once; not even are comic and tragic actors the same. "And human nature * * appears * * * to be as incapable of imitating many things well as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies."

Certain degrading forms of imitation must by all means be avoided lest the player's mask becomes the player's face.—"Did you ever observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?" No one may safely imitate menials or madmen; nor is it seemly to attempt to imitate "the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers, and the roar of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing," 396a.

There are some imitations which may be encouraged. The just and good man may be impersonated; but it is better to have this done only incidentally and to let the chief part always be a simple narrative. There are those who will undertake anything but this always with deleterious effects. In our state "one man plays one part only," 397c; and when any of these pantomimic gentlemen who are so clever that they can imitate anything comes to us * * * we must inform him that in our state such as he are not permitted to exist," 398a. The conclusion is thus reached in the main against the drama, against the theatre; and this conclusion is reiterated and elaborated, as before indicated, in the tenth and closing book. "We mean to employ for our soul's health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller who will imitate the style of the virtuous only." "Next in order will follow melody and song."

§ 26. *Melodies or Harmonies.* A song or ode has three parts—the words, the melody, and the rythm. "As for the words * * these have already been determined for us" in our discussion of the subject-matter of poetry and the style suitable thereto.

The melody and rythm must be made to depend on the words; and not the words on the melody and rythm: (a) We were saying when we spoke of the subject-matter that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow. This will rule out the mixed and tenor Lydian, as well as the full-toned and bass Lydian, and such like harmonies which are expressive of sorrow.

(b) "In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our citizens (guardians). This principle will rule out the soft or drinking harmonies, the Ionian and the Lydian.

(c) Have any of these of a military use? Quite the reverse, only the Dorian and Phrygian will avail here. "Of the harmonies I know nothing," Plato makes Socrates say, "but I want one warlike to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death * * and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer or man by instruction and admonition * * or when he is * * yielding to persuasion or entreaty or admonition. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage and the strain of temperance; these I say, leave," "and these," adds Glaucon, the lover of sports and the man of affairs, "are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which we were just speaking," 399.

§ 27. *Permitted Musical Instruments.* If we have only the simpler songs and harmonies "we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale." Artificers of lyres

with three corners and complex scales, and the makers of other many-stringed and curiously harmonized instruments, flute-makers and flute-players are all considered useless. "There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country," Apollo and his instruments, the lyre and the harp, and not Marsyas and his flute, are in favor with Plato.

"By the dog of Egypt we have been purging the state. * * Let us now finish the purgation. Next in order to harmonies, rythms will naturally follow".

§ 28. *Rythms.* Glaucon, upon whom Socrates calls for information respecting the principles of rythms and their adaptations to thoughts and states of feeling confesses he does not know." "Then we must take Damon into our counsels," but the teaching of Damon is only vaguely remembered. One thing, however, is firmly held as a ruling principle, namely, that "rythm and harmony are to be regulated by the words, and not the words by them," 400, and "in as much as the words and style will depend on the temper of the soul, all beauty of style and harmony and grace, and good rythm will depend on simplicity—I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity, which is only a euphemism for folly."

§ 29. *Reflections on the Value and Place of Art and Nature Studies in Education.* And if our youth are to do their work in life they must make the graces and harmonies of life their perpetual aim.

The arts of the painter and every other creative and constructive art as well as nature, animal and vegetable, are full of these graces and harmonies. Therefore the arts and nature studies must form a part of a perfected curriculum under the censorship of officials of the state. These ideas have been incorporated in our own times by public educational councils wherever ideal schemes of instruction for primary grades have been drafted.

"In the third book of The Republic," as Jowett observes, "a nearer approach is made to a theory of art than anywhere else in Plato." His views may be summed up as follows: "True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and ideal—the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or repose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of influences—the true Greek atmosphere in which youth should be brought up. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste which will have a feeling of truth and beauty in all things. For though the poets are to be expelled [not all of them], still art is recognized as another aspect of reason, like love in the Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but confined to the preliminary education, and acting through the power of habit (VII. 522); and this conception of art is not limited to strains of music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a wide kindred in the world. The Republic of Plato like the Athens of Pericles has an artistic as well as a political side. * * In one very striking passage (IV. 420) he tells us that a work of art, like The State, is a whole; and this conception of a whole and the love of the newly-born mathematical sciences, may be regarded, if not as the inspiring, at any rate as the regulating principles of Greek art."[1]

"Musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten imparting grace; he who has received this true education of the inner being will shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over the good which he receives into his soul, will justly hate and blame the bad even in the days of his youth before he will know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his educa-

[1] Jowett Introd. to Repub. p. L.-LI. (Cp. Xen. Mem. III. 10, 6; and Sophist, 235–6.)

tion has made him long familiar," 401–2. We can never become musical and in the Greek sense liberally educated until we know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred virtues, 402b. Both Plato and Aristotle protest against the development of mere musicians as we would call them in our time. The love of music must end in the love of beauty. And here we pass to gymnastics.

§ 30. *The Place of Gymnastics in Education, 403.* Gymnastics as well as music should begin in early years, the training in it should be careful and should continue through life. The usual training of athletes is too gross and sleepy; it exposes those under its regimen to great danger if they in the least violate it. Training for citizenship (guardianship) should have in view not the performance of particular feats of the body but the discharge with efficiency and promptitude of such duties as may present themselves in the business of life. To this end simplicity and correctness of diet as well as variety and severity in exercise commend themselves. Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years. The mind shapes the body rather than the body the mind. Nevertheless so intimate is their relation that each affects the other; and a gymnastic regimen must not be prescribed with reference to the body only. "To the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body," 403c.

These are a few obvious rules which must be observed. Beyond these more special knowledge is demanded; hence the art of medicine to prescribe remedies for disease and the science of law to impose prohibitions on the indulgence of the appetites, have been developed.

Drunkenness must of course be avoided by those who aspire to have part in the government of the state; "for of all persons an officer of the law should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is * * that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridicu-

lous indeed;" 403c. Plato preferred a regimen of military gymnastics to the regimen prescribed for ordinary athletes in his time—he insisted on a finer sort of training, one that will not induce sleepiness and listlessness; moreover too rigid an adherence to a particular diet and routine of exercise "exposes those who practice this to serious illnesses if they depart in ever so slight a degree from their customary regimen," 404a. "A finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; they must not be liable to break down in health, amid the many changes of water and of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign. * * The really excellent gymnastic is twin-sister of that simple music which we were just describing * * the military gymnastic." Soldiers must have an abundance of plain food, but they must shun dainties. Fish as a diet for soldiers is condemned. Roast meats are preferred to boiled, and sweet sauces are proscribed. Syracusan dinners, Corinthian courtesans, Sicilian cookery, and Athenian confectionary, are to be avoided, and, of course, all forms of intemperance and licentiousness. Licentious feeding and living is like melody and song composed in all the harmonies and rythms at once. "As in music variety begets dissoluteness in the soul, so here it begets disease in the body, while simplicity in gymnastic is as productive of health as in music it was productive of temperance (*σωφροσύνη*—soundmindedness)," 404c.

§ 30. *On Medicine and Law.* "When intemperance and diseases multiply in a state, halls of justice and of medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the lawyer and the doctor give themselves airs, finding how keen the interest which even well-born persons take about them," 405a.

Plato held decidedly that every man should be his own lawyer and doctor. He held it to be proof of an imperfect education and want of good breeding "that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic, because he has none of his

own at home." In this respect at least Plato did not show a modern appreciation of the importance and beneficence of division of labor, however well he may have understood and appreciated its application in other directions.[1]

But there is something even worse than this failure on the part of each to be his own lawyer and doctor; and that is the development of a special class of advocates who pride themselves on being litigious, "boasting of being adepts in crime, and such masters of tricks and turns, of manoevre and evasion,[2] as always to be able to wriggle out of the grasp of justice, and escape from punishment, and that for the sake of worthless trifles, not knowing how much nobler and better it were so to order their lives as never to be in need of a sleepy judge," 405 (Davies and Vaughan). "And do you not hold it disgraceful to require medical aid, unless it be for a wound, or an epidemic,—to require it, I mean, owing to our laziness, and the life we lead, and to get ourselves so stuffed with humors and wind, like quagmires, as to compel the clever sons of Asclepius to call diseases by such names as flatulence and catarrh."

The art of medicine, it is noted, must have greatly changed in passing from Asclepius to Herodicus. The latter is blamed for inventing the art of continuing useless lives. Asclepius is praised for not curing diseased constitutions; "he knew," we are told, "that in all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill; but people of the richer sort with a ludicrous inconsistency are not held to this condition of continuance in a state. * * When a carpenter is ill * * he expects to receive a draft from his doctor, that will expel the disease by vomiting or purging, or else to get rid of it by cauterizing or a surgical operation. But, if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells him that he must bathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he re-

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[1] See above §§ 11—13; and The Republic II, 369—71.

[2] The reference is evidently to the Sophist advocates—a class elaborately discussed in The Gorgias.

plies at once he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent nursing his disease, to the neglect of his customary employment; and, therefore, bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails he dies, and has no more trouble," 406. It is not a sufficient excuse for the rich, that, having a competence there is nothing for them to do except to nurse their own bodies; for, however rich, each man owes it to himself no less than to the state to practice virtue, *i. e.* to lead a good and useful life of service to his fellowmen. We are told it was a saying of Phocylides that "as soon as a man has a livelihood, he should practice virtue," 407. And it is questioned "whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides." The conclusion is drawn unhesitatingly that excessive care [indulgence] of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic is most inimical to the practice of virtue * * and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all, irreconcilable with any kind of thought or study or self-reflection.

§ 31. *On the Education of Physicians and Judges.* Shall we say then that there ought not to be good physicians and good judges in a state? Not at all. But we must make a distinction between a good judge and a good physician. While the latter may be improved by personal experience of disease the former can never profit by making a personal trial of evil. "Now the most skillful physicians are those who have experience of disease combined with a knowledge of their art," 408c. "But with the judge it is far otherwise since he governs mind with mind; he ought to have no contamination with evil associations when young. In their youth good men are easily imposed upon. Therefore the judge should not be young; he should have knowledge of evil, not

by personal experience, but by observation of its baneful effects in others; in this way knowledge should be his guide and not personal experience." "The cunning and suspicious juryman, who has been guilty himself of many crimes, and fancies himself knowing and clever, so long as he has to deal with men like himself, betrays astonishing wariness, thanks to those inward examples which he has ever in sight, but when he comes into communication with men of years and of virtue, he shows himself to be no better than a fool, with his mistimed suspicions and ignorance of a healthy character; he can not recognize an honest man because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; and as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself and and is by others thought to be rather wise than foolish," 409.

§ 32. *The Relation of Medicine and Law to Gymnastics.* The logical relation of physician and judge and the reason for bringing the consideration of both together under the head of gymnastics seems to lie in the reflection that the right sort of law and the right sort of medicine in a state will minister to the improvement of the health of citizens in body and mind; and that under the direction of physician and judge an appropriate regimen of exercise of body and practice of virtue may be developed for the proper education of citizens. He who follows the mandates of heroic and sober music will have no need of law-courts; and the great object of gymnastic is to render resort to the medical art unnecessary.[1]

§ 33. *The Proper Blending of Music and Gymnastic.* Music and gymnastic are designed, not as is often supposed, the one for training of the soul, the other for the training of the body [but] both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul, and this view is confirmed by observing the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music, the one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of soft-

[1] Cp. III. 409–10.

ness and effeminacy. The mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him. Ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become hard and brutal. On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate. "If a man takes violent exercise, and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music (literature, history and music) and philosophy, the high condition of his body fills him with pride, and if he does nothing else he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion he lives in ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.[1]

"There are two principles, then, of human nature, one the spirited and the other philosophical, some God as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed and drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized." "And he who mingles music (literature and music) with physical gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may rightly be called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of strings," 412.

§ 34. *The Details of Gymnastic Training or a Gymnastic Regimen.* So far general principles have engaged our attention. The details of gymnastic are not pursued in The Republic, though in the barest way outlined in these words: "Details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests must correspond with the foregoing outlines of education," 412. These are somewhat expanded in the second and seventh books of The Laws; and quite well detailed in Xenophon's Economist.

[1] Cp. III. 410–12.

§ 35. *On the Greek Sense of the Importance of Public Education.* There is a fine passage[1] in the Menexenus, a socalled doubtful or spurious dialogue of Plato; but if of doubtful authorship there is no doubt about the thoroughly Greek and even Platonic spirit of the passage which I here quote. The soldiers going forth to war are represented as saying: "To the state we would say"—this address is preceded by an address to their families—"Take care of our parents and of our sons; let her worthily cherish the old age of our parents, and bring up our sons in the right way." This appeal is met with the response that the state will see that their "fathers and mothers will have no wrong done to them. That the city will share in the education of the children. * * While they are children she is a parent to them, and when they have arrived at man's estate, she sends them to their several duties in full armor clad; and bringing freshly to their minds the ways of their fathers, she places in their hands the instruments of their father's virtues."

"Such then are our principles of nurture and education," says Plato in closing the discussion of elementary education in The Republic.

PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATION; AND THE FINAL DEFINITION OF JUSTICE.[2]

§ 36. *The Selection of Rulers.* Who are to be rulers and how are they to be selected? And who are to be subjects? The elder must rule the younger. But this is not a sufficient principle of selection. Not only must elders rule the younger, but the best of the elders must rule. How can these best be found? Just as those are the best husbandmen who are most devoted to husbandry, so those are the best rulers (guardians) who have most the character of rulers

[1] Menexenus, Jowett's Transl., 3d ed. vol. 2, p. 531–2.

[2] The Republic, III. 412–417; IV. 419–439; (439–445 on Justice); The Laws VI. 751–772.

(guardians). As such rulers (guardians) must be wise and efficient and devoted to the interests of the state, those who are to be appointed rulers must have been tested in all the stages of their lives. "Let us note among the citizens (prospective guardians) those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests. * * * And they will have to be watched at every age in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence of force or illusion, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the state."[1]

But it is not easy to discover the best men even by these tests. All citizens (guardians) must be watched from their youth up and they must be required to perform difficult actions, actions requiring discretion and judgment; they must be subjected to special toils and pains, and conflicts prescribed for them; and finally they must be tried by enchantments, by the allurements of pleasure, and by the terrors of vice. If under all these tests they maintain a noble bearing and prove themselves good guardians of themselves, retaining under all circumstances rythmical and harmonious natures, then we may conclude that having shown themselves serviceable to themselves, they will also be serviceable to the state *i. e.* to the community, the body of the people. "He who at every age as boy and youth and in mature life has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the state; he shall be honored in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails we must reject," 413–4.

§ 37. *The Guardians and the Other Political Classes.* The elect tried and pre-eminent which we described above are alone to be *rulers* of the city, *guardians* par excellence of the public interests; but others are not without part in the sup-

[1] III. 412c.

port and maintenance of the city; they have a lesser part, less eminent responsibility and power but they have nevertheless both responsibility and power.

There remain besides duties of supreme direction and guidance, which are to be entrusted to the select spirits whom we have just described, and whom we shall by way of eminence call guardians or rulers in the strict sense, other duties which are best indicated by the classes or ranks which we found to exist or to have come into existence, in our study of the origin of the state, as a result of the principle of division of labor, namely: the husbandmen, artisans, soldiers, and thinkers. All these are classed as subjects. An old Phœnician tale is recited to explain and justify the classification or ranking of the population into their several orders according to their functions.

§ 38. *The Transposition of Classes.* But the lines of division or separation must not be permitted to become rigid; classes must not be replaced by castes. There must always be opportunity for those of exceptional ability to rise into the classes higher than the one in which they were born; while demotion awaits those who fail to meet the responsibilities of their station.

"Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these He has mingled gold, wherefore also have they the greatest honor; others He has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen He has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. * * If the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child, because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of

artisans, who having an admixture of gold or silver are then raised to honor and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the state, it will be destroyed." Jowett commenting on this conception of the transposition of ranks, calls it one of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, and very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the world.[1]

"Such is our tale," Plato makes Socrates say, and with a sad eye upon his own time and his own city, and with its extravagant faith in the perfect equality of all and light-headed appreciation of public duty, he has him add, "Is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?" "Not in the present generation," replies Glaucon; "there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them," 414—5.

§ 39. *The Consequent Importance of Universal Education.* The importance of universal education follows as a corollary from the reasoning respecting the high duties of the guardians, the relative duties of all other ranks, and the possible transposition of individuals from one rank or class to another.

Plato argues in the spirit of a modern liberal for a general education of all and specific preparation of each, to discharge the duties appropriate to his rank or class.

The guardians, as we have seen, are the rulers par excellence. Those destined for the discharge of the highest functions and prospective guardians should be organized into training camps, in which they will be required to give an honorable account of themselves by the practice of just deeds and honorable conduct, discharging with fidelity those duties assigned to them in accordance with their rank or class. Preeminently may the life of the soldier class be so organized as to make the soldiers the more efficient as soldiers and to constitute their period of discipline at the same time a school in

[1] Cp. Jowett, Introd. to The Republic, p. LII.

which to prepare them for the highest functions of command and legislation.

But in modern times we see more clearly than Plato saw that in the peaceful pursuits of life no less than in the camp life of the soldier or in the field of war, may we find that discipline of the will and that sharpening of the intellectual faculties of insight and apprehension, which are useful in the career of men whether burdened with the responsibilities of office or the duties of private life. In an interesting chapter of Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics, Book IV., ch. VI., we have a parallel line of reasoning to that which the Egyptian tale as recited by Plato suggests, namely, a plea for universal education in the elements of knowledge concerning the art of life combined with a system of free scholarships "which will enable the clever son of a workingman to rise from school to school, till he has the best theoretical and practical education which the age can give." And again: "There are few practical problems in which the economist has a more direct interest than those relating to the principles on which the expense of the education of children should be divided between the state and the parents."[1]

§ 40. *The Soldier Class and their Camp Life.* The soldier class is composed of the young men of good birth and rank from whom when they become elders the list of guardians, the supreme officers of the government is to be replenished. "And perhaps the word guardian, in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies, and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, and the others the power, to harm us. The young men, whom before we called guardians, may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of their rulers," 414.

Readers of Plato are sometimes hopelessly confused by this double use of the term guardian. Throughout the third book

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1 Marshall's Principles of Economics, p. 295 and 299. For further remarks on education as a national investment, see Marshall, Book IV. ch. VI., especially § 7.

in the discussion of the elementary education the term guardian is used so broadly as to include all prospective or potential guardians in the narrower and higher sense. In these essays the term in the broad sense is often replaced by the wider term citizen, or by the descriptive prospective guardian.

The soldier class or the younger citizens are called auxiliaries in view of their constituent importance in the ancient city-state. Plato, it would seem, advocated the existence of a standing army in the sense that he held it necessary that a certain portion of the citizens should always be ready for war defensive or offensive. War in the ancient world, in the entire history of the world from its dawn to the present hour, or readiness for war, has been the essential condition of continuing the life of states. The army was not only to be organized by the rulers of the state and placed under their command in periods of special danger or war; but it was to be permanently in camp-life—each soldier serving his appointed time, until by reason of age he would pass out while another of a younger generation would take his place, much after the manner of the modern German and French military systems. But Plato did not see as clearly as we now see that the best auxiliary for good government is the universal self-government of all citizens. "Let them, the rulers, look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress an insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves, may come down on the fold from without; there let the soldier class encamp."

The camp life is to be humane, but under the strictest discipline, a discipline partaking of the nature of a system of education. Neither the privates in the line nor the officers in command shall have homes or property of their own. The silver and gold we will tell them they have in their own nature, and it is not meet that they should become tradesmen; cp. 416–7.

The severity of the regimen prescribed for the camp life of the soldier class is subjected to criticism by Glaucon. The method of dialogue enables Plato to present his sub-

ject from different points of view—and put discursively the ideas which he advances as his own. In the Platonic dialogue, as every reader of Plato knows, Socrates is usually chosen as the mouth-piece of the positive views of Plato. The reply made to the criticism noted is to the effect: first, that the happiness of the rulers, including soldiers, is not the first, but only an incidental aim in the good government of a state; secondly, that even under the severe regimen proposed, the soldiers may be the happiest of men, because happiness does not consist in satiety of food and drink nor in excessive indulgence of any appetites, but in the right ordering of one's life;[1] and thirdly that our aim in describing the constitution of the ideal-state is not to secure the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a state which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole, we should be most likely to find justice and in the ill-ordered state injustice; and having found both the well-ordered and the ill-ordered state, we may then decide which is the happier, cp. IV. 420.

§ 41. *The Unity of the State and the Subordination of its Parts.* The argument continues that in devising an ideal constitution the state must be considered as a whole and the principles of its administration must be determined as a whole. And the passage in which the argument is developed is one of the most famous in The Republic, and on account of its remarkable character both in point of content and style it is here transcribed at length: "At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy state, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of state.[2] Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to us and said: Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most

[1] A proposition developed more fully in another place in The Republic, IX; X, 608f.

[2] This is done, in detail, in the eighth and ninth books of The Republic. In the middle books of The Republic the well-ordered state is pictured as a kingdom of philosophers.

beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be purple, but you made them black. To him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes, consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you do not compel us to assign to the guardians [the true rulers and the soldier class are both included under this term here] a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fire-side, passing round the wine-cup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this we might make every class happy—and then, as you imagine, the whole state would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads, for if we listen to you, the husbandman will no longer be a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the state. Now, this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not really guardians, then see how they turn the state upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the state.[1] We mean our guardians," he proceeds to say finally, "to be true saviors and not destroyers of the state, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the state. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a state. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest

[1] This sentence contains an expression of faith in the power of the legislator and administrator distinctively Greek, but wholly un-modern.

happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the state as a whole. But if the latter be the truth then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole state will grow up into a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them," 420–1.

§ 42. *The Moderation of Wealth and of the Size of the State.* The state like the individual is in the best position in respect to wealth if it is neither excessively rich nor extremely poor; because excessive wealth is the parent of luxury and indolence, while extreme poverty is the parent of meanness and viciousness, and both are the cause of discontent.[1]

But on these premises how shall a state go to war, especially against a rich state? The case is not bad, if it means that our state shall have to pit its trained soldiers against an army of rich men. A single boxer, who is perfect in his art, will easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who are not boxers. Despising wealth our citizens may give themselves up to the practice of virtue, and when they need allies they can offer all the spoils of war to secure a defensive alliance, while an offensive alliance will not be needed as our ideal state will have no motives of greed that impel any attempts to conquer territory not its own. Nor is there much occasion to fear the power of existing states such as we have in our time. Plato was thinking of the states of his own age —because they were not at real unity with themselves. Of such states as we see about us, we ought to speak "in the plural number; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game." For our cities, however small, are divided into two parts, the rich and the poor, while the ideal-state which we are describing is to be pervaded by order which will give it unity and strength such as you will not find duplicated in our time in all Hellas.

[1] IV. 422.

The ideal-state must be limited in size by the possibilities of unity—"I would allow the state to increase in size so far as is consistent with unity," 423. In The Laws, Book V., Plato fixes the size of his city-state at the number of 5,040 citizens; and defends this number, among other reasons, because it has so many multiples; it "can be divided by exactly forty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten."[1] In The Republic he intimates that a city-state with a thousand warriors trained in accordance with his regimen would be strong enough to stand against any city in Hellas. Finally then "Let our city-state be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing," p. 423.

§ 43. *General Education the Condition of Continuous Unity in the State.* Only in comparatively recent times have statesmen again come to an appreciation of the importance of education to the life of states comparable in point of degree to the high value set upon education by the Greek philosophers. Plato recurs to the need "of degrading offspring of guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally superior." It is the intention, he proceeds to say, "in the case of the citizens generally, that each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many. * * The regulations which we are prescribing are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing, namely education and nurture. If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these as well as other matters which I shall omit. * * Good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals. * * Then to sum up: This is

[1] The Laws, V. 738.

the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed, that music, inclusive of literature and gymnastic, be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made," p. 423–4.

Education in the opinion of Plato is the most important means toward maintaining the unity of the state and into the approved system of education no innovation must be introduced. Innovations lead to lawlessness, and lawlessness in ever so small a matter leads to hurtful changes in greater matters. An excessive conservative marks this argument. Evidently Plato has no distinct and positive theory of progress—although the attempt to secure progress by well considered modifications of the law *i. e.* by wise legislation is a Greek thought, that lies near to Plato's mind, but he has no faith in the self-adjustment of the forces of nature, if given free play, such as modern thought encourages.

That Plato appreciated the dangers of a growing spirit of lawlessness is well shown by a passage in which he speaks of innovations in amusements as appearing harmless and admits there would be no harm in them, "were it not that little by little this spirit of license, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last by an overthrow of all rights, private and public," 424. There can be little doubt that when Plato wrote these words, he had in mind the course things were taking in his own city. He pleads accordingly for a stricter system of education. "Our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for, if amusements become lawless, they can never grow up into well conducted and virtuous citizens. * * And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music, have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order * * will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places in a state, will raise them up again.

* * Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected," 425.

§ 44, *Some Neglected Points in Education.* Plato lets us know some of the particulars of a good and more strict system of education, which in his opinion were neglected. "I mean" he makes Socrates say, "such things as these: when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honor is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; in short, deportment and manners in general," 425. Plato's thought is not that there should be laws on such items as the above, but that given a right system of education, correct views will follow on these neglected particulars. Indeed he says: "But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters; * * nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting."

§ 45. *Details of Legislation.* In The Republic Plato treats but briefly the details of legislation; he marks out the scope of legislation only in part. This subject is developed by him in The Laws at great length. In The Republic he tells us briefly that laws may be made: (a) about the business of the agora, the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; or (b) about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries. (c) Impositions and exactions of market and harbor dues—the regulations of markets, police, harbors and the like, cp. 425.

In regard to all the above items there is a strong tendency to excessive legislation and Plato ventures the suggestion that absolute freedom of contract and initiative should be permitted to individual citizens. He compares certain reformers of the law to those invalids who are always doctoring themselves, but never listening to the truth, always applying

remedies, but never the right ones, such as temperance and self-control.

Demagogues, many of whom are sincere, like this meddling with the laws; they "try their hand at paltry reforms—they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and other rascalities * * not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra," 426c.

(d) Laws concerning religion. It is best to accept these from our ancestors. "The institution of temples, and sacrifices, and other ceremonies in honor of the gods, demi-gods and heroes, and likewise the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and all the observances which we must adopt in order to propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant, and as founders of a state we should be unwise in trusting them to any expositor but our ancestral god," 427.

§ 46. *The Positive Definition of Justice.* We are now prepared to define the nature of justice. There are four virtues in a perfect state: (1) Wisdom *i. e.* good counsel. This is possessed only by a few in the Platonic state *i. e.* by guardians.

(2) Courage, which is the right opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared. This is the special virtue of the soldiers of a state and is dependent upon a correct system of education.—Our soldiers must take the dye of the laws.

(3) Temperance, which is the state of a man in whom the better principle has always the control of the worse. This is a virtue which should be possessed by all citizens, but a state may be said to be temperate whenever the governing element keep in control or subjection all the lower elements; the lower or the many would in this way be brought into agreement with the higher, the nobler and the few, they would, so to speak, be compelled to temperance, and thus all would be in possession of this virtue.

There remains (4) the virtue of justice. Thus justice is reached by a process of exclusion.[1] "The original principle

[1] Cp. IV. 427–33.

which we were always laying at the foundation of a state, that one man should practice one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it," 433. "Justice is doing one's own business, and not being a busy body." Justice is moreover the fundamental virtue. It "is found in women and children, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject—the quality, I mean of every one doing his own work, and not being a busy-body."

This idea (definition) of justice is confirmed by the principles which govern in the decision of cases at law. Suits are decided on the ground that a man may neither take what is another's nor be deprived of what is his own. To find then what is a man's place, his duty, and his own, is to find what is just concerning him.

There are three classes in a state:[1] (1) artisans or traders; (2) rulers or legislators; and (3) warriors. A state may be said to be just when these three classes severally do their own business, cf. 435. Certain qualities of these same classes determine also whether a state is temperate valiant and wise. Wisdom, as we have already said, must be the special virtue of the legislators, courage of warriors; temperance consists of harmony in the relation of the classes combined with the dominance of the better principle in each or at least in the legislators who may then dominate the other classes; while justice consists in a normal status of each of these classes.

§ 47. *Definition of Justice in the Individual Man.* To the three classes in the state correspond three faculties of mind in the individual: desire, reason, and will. In the perfect performance of the functions of each of these faculties in the individual man, we find justice or the just man in the individual.[2]

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[1] *Aristotle* also enumerates in one place three classes, The Politics IV. 4, cp. 95f above; in another eight. VIII. 8, cp. 154f above.

[2] These ideas are elaborated in the latter part of Book IV. 435–45.

"As we were saying, the united influence of music[1] and gymnastic will bring them [the several faculties of man—desire, reason, and will] into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rythm. * * And these two—reason and passion [will]—thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest waxing great and strong with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man," 442a.

§ 48. *Conclusion.* It is in this way that Plato reasons from the greater to the less, from virtue in the state to virtue in the individual man, according to a plan announced near the opening of the second book.

He found the usual inquiry concerning the nature of justice, attempted in the first book and the opening pages of the second, unsatisfactory. He proposed, therefore, in order to discover justice to look for it where it might be found written in larger letters. He believed he could find it in the state. He undertook therefore an examination into the nature and structure of the state. He described first the structure of the state; in doing this he asked how the state came to be, what were its constituent elements as determined by that fundamental principle of human association and organization, namely, the division of labor; he then recognized the propriety of asking how these constituent elements can be organized into the various forms of existing government, and

[1] Music to the Greeks, it must always be remembered, included poetry *i. e.* literature as well as music in the sense in which we now use the word. Mere music as we should say was rather despised by the Greeks and certain forms of it were pronounced distinctly harmful by Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers.

how they may be dominated and preserved, but he postponed an answer.[1] Second, in his analysis of the state he discovered the importance of a correct system of general elementary education; and this was followed lastly by a consideration of the correct principles of administration; and finally by his ability to state a positive definition of justice, as the principle of order in society *i. e.* in the state, and the principle of order likewise in the mental and moral life of each individual man.

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[1] The answer is undertaken in the eighth and ninth book of The Republic.

II.

GOVERNMENT BY PHILOSOPHERS; AND THE HIGHER EDUCATION.

E. THE DOCTRINE OF COMMUNISM.

§ 1. *Introduction.* As the first four books of The Republic deal with the nature and structure of the state with special reference to determining the nature and range of justice, so the fifth, sixth, and seventh books are bound together by their treatment of problems set forth in the title above given. Plato makes some show of hesitating to enter upon the discussion of this topic both on account of its difficulty and its delicacy. "I feel a reluctance to approach the subject," he makes Socrates say to Glaucon, "lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at from another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practical, would be for the best, is also doubtful," V. 450.

§ 2. *The Equality of the Sexes.* The reader will find in this portion much more than a vulgar communism in the relations of the sexes. The first doctrine that greets him after the good-humored abandon of the introduction is a doctrine which many are disposed to hold as an exclusively modern doctrine, the equality of women with men, and the first step is an argument for an education of women similar in kind to the education for men, 451f.

The objection that women are different from men is often not well considered. We must enter more fundamentally into the theory of division of labor, in order to get a basis for the distinctions by which we assign different pursuits to different

natures and the same pursuits to the same natures. Superficial or ostensible differences must not hastily be accepted as ground for assigning different pursuits and different education to men and women. "The difference which consists in women bearing children and men begetting children, does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect to the sort of education she should receive." And on careful reflection we may find "that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would effect them in the administration of the state," 455f. The same natural gifts are found in both sexes, 455. Women have all the mental qualities of men, but some of these qualities they possess in less degree. Men and women differ in intellectual endowments, but men differ in this respect also among themselves; and so do women. Women like men have differing gifts and predilections: "one woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature. And one woman has a turn for gymnastic, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics. And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit. Then one will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness. And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and character. The same natures ought to have the same pursuits. There is, therefore, nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of guardians, 456. The most serious objection against the equality of the sexes in their education, it occurs to Plato, would be the freedom of the palæstra; he imagines great fun would be made of women exercising their bodies after the manner of men, but to all such objections he answers with the sentiment that evil is to him only who evil thinks, and it is only the fool laughing in his folly, for this is and ever will be

the best of sayings: That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base, 457.

§ 3. *The Community of Wives and Children.* The motive of the scheme for community of women and children was (1) the establishment of a system by which through formal marriage ceremonies under supervision of the officers of the state *i. e* of the guardians, parentage might be limited to the strong and efficient, the well formed and ripely developed in body, mind, and will, in order that the principle of artificial selection might be applied to the procreation of human beings as it is now applied by stock-breeders to the development of fine animal stocks. The Greeks, as well as the moderns, though not in as great detail and with less thoroughness, understood the advantage of selecting the sires and dams if they sought a high grade of offspring. And (2) to reduce the grounds of suspicion and jealousy in the ruling classes as far as possible. For the latter reason community of property was also urged.

That Plato understood the difficulty of devising a scheme of communal marriage and family life for the guardians that would be workable, is evident both from the cynical and half-humorous tone in which he couches the discussion of the communistic family as well as from the express recognition of the difficulty. He thought it was necessary to make the lot the basis of the system of marriage, which he proposed in order that those who were ruled out of the privilege of parenthood (the begetting and bearing of children) might blame their ill-luck and not the guardians who were to manipulate the lot.

As fast as children are born they shall be received by the officers appointed for the purpose, whether men or women, or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men, and taken to a general nursery which is to be located in a suitable quarter of the city in charge of special nurses. The mothers are to be brought to this nursery to suckle the children, but "the greatest possible care shall be taken that no mother recognizes her own child; other nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the

process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants," 460. This is a picture of an aristocratic state; the institutions described apply only to the guardian or governing class. "The children of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be. * * This must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure," 460.

The prime of life is reckoned at the age of thirty for men and twenty for women. The suitable period for parentage is fixed for women as that between the twentieth to the fortieth year, and for men from the twenty-fifth to the fifty-fifth. It is intimated that generally men are not prepared to be fathers until they have considerably passed the age of twenty-five; men should wait until they have passed by the sharpest burst for the race of life, or as we might say, until they have established themselves in their trade or profession. A public opinion is to be cultivated, which will put severely under the ban any union of parents not sanctioned by the laws; but a large freedom in the intercourse of the sexes outside of the aims of parentage is permitted, cp. 461. In his description of the system of reckoning kinship in the communistic family Plato is necessarily obscure and illogical because there can be no definite degrees of kinship established, and yet Plato desires to find some basis of distinction in order to establish a table of prohibited degrees for the regulation of marriage and other relations of the sexes.

There is no formal description of the scheme of community of property in The Republic, apart from the incidental notice of it in describing the camp life of the soldier-class.[1]

§ 4. *A Defense of Communism.* Plato's defense of communism is idealistic and is as vague as such a defense must always be. The chief aim of the legislator, Plato tells us,

[1] § 40 of Essay I on The Republic.

ought to be unity in the state,[1] and that unity results from common aims, common pains and common pleasures, 462. When one member of the state suffers all others shall suffer with him; in like manner all shall rejoice in the prosperity of each.

In the communistic state rulers and subjects will exist, but they will all speak of one another as citizens. The people will call their rulers saviours and helpers, whereas in other states they are called masters; and the rulers will call the people maintainers and foster-fathers, whereas in other states they are called slaves; of each other the rulers will speak as friends and not as enemies or strangers, 463. The modern reader may consider all this a noble aspiration but not an argument.

The family ties and affections being universal there will be no discord. The argument is in effect that by abolishing the private family a universal family will take the place of all private families, as if the private family were not itself a product of nature carrying within its bounds certain necessary limitations and relations. Common property in goods it is intimated will eliminate suits at law and violence of all sorts except perchance personal violence; a law is therefore ordained making it the duty of each to resent personal insult on the spot, cp. 464—5. But shame and fear are nevertheless to be invoked as guardians of the peace between citizens.

"As the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another. * * I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid for they are beneath our notice; such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family," 465. Such sentiments may be attractive as marks of gentle irony or as expressions of what human character ought to attain unto, but they can not be regarded as in any sense the conclusion of any

[1] For Aristotle's criticism of Plato's communism see §§ 2—5 of Essay II. on The Politics.

serious or systematic thinking. Finally the comment of Adeimantus, that the guardians are made unhappy in order to secure the happiness of the state is recalled and dismissed with the statement that the life of the guardians freed from the vexatious incident to the ordinary course of life and crowned with the honors that come with the faithful discharge of their duties is itself a guaranty of happiness with which their burdens and self-denials in respect to the grosser sides of life can not be brought into comparison. The guardians are even more blessed than Olympian victors. The guardian class are to have a common education, common pursuits, common children, and common goods, and men and women are to be on an equal footing with one another, 466.

§ 5. *War and Foreign Relations.* While there will be no dissensions among the citizens themselves in the ideal state of Plato, he does not venture to leave out of consideration the needs of war and the principles for the regulation of foreign affairs. The children are at an early age to be permitted to accompany the citizens on military expeditions, and observe the course of war, mounted on tractable but fleetfooted horses who may in moments of danger carry them unharmed from the scenes of battle, 467.

The hero in war receives from Plato his due meed of praise; he shall receive honors from his comrades and favors from his beloved; he shall have a special abundance of meats and drink; hymns shall be sung to him, and divine honors may be given him after death. But the coward shall be degraded in rank; he shall cease to be a guardian and remanded to the class of husbandmen or artisans. "He who allows himself to be made a prisoner may as well be made a present to his enemies."

In his account of the principles of conduct in dealing with enemies, Plato takes high ground. He argues for the extension of the accepted principles of international law among the Greeks to all dealings with the barbarians as well, and for a much higher standard than prevailed in his time of unity and comity among the Greeks themselves. First of all, the Hel-

lenes should not enslave any subject Hellenic state; they should aim rather to spare all Hellenic states all the more in view of their common danger of falling one day under the yoke of the barbarians; and no Hellene shall be made a slave, 469.

Next, those slain in battle shall not be despoiled. The practice of despoiling an enemy often is but an excuse for not facing the battle. Moreover, it is a mark of meanness and avarice. Nor shall the proper burial of the dead be hindered.

"Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes." Nor may the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses be permitted; and no booty in excess of one year's crop may be carried away, 470. Hellenic warfare must be considered only as a kind of discord; the parties to it are friends and relations. "The guilt of war is always confined to a few persons," 470–1.

§ 6. *The Possibility of the Ideal State.* But we must answer the question whether such an order of things as that which we have described is really possible. "Is such an order of things possible," Glaucon is made to say to Socrates. "For I am quite willing to acknowledge," Glaucon continues, "that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the state," 471.

Socrates hesitates to reply to this leading question. He explains that he has already run great risk of being overwhelmed by the waves of objection and protest, because he has announced, first, his faith in the substantial equality of the sexes, and secondly his belief in the advantages of a general community of family life and of property. If now to these uncommon doctrines he adds a third heterodoxy, he feels himself in danger of absolute annihilation.

Let us review, first, the course by which we have come. We have found our way hither in our search for justice and injustice. How can we expect to find absolute justice and the absolutely just, or must we not rather be satisfied with an ap-

proximation? We were searching for an ideal; and we have so far been describing only an ideal in order that we might have some standard by which to judge our own happiness or unhappiness. A painter would not be reckoned the worse, if he succeeded in delineating the ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, even if he could not prove that any such man ever did exist. But the ideal may be approximated. So in our ideal state, 472–3. The actual state may not in every respect coincide with the ideal; but, if we can show how an actual state may be governed nearly as we propose, the possibility of our state will have to be admitted.

Plato makes Socrates announce with impressive solemnity, that one change only would make the ideal state a reality and that change is a change of rulers. "Now, then, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonor; and do you mark my words.

Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race, as I believe—and then only will our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day," 473.

F. THE RULE OF THE PHILOSOPHER.

§ 7. *Who is a Philosopher?* We must explain whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the state. There will be those who are by nature qualified to study philosophy and become leaders in the state, whereas others are meant to be followers rather than leaders, 474.

The philosopher is a lover not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole, he has an appetite for learning. But mere curiosity is not in itself a symptom of philosophy. True philosophers are lovers of the vision of truth. They are not mere

sight lovers or lovers of art; they seek for knowledge and not for opinion only, 476–80.

The true philosophers are alone able to act as guides and guardians of the law, they having the vision of true being in the other world, know how to order if not already ordered the laws about beauty, goodness, and justice in this, VI. 484. "He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure. * * Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending have no place in his character," 485.

Another characteristic of the philosopher is breadth of view; there must be no taint of meanness. "Littlemindedness thwarts above everything the soul that is destined ever to to aspire to grasp the truth, both divine and human, in its integrity and universality."

The philosopher is "the spectator of all time and of all existence," 486; he can not possibly think much of human life; nor will he account death a fearful thing. The mean and the cowardly nature has no part in true philosophy. The true philosophers are harmoniously constituted, not covetous or mean or boasters or cowards. Can such ever be unjust or hard? Justness and gentleness and sociability are signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature. The potential philosopher has a pleasure in learning and a good memory; he is not forgetful, retaining nothing of what he learns like an empty vessel. Truth is akin to proportion, whereas, the inharmonious and unseemly nature tends only to disproportion, 486. A naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything, and all the qualities enumerated are in a manner necessary to the soul which is to have a full and perfect knowledge of being.

"And must not that be a blameless study which he can only pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to

learn—noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance? The god of jealousy himself could find no fault with such a study;" and to men like this, when perfected by years and education, and to these only we shall entrust the government of states, 487.

§ 8. *The Reputed Uselessness of Philosophers; The Corruption of Philosophers.* The objection is made that although the argument glorifying the philsopher cannot be met at each step, the fact is nevertheless that the votaries of philosophy who study it not only in their youth, but follow it as a pursuit in later life, are for the most part strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that the best of them are made useless by this very study, 487.

"The manner in which the best men are treated in their own states is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it," 488. Plato describes the existing governments of his time in a figure: "Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain, who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is defective. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering—every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and can not tell who taught him or when he learned; more than this the sailors will assert that it can not be taught, and they are ready to cut to pieces every one who will assert the contrary," 488. The mutinous crew will conspire to drug the captain's senses with strong drink or some narcotic. Their partisans they will compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman; their rivals and critics they will call good-for-nothing, or in extremities, they will kill them and throw them overboard. It never occurs to them that "the true pilot must pay attention to the year and the seasons, and the sky and the stars and the wind, and whatever belongs to his art if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship; and that the true pilot must be in authority whether all of the crew like it or

not." With such a crew will not the true pilot be called a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing? Just so it is with the true philosopher in the state. Tell the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honor in their cities, "that in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. It is not the order of nature that the pilot should humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him, or that the wise should wait at the rich man's door—the ingenuous author of this witticism was mistaken," 489. They that have need of a physician must call one.

"But the real enemies of philosophy are after all her professed followers, the same to whom you suppose your accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless." The allusion here is undoubtedly to the sophists. The reason why the good are useless has been explained. That there are so many perversions of the philosopher will now be explained.

There are indeed so many imposters, philosophers falsely so-called, that it is difficult for the masses of mankind to discern the true philosophers who are few in number, because but few are born with the potential endowments of the philosopher and fewer yet because of the great and numerous obstacles thrown in the way of those who are endowed with the requisite natural gifts before cited, namely manliness, high-mindedness, a quick apprehension, and a good memory, 490–1.

Among the obstacles to their development Plato enumerated six, and concluded that if potential philosophers are saved at all, they must be saved by the power of God, 491–2: (1) There are few of them; and (2) of these few many are distracted from philosophy by their very virtues, by their courage for example by which they fall in battle more often than men of inferior spirit; (3) by the ordinary goods of life, having too easy a time in their youth and early manhood; (4) by a false education, their susceptibilities being keen, they are the more easily corruptible, their finer natures are more liable

to injury; (5) by a false public opinion—they are not so often corrupted by private teachers, *i. e.* by sophists as by a false public opinion; (6) the careers of many philosophers, actual and potential are ended by attainder or confiscation or death.

Of these six the fifth is of special importance, because its fine statement is couched in terms which contain a striking description of the reaction of the social mind or public opinion upon the character of the individual.

"Our philosopher," Plato says, "is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature in all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they (the public) not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? * * When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly (ecclesia), or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or the blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have?—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be," 492. But here is a still greater obstacle Plato makes Socrates say, with good natured irony, "the gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, the public, apply when their words are powerless." "I would not have you ignorant that in the present evil state

of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say," 492.

"Let me crave your assent also to a further observation: Those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists, and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do in fact teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom," 493a. They study the crowd like one might study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast, which is held in custody. Their philosophy like their morality is a mere echo of the whims and fancies of the multitude. The praise of the crowd turns the head of many a gifted youth; he will fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and barbarians, or believe himself a poet or master artist, 493—4. "Now if, when in this state of mind, some one comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that under such circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen," 494c; and if peradventure he gets his eyes opened and is a little humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think they are likely to loose the advantage of his companionship? Will they not do anything to render his teacher powerless?

The very gifts which make their devotion to philosophy a possibility, constitute also a temptation to enter upon other courses of life, and so philosophy is left desolate, 495. And again, among those tempted to enter her service, are many who have so scant endowment by nature, that they make but a sorry figure in her company; they are like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune. "And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her, who is in rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be genrated? Will they not be sophisms having nothing in them akin to true wisdom," 476.

The worthy disciples of philosophy are but a small remnant. They know they can not resist the wildness of the multitude. Unwilling to join in the wickedness about them and

seeing no opportunity of usefulness to the state or to their friends, they hold their peace and go their way. They are "like one who takes shelter behind a wall on a stormy day, when the wind is driving before it a hurricane of dust and rain; and when from his retreat he sees the infection of lawlessness spreading over the rest of mankind, he is well content, if he can in any way live his own life here untainted in his own person by unrighteousness or unholy deeds, and, when the time of his release arrives, take his departure amid bright hopes with cheerfulness and serenity," 496c. Existing states are unworthy of the philosophic nature, hence that nature is warped and estranged as an exotic seed in an alien soil, 497.

§ 9. *The Possibility and Feasibility of Giving Philosophers Rule.* Our next problem is: How education may be so ordered as to bring philosophers into rule within the state. This must be worked out because of the importance of giving the philosopher rule. If a perfect constitution is to endure however good it may be, some living authority will always be required in the state having the same idea of the constitution, as those who originally framed it, 497.[1]

Education in our present system is too much a side matter, an incidental occupation, 498. It must be made the chief business of those who are the guardians of the state. The Republic of Plato is often described as a Utopia. The impression seems to be general that Plato himself regards his schemes as possibly visionary and impracticable. As a matter of fact, Plato does regard some of his proposals in this light, but even these he invariably tries to present in a realizable and feasible form. He argues in favor of the possibility and feasibility of more than one scheme, which is so often in our day dismissed as presumptively impractical, and as being regarded so by Plato.[2] Plato, however, affirms stoutly the possibility of his conceit of the philosopher in office. That people dis-

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[1] Cp. § 4 above.

[2] Cp. Elaborate argument of Jowett, v. 3, Introduction to The Republic, pp. CLXXIII—IV.

trust philosophy because they know too often only bad and conventional imitations of it, he has already affirmed. "They have seldom, if ever, heard," Plato said in his own age most truly, "free and noble sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge. * * * They are strangers to [such] words. * * * This is the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor states, nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the state, and until a like necessity is laid upon the state to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings and sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of philosophy.[1] That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm; if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. * * If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime, which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been, or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior to have the charge of the state, we are ready to assert to the death that *this our constitution has been, and is, yea, and will be*, whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this, that there is a difficulty we acknowledge ourselves," 499.

The popular feeling against the philosophers will vanish when the real philosophers come into the public service. The spurious philosophers are to blame for all the hard feeling against philosophy itself; they are always talking about things whereas the true philosophers fix their eyes upon immutable principles, 499—500. The true philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; and he will be no unskilful artificer

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[1] Cp. The Views of St. Simon and Auguste Comte. See Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2d. ed. v. 1. pp. 133—8.

of justice, temperance and every virtue, and no state can be happy that is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern, 500. Plato suggests in a rather non-modern spirit that the philosophers can construct a constitution upon a tabula rasa, but he insists that when filling in the details they will have in view not only the ideal, but also the practicable and real. "They will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements into the image of a man; and this they will conceive, according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God," 501.

When the enemies of philosophy will begin to appreciate the services which it is capable of rendering, they will be placated, 501–2. It is quite in the spirit of this contention, if we may quote from one of the other Platonic dialogues, that Socrates undertakes to persuade the young Lysis "that in the things which we know every one will trust us, Hellenes and barbarians, men and women; and we may do as we please about them. * * But in things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they will hinder us as far as they can, not only strangers, but father, mother and friend will also hinder us. * * We can not be friends to others, nor will others love us in so far as we are useless to them. And, therefore, my boy, if you are wise all men will be your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but, if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your friends."[1]

We may conclude therefore that our laws, if enacted, would be for the best, and that the enactment of them though difficult, is not impossible. This part of our subject having been completed we ask in what way and by the help of what pursuits and studies, shall we secure the presence of a body of men capable of preserving the constitution unimpaired, 502c.

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[1] Lysis, Jowett's Dialogues of Plato, v. 1, 3d ed., p. 57—8.

§ 10. *The Training of Rulers.* The guardian in a perfect polity must be a philosopher. From his youth he must be a man of rare gifts; he must have combined in himself the quick and solid temperaments in one.

As an aspirant for the higher education, he must first have a careful elementary education, he must first be tested in those labors and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before.[1] He must later enter upon another kind of probation; he must begin another education, one which we have not yet mentioned, he "must be exercised also in the highest kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises," 503c.

There is thus a shorter and a longer road to education. In our previous discussion we followed the shorter course—we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom. The guardian must take the longer course. There is a "knowledge still higher—higher than justice and the other virtues. * * And of the virtues we must not behold the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us," 504.

G. THE HIGHER EDUCATION.

§ 11. *Chief Characteristics of the Higher Education.*[1] It is search for the highest knowledge, which is the idea of the good that constitutes the chief characteristic of the higher education and all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use, in leading us toward the determination of what is good. You have often heard me say we know very little of the good.

Some affirm the good to be pleasure; others say it is knowledge, and these when pressed, to be more definite are com-

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[1] Cp. Essay I, especially §§ 20—40.

pelled to say rather ridiculously that the good is knowledge of the good as if we understood them when they use the term good. And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good. And therefore they must acknowledge that bad and good are the same. As a matter of fact all pursue the good, but without knowing the nature of it. The guardians ought to know its nature. So much for what others say of the good. But what shall we teach? "A fastiduous gentleman like you, Adeimantus, would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters." "True, Socrates," comes the reply, "but I must say that one like you, who has passed a life time in the study of philosophy, should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own." "Well, but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know?" 505–6.

§ 12. *What is the Highest Good According to Plato?* The good is God is the practical summary of an extended dialectic in which occurs the famous allegory of the dark-cave[1] the inhabitants of which with faces turned from the light see and hear only the shadows of beings who pass along the wall behind them. "My opinion," so concludes the discussion, "is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or in private life must have his eye fixed," 517. The power of learning exists already in the soul.

§ 13. *How the Philosopher may be Induced to Accept Public Office.* That the philosophers will not seek public office

[1] Opening of Bk. VII. This allegory and much of the discussion in the 6th and 7th books of The Republic is of greater interest to the psychologist and the student of metaphysics than to the student of politics.

may be expected, but we compel them to descend their heights into the humdrum of every day toil and experience; we propose that they shall take their turn in carrying the burdens of the state. Our aim is not to make one class happy but all classes. The public providing for their education may expect a return from them in the way of eminent public service. "The truth is," Plato says pungently, "that the state in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the state in which rulers are most eager to rule is the worst governed," 520. Just men will take office as a stern necessity. "You must contrive for your future rulers *another and a better life* than that of ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered state; for only in the state whlch offers this will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom which are the true blessings of life. * * The only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. * * Those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task. For, if they do, they will be rival lovers, and they will fight," 521.

§ 14. *The Curriculum of the Higher Education—Part I. Mathematics.* The curriculum of the shorter course has already been given. It is to include music and gymnastics as we have seen. The advanced or higher course will be devoted to those subjects which have a universal application giving science and tending to the discovery of that good which we are seeking. The main branches of this inquiry are mathematics and logic (dialectic). Of these we enumerate first the subdivisions of mathematics. (1) Arithmetic or the science of number and calculation. The true use of this study is to draw the soul toward being, cp. 523. Arithmetic has a practical and philosophical use. "For the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also because he has to arise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician. * * Our guardian is both warrior and philosopher. Arithmetic then is the kind of knowledge

[science] which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must persuade those who are to be the principal men of our state to learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor, again, like merchants or retail-dealers, with a view to buying or selling. * * Arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about an abstract number. * * And you have further observed that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been," 525–6.

(2) Geometry. We are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician." But there is a more important part of geometry which must especially be cultivated, that namely which tends to make more easy the vision of the good; such a conception of the science is however in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians who have in view practice only, and are always speaking of squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas, knowledge is the real object of the whole science. * * The knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing or transient. * * Then geometry will draw the soul towards truth and create the spirit of philosophy. * * Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city [our ideal state] should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects which are not small. * * There are the military advantages of which we have spoken; and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not," 526.

(3) Solid geometry. After plane geometry we now usually study astronomy, which is the science of solids in revolution. But we should first consider solids in themselves. After plane geometry should come solid geometry; but this subject is as yet very little developed. * * "And for two reasons—in the first place no government patronizes them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they [solids in themselves] are difficult; in the second place students can not learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found [at present *i. e.* in the time of Plato], and even if he could as matters now stand, the students are very conceited, and would not attend to them. That, however, would be different, if the state became the director of these studies and gave honor to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now disregarded as solids in themselves are by the world, and maimed as they are of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies of solids in themselves force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the state [the favor and patronage of society as we in our own time might say] they would some day emerge into light," 528. Then assuming that the science now omitted (solid geometry) would come into existence if encouraged by the state, let us go on to:

(4) Astronomy the science of solids in motion or more accurately one form of the science of solids in motion. The lower phases of astronomy deal with the observation of the seasons and of months and of years, which is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor, but in its higher phases "astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another," 529.

Glaucon suggests the propriety of studying natural philosophy, but Socrates rebukes him: "In my opinion," Socrates is made to say, and he is spokesman for Plato, "that knowledge only which is of being and is unseen, can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens, or blinks

on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science," 529. This rebuke modern science would not justify; modern science would rather say, he who is thus engaged is studying physics, while he who works upon astronomy in the spirit of Plato, is studying metaphysics. But Plato urges only that the astronomer must look farther than the stars and deeper than the heavens, in order that he may discever the relations and forces the essence or cause which holds them in being. Our next study is:

(5) Harmonics, which is another form of the science of solids in motion. It is to the ear what astronomy is to the eye, and was developed by the Pythogoreans with whom in this regard Plato and his followers agreed in the main. But Plato criticises the Pythagoreans for investigating only the numbers of the harmonies which are heard and never attaining to problems of number—"that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not," 531; while he ridicules the customary teaching of acoustics as that prevailed in his time. But this series of mathematical studies is but the prelude to DIALECTIC or the science of reasoning.

§ 15. *The Curriculum of the Higher Educatiom. Part II.* The skilled mathematician is not a dialectician. "I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning."[1] The power of dialectic alone can reveal reality or a *knowledge of being* and *of the good*, but that only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences *i. e.* of the mathematical sciences.

Dialectic has two parts or divisions, that of the intellect or knowledge, and that of opinion, each of which has two subdivisions. The former: (1) the dialectic of knowledge or positive science; (2) the dialectic of the understanding or probable science. The latter: (1) the dialectic of faith or the science of theology; (2) the dialectic of the shadows of things

[1] Cf. Prof. Weld's paper on The Place of Mathematics in a Liberal Education read before Colleg. Sec. of S. E. I. T. A., Iowa City, April '99.

or the science of mythology.[1] Of these four only the first is pure dialectic, and it is upon this highest science that Plato lays greatest stress. "And surely you would not have the children of your ideal-state, whom you are nuturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts,[2] having no reason in in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters. * * Then you will make a law that the children and youth shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions," 534. This is an ideal which corresponds to our modern idea of a legal education, it was thoroughly exploited by the Greek sophist advocates. Pure dialectic is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them. Only those who are sound in body and mind may be introduced to and carried through the rigorous system of education here sketched.

§ 16. *Who May Take the Course in the Higher Education.* The men who are destined to do the world's work and be leaders in thought and action, should have noble and generous tempers and be in possession of such natural gifts as will facilitate their education—such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition, for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics; the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body," p. 238—9. The man capable of the higher education is well described in these lines: "He of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied, solid man, who is a lover of labor in any line; or, he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise, and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him," 535.

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[1] 533c. I have allowed myself unusual liberties in this statement of the subdivisions of Dialectic. The reader should be informed that in the text we have four words, which give a clue to the branches which I have designated by titles now well understood. These are *science*, *understanding*, *belief*, and *perception of shadows*. Plato's distinctions would not be accepted today.

[2] γραμμάς, literally 'lines' probably the starting-point of a race-course, —Jowett.

The thing to be lamented at present is that those who study philosophy have no vocation, 535. The votary of philosophy must not have a lame or halting industry; nor must he be half-hearted in his devotion to the truth; he must extol all the virtues. If our pupils are incompetent, unsound in mind or body, we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present, 536.

§ 17. *When will the Philosopher Have a Vocation.* Plato deplores the fact that "those who study philosophy have no vocation." This is in contrast to the remarkable demands which our own age makes upon the man of science. It is true that in politics we are still indisposed to trust the scholar but the same reason which prevailed in Plato's day is still in a measure good. The political philosophy of the closet is not always philosophy, it is not always true wisdom. There is, however, at the present time an extensive machinery of learning and mental labor at the disposal of those who to-day guide the administration of states. Governmental inquiries of various kinds, and elaborate and frequent census reports by governments central and local, Bureaus of Labor, Education, Manufacture and Commerce, are constantly accumulating information to guide those who can see through the maze of facts to the formation of safe and rational public policies. But the teaching of Plato that facts in themselves have no intelligence is still valid.

If philosophy attains to a vocation her votaries will not be half industrious and half idle, but will work with constant zeal for the advancement of social well-being.

§ 18. *The Age of Admission to Higher Education and Duration of the Course.* The youth must not enter too late upon this higher course. "Arithmetic and geometry and all the other elements of instruction [including music and gymnastics], which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education. * * Because a

freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind. Do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent," 536—7.

Gymnastics must be completed before the several studies of the dialectic, and during the years when the severer exercises in gymnastics are prescribed there will be little use in attempting anything else, "for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning"—excessive exercise conduces to sleepiness and slowness of mental action.

At the age of twenty the first period of education which embraces the course in gymnastics and the elements of knowledge in the sciences is supposed to have ended. From the class who are twenty years old, those are to be selected who have the capacity for the higher education: "The sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see their natural relationship to one another and to true being." Gymnastic exercises during this period, from the age of twenty to thirty, shall continue in the form of prescribed military duties, but they are no longer the main thing.

"Those who are most steadfast in their learning and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty, will have to be chosen out of a select class to be advanced to greater honors; they will have to prove their ability by the test of dialectic," 537. Plato comments on the tendency of dialectic to beget scepticism; he is aware that the discovery of the inadequacy of the alleged explanation of phenomena results often in abandoning faith in the verity of things altogether. He says: "There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouth, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing all who come

near them. * * And when they have made many conquests and received defeat at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence not only they but philosophy and all that relates to it, have a bad name with the rest of the world. * * But when a man begins to get older he will not suffer himself to be led away in this manner; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and as a consequence of his superior moderation he will increase instead of diminish the respect for his pursuit," 539.

A post graduate course of five years is now to be devoted to the special pursuit of philosophy from the age of thirty to thirty-five by that small class who are selected from the already select class who pursue the higher education from twenty to thirty, a previous process of selection having been made from prospective candidates for advancement at twenty.

§ 20. *Induction into Public Office.* When the third course of study will have been completed at the age of thirty-five the educated citizens are considered ready for office. They shall then be compelled to hold military or other offices, such as befit young men; in these offices they will get their experience of life. Here again they are put to the test to see whether they will continue steadfast notwithstanding every manner of temptations.

This preliminary stage of official life is to last for fifteen years. "And when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives, and in every branch of knowledge, come at last to their consummation." Henceforth they are to be law-makers and responsible officials touching the highest questions of policy. "The time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the state and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also, making philosophy their chief pursuit; but

when their turn comes toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty, and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the state, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, in any case as blessed and divine.

"You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.

"Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures go," 540.

The second part of The Republic ending with the seventh book closes with the reflection that government by philosophers is not a mere dream and a suggestion for the immediate preparation for a transition to the new order. The way for that new order Plato believed to lie only in the direction of a far-reaching and thorough system of education, which would take the young at an age when they will still be unaffected by the habits of their parents, and train them in the laws and constitution dimly shadowed in this sketch.

III.

A CRITICISM OF EXISTING STATES.[1]

§ 1. *Existing Forms of Government and the Corresponding Types of Human Character.* At the opening of the eighth book the dialogue recurs to the discussion of the existing forms of government to which a brief allusion was made at the close of the fourth book. Plato enumerates five forms of government, but in such a way as to show that by one method of counting he would name six, namely: monarchy and aristocracy—these names he applies to his ideal state; timocracy or timarchy; oligarchy; democracy; and tyranny.

"Virtue is one, but the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones worthy of note. * * There appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the state. * * There are five of the state and five of the soul. The first is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many. But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the state will be maintained."[2]

At the opening of the eighth book the speakers restate their purpose to determine through an examination of the ideal state and existing states, not only what constitutes the best and the worst individual life, but also whether the best man is

[1] The Republic, Books VIII., IX., and X.

[2] IV. 445. The translation of this extract and of others which follow, as of many that have preceded, is Jowett's.

not also the happiest and the worst the most miserable. Plato's repeated assertion of the analogy of the individual and the state is like the doctrine of the community of property and families, or, the scheme of government by philosophers, one of the characteristic teachings of The Republic.

Counting monarchy and aristocracy as one, there are four other forms which Plato regards as perversions of the first or ideal. The ideal state having been considered in the intervening books[1] we turn to an examination of the perversions of the ideal state *i. e.* to existing forms of government. "The four forms so far as they have distinct names are, first those of Crete and Sparta which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next—this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils; thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different; and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all and is the fourth and worst disorder of a state. * * We may regard as minor links in the series all principalities and purchased sovereignties and other intermediate forms of government, found both among the Hellenes and barbarians. * Governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and there must be as many of the one as of the other. For we can not suppose that states are made of 'oak and rock,' and not out of the human natures which are in them," 544.

The Cretan and Spartan constitutions Plato regards as resting on honor or ambition, and he describes them as a timocracy or timarchy. This constitution is first considered, because it is supposed to be the least deviation from its primitive counterpart. This is followed by an examination of the other forms of government in the order named above; and the description of each of these forms is accompanied by an account of the type of character which it is supposed to produce or foster.

§ 2. *The Origin and Nature of Timocracy; The Number of the State.* "First let us inquire how timocracy (the gov-

[1] V., VI., and VII.

ernment of honor) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). All political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, can not be moved." This assumption of the perfection and natural permanence of the first or ideal form of the state is part of Plato's theory of the existence of universals, but in spite of the difficulty of seeing how a change from this assumed original and true form, should or could be effected, Plato does see, as he thinks, such a change has come to be, and he accordingly sets himself the task of finding an explanation. The explanation is found or supposed to be found in the failure of the rulers to have attained to the true knowledge of the law of population. Failure to comply with the law of number results both in a quantitative and a qualitative disturbance of the equilibrium of population.

In describing his number theory as a solemn jest of the muses, he appears to imply as Jowett observes,[1] some degree of satire on the symbolical use of number.[2] But if we may judge from Aristotle's respectful allusion to this passage and other evidences of thoughtful attention to this subject among the Greek philosophers, we are warranted in assuming that they took their speculations seriously; at any rate we may suppose that their manner of speech was fairly well understood by themselves and their comtemporaries. Plato probably took this method of supporting the number 8,000 as a suitable number for the population of a city-state, an ideal number which in The Laws he replaces with the number 5,040. In the latter instance he argued professedly from the standpoint of expediency alone, while in the former case his argument is speculative. The number 8,000 was probably suggested by the fact that this was the number of the citizen population of Sparta in its prime; 400 is the first harmony and represents the number of rulers; 7,600 is the second or oblong harmony

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1 Jowett, Introduction, p. CXXX.

2 Cp. Cratylus, passim; Protagoras, 342ff.

3 The Politics, V. 12. 7f.

and represents the number of the people. Other interpretations are possible.

These calculations are based upon four primary numbers, probably 3, 4, 5 and 6; the first three are especially conspicuous in the computations by which the conceptions of Plato are set forth. Three, 4, and 5, represent the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, known to the Greeks as the figure of marriage. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 also denote the intervals of the musical scale which is used by Plato in IV. 443 as a symbol of the harmony of the state; besides these numbers may refer respectively to the three orders in the state (soldiers, guardians, and priests) or the three parts of the soul, the four virtues, and the five forms of government. Commentators on The Republic have not agreed in their interpretation of this passage, VIII. 546; but the whole argument no doubt is a survival of the influence of Pythagoras on Plato.[1]

When degeneracy once sets in, it proceeds rapidly. The quality of the guardians declines, and through their neglect of music and gymnastics succeeding generations of rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the different classes.[2] Discord will arise until the philosopher shall have given way to the soldier.

§ 3. *The Timocratic Character.* The timocratic man will be contentious, ambitious, covetous; a friend of culture but uneducated, rough with slaves, courteous to freemen but remarkably obedient to authority, a lover of power and honor, claiming to be a ruler not because he is eloquent, but because he is a soldier; a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase; he will despise riches when young, but as he grows old he will become fond of wealth, 549. The character of the timocratic man originates in a reaction from the character of his father, supported and encouraged by his mother and the old servants of his household, 550.

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[1] The reader who cares to examine further these speculations, is referred to Jowett, Introduction, p. CXXXf. where he will find a good summary of the modern discussion of this subject.

[2] Cp. §§ 37, 38, and 39 of Essay I. on The Republic.

§ 4. *Oligarchy.* This is the form of government which rests upon a valuation of property in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal methods of expenditure, for what do they care about law. Then as they see one another grow rich they become rivals in the race for wealth. In this way the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money; and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue. What is honored is cultivated, and whatever has no honor is neglected. And so at last instead of loving war and glory they become lovers of money and trade, 550f. A ruler elected because he is rich! Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot. Another defect consists in the inevitable division which must arise between the rich and the poor.

Plato observed, as did Aristotle, that oligarchies were weak in war. Either the oligarchs must arm the multitude and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they must appear oligarchs indeed, few to fight and few to rule. Their love of money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

But the picture of the broken man appeals to Plato most of all as an evil of his third form of the state, a picture impossible, he would have said, in a state with a system of common property. "A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor helpless creature," 552. Plato objects also to the tendency in the oligarchical and other perverted forms of the state to give one man more than one trade or calling.

The sharp divisions between wealth and poverty beget on the one hand a set of drones, who are of little use to the state, passing their lives as spendthrifts, seeming to be members of

the state, but being in truth neither rulers nor subjects. On the other hand there is the pauper class, and "wherever you see paupers in a state, somewhere in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and cut-purses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors. * * The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill-training, and an evil-constitution," 552.

"Oligarchy or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth may now be dismissed. Let us next consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this state," 553a.

§ 5. *The Oligarchical Man.* The timocratical man changes into the oligarchical man in this manner: The representative of timocracy has a son who begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps. Presently the son sees his father founder against the state as upon a sunken reef and he and all he has is lost; "he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him. * * And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion head-foremost from his bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making, and by mean and miserly savings and hard work he gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne, and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?" 553.

The oligarchical man is avaricious; and the individual character from which he springs, is like the timocratic state from which oligarchy comes. The timocratic man and the oligarchical man resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth, and also in their penurious and laborious character; neither of them are men of cultivation. If you would observe the oligarchical man's real character you must watch him "where he has some great opportunity of acting dishon-

estly, as in the guardianship of an orphan. * * In his ordinary dealings, which give him a reputation for honesty, he coerces his bad passions by enforced virtue, * * he will be at war with himself, but in general his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones," 554. In a contest he fights in true oligarchical fashion with a small part only of his resources with the usual result that he saves his money but loses the prize, 555a.

§ 6. *Democracy.* "Next comes democracy, of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us; and then we will inquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment," 555.

The change from oligarchy into democracy arises in this wise: The good at which the oligarchical state aims is to become as rich as possible. The rulers, aware that their power rests on their wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth, because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance. The love of wealth and the spirit of moderation can not long exist side by side. On the other hand carelessness and extravagance reduces some men of good family to beggary. "These continue in the states and they are ready to sting; some of them owe money; some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have gotten their property, and against everybody else, and they are eager for revolution. Besides the men of business follow up their own interests apparently not seeing their enemies, they insert their sting, that is their money, into some one else not on his guard against them and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children, and so they make the drone and the pauper to abound," 555.

Now follow two remarkable suggestions by the great philosopher, the spectator of all time and of all existence:[1] (1)

[1] Cp. VI. 486; see § 7 of Essay II. on The Republic, p. 249.

That the evils of self-aggrandizement and excessive usury might be checked by restricting a man's use of his property. In this respect modern society has undertaken and accomplished very little, but yet something; the common law doctrine of nuisance and the system of licenses thrown about trades and professions are in the spirit of regulating the use a man may make of his own. (2) In the spirit of a classical economist or the Smithian school Plato remarks: "Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money making, and the evils of which we are speaking will be greatly lessened in the state."[1] The spirit of this suggestion embodied in the teaching of modern political economy has resulted in the abolition of imprisonment for debts and the passage of bankruptcy laws favorable to the debtor class.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that in the oligarchical state the rulers mistreat their subjects; by and by, perchance. "The wiry, sunburnt, poor man, may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wit's end how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are rich only because no one has the courage to despoil them?" 556. Thus the poor will come to despise the rich and pitting numbers against wealth they seize upon power and the democratic state has come into being.

When the many come into power they will slaughter some of their opponents, banish others, and to others still they will give an equal share of freedom and power with themselves. In democracies the magistrates are commonly selected by lot.

And now what is the manner of life in democracies? What sort of government have they? For as the government is, such will the man be. Plato's conception of democracy, as we may infer from his description of it, probably an all too true

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[1] For a similar suggestion looking to absolute freedom of contract see IV. 425–6; cp. § 45, of Essay I on The Republic.

picture of the democracies that he knew, is that of an extreme type of democracy, a lawless sort of government, a kind of anarchy. His characterization is serio-comic: In the first place in democracies men are free and frank; they may do what they like. Consequently there will be the greatest variety of human natures. Democracy is likely to be the fairest of states, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. * * Because of the liberty which reigns there, they have a complete assortment of constitutions. And in this state you are not obliged to hold office even if you have the talent for it, and you do not need to submit to government if you dislike it. * * And is not their humanity to the condemned charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or to exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero and nobody sees or cares. See too the forgiving spirit of democracy and the 'don't care' about trifles, and the disregard of such doctrines as we have laid down with an air of importance, for example that no one who is not endowed with an extraordinary nature can ever become a good man unless from his earliest childhood he has been used to play among beautiful objects and to study beautiful things—how democracy tramples all these fine notions under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honor any one who professes to be the people's friend. These and other characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming sort of government full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike," 557–8.

§ 7. *The Democratic Man.* As the oligarthical character springs from the timocratic character by disintegration of the latter, so the democratic arises from the failure of the oligarchical through the conflict of pleasures. This conflict of pleasures is between the necessary and unnecessary pleasures by which Plato means the useful and harmful. Necessary

pleasures Plato suggests are not simply those necessary for existence, but also those necessary for health.[1] The desires which go beyond the necessaries for life and health should be got rid of by self-control and proper training in youth, because they are not only useless but even hurtful to the body and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. Plato seems to recognize something of a mean between these two types of pleasure, because he recognizes one who is subject exclusively to the necessary as miserly and oligarchical, whereas, he who is subject altogether to the unnecessary pleasures is the democratic man, self-willed, capricious, intemperate, lawless. The democratic character is a corruption of the oligarchical through the allurements of pleasure. It may be observed again that Plato's conception of democracy is that of anarchy as distinguished from that orderly regime of government, resting upon principles of self-control and enlightened self-direction, which by moderns is usually described as democracy. Corresponding to his description of the democratic state, Plato sketches the character of the democratic man in a parable which teaches that the son of a miserly and oligarchical man lacks the poise, the accomplishments, the habits of truthfulness, the love of fair pursuits and true words required to withstand the allurements of harmful pleasures. Once overcome by the lower and ignoble passions, the democrat lives a motley and manifold life, passing from one extreme to another, now lapped in drink and the strains of the flute, then taking a turn at gymnastics trying to get thin; "sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of the philosopher; often he is busy with politics and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on," 561.

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[1] Cp. modern economic distinction between necessaries for existence and necessaries for efficiency, see Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, Vol. 1 (3d edition) p. 138.

With such a description of the democratic man and the democratic state before us, we can understand why Greek philosophers like Aristotle and Plato should have hesitated to place democracy as it prevailed in their age and as understood by them, among the safe or even moderate systems of government; they thought of it rather as no government or as government at most only by a mob, by caprice, by the impulse of the hour. And yet in their account of the state as it ought to be, that is, of government as it should be organized and administered, they approach the conceptions and standards which modern political philosophers describe as the conceptions and standards of democracy. Aristotle saw more clearly than Plato, that there were two aspects to the so-called government by the many, that in its moderate and saner forms it incorporated the principles of rule, which he described as the polity par excellence, while in its extreme and drastic forms it implied a negation of those principles. The strong and stable governments known to Aristotle and Plato had in them an element of monarchy or oligarchy. Consequently to their minds the verdict of history was for these forms of government; but their philosophical analysis no less than their observation taught them that there were defects in the organization, life, and conduct of these states; consequently they set to groping for principles of rule, which would take cognizance of the rights and the humanity of all classes of the population of states and concede the right of self-expression and self-direction to all apart from the rights and privileges which were associated with social ranks or classes as such; and history has verified the accuracy and soundness of their speculations, and has since their time furnished patterns of constitutional rule which were then regarded as possible only in idea. But from the point of view of preparation for office and the purposive attainment of fitness for public service some of their ideals, particularly those of Plato, are still far in advance of the reality in any modern state.

§ 8. *The Origin and Nature of Tyranny. A Hint to the Poets.*[1] Among the Greeks as among us there were those who admired tyranny as a manifestation of sheer power, whether of the mind or of the sword. At the outset the tyrant always gained power because he hoodwinked, cajoled, outwitted his fellows, unless indeed he were the son of a tyrant, and more than one observer in antiquity has informed us that tyrannies seldom last into the second generation of rulers, and still more rarely do they reach into the third.

That tyranny springs from democracy is evident, because democracy exalts freedom and unregulated freedom in the end means anarchy. Tyranny then arises from anarchy. The reasoning of Plato respecting the successive steps in the revolution of governments from one form to another in a descending series is based on the assumption that these revolutions represent a gradual disintegration of the ideal state, and as an analysis of the course of possible degeneracy, the reasoning is more accurate and sound than Aristotle represents it to be, where he quotes Plato on this subject to criticise him.[2]

The love of wealth is the ruin of oligarchies. The love of an excess of liberty is the ruin of democracies. By degrees the anarchy reaches everywhere, 562c. Spending without earning is an evil common to all the perverted forms of government, and is equally the ruin of all. There are three classes in a democracy. The first and the worst class are the drones: "In an oligarchy they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they can not train or gather strength; whereas, in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side," 564. The second class are the orderly people who have property, from whom the drones squeeze their honey. The third class are the poor who work with their hands; these congregate from time to time for a little honey.

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[1] VIII. 362–9.

[2] See above Essay IV., § 17, on The Politics.

It is the middle class who in extremity are compelled to seek a protector. They seek a champion and nurse him into greatness. The protector turns into a tyrant; "from being a man he becomes a wolf;" he makes a party against the rich, is driven out, but comes back a tyrant full grown. Then comes the request for a body-guard, which is answered by the cry: "Let not the people's friend be lost to them," 566a.

"In the early days of his power he is full of smiles, and he salutes everyone whom he meets; he to be called a tyrant who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind to every one!" And when he has thus settled things at home, he immediately stirs up wars in order that he may prove to the people that he continues to be useful and indispensable. By the course which he now pursues he impoverishes the people by the imposition of taxes and compels them to grind for their daily wants. Finally he puts to death the brave and spirited who venture to oppose him preferring to live with his slaves; these are new citizens who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him, 566c–8a.

And yet cringing poets like Euripides praise the tyrants and say of them:

'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise.'

This and many other like things the poets say, especially those of my time, Plato might have added. Verily tragedy is a great thing and Euripides a great tragedian! "Therefore the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and others who live after our manner, if we do not receive them into our state, because they are the eulogists of tyranny," 568.

We have here the fundamental note of Plato's opposition to the poets; they seemed to him to be mere imitators, the friends of vice and insincerity as mere artists are apt to

be.[1] Surprised as we maybe that Plato, who was himself a poet, who wrote poetry both in verse and in prose, should have been the enemy of poets as a class, it may be urged on the one hand that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances of his time, and on the other hand that there is substratum of truth as well as error in his contention.[2]

Plato protests against tyranny and against everything that makes for it and against every one who apologizes for it. Let the poets sing their loud praises; they are paid for it. The highest honors they will receive from tyrants, and the next highest from democracies for their time-serving; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, that is the nearer they approach to living in a state whose affairs are administered on the basis of equity and justice to all, the more their reputation will fail if they persist in being mere imitators and vain prattlers. The tyrant meanwhile, in order to maintain that numerous and various and ever-changing army of his will seize upon, confiscate and spend the sacred treasures of the city itself; and if the people rebel he will beat them, though they are his own father; and at last the people will discover that they have jumped from the smoke into the fire, 569.

§ 9. *The Tyrannical Character.*[3] Like state, like man. The tyrant exists in the private relations of life as well as in the public; the private tyrant like his public counterpart, is a man in whom the wild beast nature is unchained, he is dissolute, intemperate, mad. He is the waking reality of his dissolute dreams. He is like the democratic man from whom he springs, but in greater frenzy, more passionate, more intemperate. He will make war on father or mother, break into houses, rob temples; he is treacherous and utterly unjust. Can such a man be happy? "Tyrants are always either the masters or servants, and never the friends of anybody," 576a.

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[1] Cp. Brochure by Bruntiere on Morality and Art, translated from the French into English by Arthur Beatty. Crowell. 1899.

[2] Cp. Jowett, Introduction, p. CLVIIf.

[3] IX. 371–6.

§ 10. *The Relative Happiness and Misery of the Just and the Unjust, of the Royal or Aristocratical Ruler and the Tyrant; 729 the Interval by Which They are Separated.*[1] Here we come finally to the discussion promised from time to time in earlier passages of the dialogue, promised especially to Glaucon and Adeimantus, when Socrates turned aside to discuss the nature of justice in the large letters in which it is written in the state.[2] After having examined the ideal state and the several types of its perverted forms we are now prepared to contrast the pictures which we find at the extremes: the perfectly just ruler and the perfectly unjust, the royal or aristocratical governor and the tyrant.

In judging of the relative happiness and misery of the just and the unjust, of the king and the tyrant, we must inquire carefully into every nook and corner of each state, and of each character, and we must likewise ask that we have a judge who is competent to pass on our answer, "a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature; he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight," 577a.

As the state which is subject to a tyrant is the worst, so it is also the most miserable; it is enslaved; speaking generally its people are degraded; it is incapabable of acting voluntarily; it is poor and full of fear. On the other hand the tyrannical man is like the enslaved city. His soul is full of meanness and vulgarity; he is a slave to his own madness. His soul is tormented by insatiable desires, goaded as by a gadfly, he is full of trouble and remorse. Plato tells us that the man of tyrannical character is by far the most miserable of all men. But then it occurs to him that there is one who is even more miserable than the most miserable of all, and that is "he who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a

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[1] IX. 576—88a.

[2] Cp. §§ 3—10 of Essay I on The Republic.

private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant," 578.

But in this high argument we should not conjecture merely. That the tyrant is relatively more miserable than the king, which is one way of saying that the unjust is more miserable than the just, is argued on three distinct lines:

(1) The argument from the analogy of the slave-owner and the tyrant. The tyrant is not like the ordinary slave-owner, for the ordinary slave-owners have the fellowship and mutual help of other slave-owners. He is like an isolated slave-owner who finds himself alone among his slaves in a wilderness, removed from the habitation and intercourse of freemen. The daintiest of all men, he has to endure the hardships of a prison, living in his hole like a woman hidden in the house afraid to venture forth, and jealous of every one who has freedom. At the conclusion of this first line of argument by analogy, Plato announces that there can be no doubt that of the five orders of the state and the five types of character, the royal, the timocratical, the oligarchical, the democratical, the tyrannical, the first ranks highest, and the last the lowest in the scale of happiness; and by implication of the whole tenor of the dialogue the others rank in a descending series in the order in which they stand. The best is the happiest and the worst is the most miserable. This is the proclamation of the son of Ariston,[1] 580.

(2) The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul. There are three principles of the soul: the sensuous, passionate, and mental; the first may be generalized as the love of money, because by the medium of money all things which gratify the senses may be secured, the second may be called the love of honor, and the third the love of knowledge or wisdom. To these correspond three classes of men: lovers of gain, lovers of honor, and lovers of wisdom. Each of these

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[1] Here is a possible allusion to Plato himself, although it may also refer to Glaucon, who is respondent in this part of the dialogue. Glaucon and Adeimantus were brothers of Plato. Plato mentions himself by name only twice in all the dialogues, once in the Apology, 38 B. and once in the Phaedo, 59 B.

will praise his own choice of pleasure most, but the philosopher alone can judge of them all because he alone has experience of them all; he alone therefore speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

(3) Now comes the third trial which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus: No pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure. True pleasure is absolute not relative. Some pleasures are the mere absence of pain or the cessation of pain; others are positive, but still they are passing, transient, these are the pleasures of the senses and the passions; they are below the mean and the many never go beyond this; they move up and down the region below the mean, but they never pass into the true upper world. "Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs, which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust," 589.

Only the intellectual pleasures are true, abiding and permanent. Pleasures are attained in the highest degree only when the desires which seek them are under the guidance of reason. The lovers of honor and money will attain the highest pleasures by them attainable only when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge inasmuch as then only do they follow truth. "When the whole soul follows the philosophical principle and there is no division, and the several parts are just and do each of them their own business, then they enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable," 586–7; cp. 583–7.

Finally we may estimate the interval which separates the lowest pleasures from the highest, that is the interval which separates the pleasures of the tyrant from the king. There are three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious. The king or perfectly just man, the philosopher alone, has genuine pleasure; the timocratic man has the pleasures of honor; the emocratic those of sense, of appetite; while the oligarchical

man partakes partly of each of the lower pleasures. But the pleasures of the tyrant lie way below all of these. As there are three steps from the highest to the lowest of the three substantial pleasures, it somehow occurred to Plato that the cube of the square of the number three might express the interval by which the highest and the lowest were separated. The cube of the square of three is 729. The pleasure of the tyrant is only the shadow, not even the reality, of the lowest pleasures. The tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch, the democrat is in the middle; and the oligarch is third from the royal or aristocratical. The tyrant is thus removed from royal or aristocratical man by two steps the cube of the square of three which is taken as the measure of the interval. The number 729 we are told is nearly equal to the number of days and nights in a year, namely 730; this is like saying one day is better than a thousand, cp. 587–8.

§ 11. *The Refutation of Thrasymachus; the Pattern which is in Heaven.* And shall we still say with Thrasymachus that injustice is a gain to the perfectly unjust man who is reputed to be just? 588a. Let us make an image of the soul that he may have his own words presented to his eyes. Model first the form of a multitudinous many-headed monster, "then make a second form as of a lion, and third the form of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second. * * Now join them and let the three grow into one. Fashion the outside into the form of man.

Now to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion at the expense of the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another —he ought rather to suffer them to fight and devour one another. Should not rather the creature so act as to give the

man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the manyheaded monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing, cp. 588–9.

Men are blamed by the common consciousness of their kind for permitting their lower natures to predominate. "That man is reproached for meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey," 590. Every one should be ruled by the divine wisdom within him, and where this is impossible, then by external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals. To implant in children this safe guardian and principle of rule is the highest end in education; and he will honor the studies and exercises which impress these qualities on the soul.

"He who is undeterred in wrong gets only worse, whereas he who is detected and punished, has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized," 591. The wise man will prefer temperance and justice, and the other virtues even to health and wealth. He will not heap up riches in violation of the principles of reason; but he will gain or spend according to his means within the limitations of the divine principle of order within himself; and he will accept only such honors as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those honors whether public or private, which are likely to disorder his life he will avoid.

Then he will not be a statesman. Perhaps not in his own city! But in our city. "I do not believe there is such a city on earth," Glaucon is made to say. "In heaven," Socrates replied, "there is laid up a pattern of it, which he who desires may behold, and beholding may set his own house in order. Each one in his own life may live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other," 592.

§ 12. *The Expulsion of the Poets.* "Of the many excellences, which I perceive in the order of our state, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry," namely the rule which relates to the rejection of imitative poetry.[1]

The reason for the expulsion of the poets appears clearer now to the disciples of Socrates since the argument concerning the nature of justice has been completed. Imitative poetry is rejected because all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding, unless indeed the knowledge of their true nature may prove an effective antidote to the evil which might otherwise be caused by them.

Although it is hard to speak against Homer and the charming company of which he is the captain and teacher, the truth must be told that tragic poetry is only imitation and imitation thrice removed from the truth, that is from the original, 595f. Thus for example there is the idea of the bed or the table; then there is its copy or expression by the carpenter in a particular bed or table; and lastly there is the painter who makes the picture of the bed or table. There are therefore three kinds of beds and three kinds of makers of beds: God makes one bed, the idea of the bed, human makers make many beds; but the painter is a mere imitator who makes but the shadow of a bed; the painter is therefore far removed from the truth.

And so of poets, they are mere imitators. There are those who pretend to know all things, and by this very pretension they prove themselves ignorant of the very nature of knowledge, and to attribute universal knowledge to Homer or any of the poets is folly,[2] 598c. The poets do not know when they speak the truth.

§ 13. *The Uselessness of the Poets; their Harmful Influence.* Had Homer and Hesiod rendered any service to their age,

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[1] X. 595. The reference is to the discussion at the close of the second book and in the first half of the third; see above Essay I, §§ 20—25.

[2] There were in Plato's time, sophists, who quoted the Homeric writings as sacred and authoritative scriptures for the settlement of all questions under dispute.

had either been a legislator, or an inventor, or a teacher, or in any way useful in his day and generation, they would not have been allowed to go about as rhapsodists,[1] 600. Being an imitator the poet has neither belief nor knowledge, cp. 601–2. By the art of measuring man may correct the errors into which he falls from merely trusting to his eyes and through the use of his reason he can escape from being governed by opinion alone, 602—3; but the imitative arts have recourse to neither of these alternatives in reaching the truth.

The most serious indictment against the arts is that they minister to the inferior parts of the soul, to feeling and opinion, and not to knowledge and the will. Indeed there is a quarrel between poesy and philosophy, 604f. The poets encourage what the philosophers would repress; they encourage weakness by cultivating impatience and recalling trouble and sorrow; they pander to the crowd. The mistake men make in their heedless devotion to the poets is that they fail to arm themselves against the reaction of that which they approve or praise. Thus a sentimental pity aroused by tragic poetry creates real weakness, and in like manner the love of comic poetry may turn a man into a buffoon, 606.

"But poetry must not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. * * Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered state, we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth," 607. Imitative poetry is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth, and he who listens to her should be on his guard against her seductions,[2] 608.

§ 14. *The Rewards of Virtue.* The rewards of virtue are not confined to the present life. Nothing is great in a short

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[1] This sentiment is rather in contrast to what Plato says about the world's neglect of its great men in VI. 448; see above Essay II, § 8, p. 250.

[2] For Jowett's comments on Plato's hostility to the poets see especially his Introduction to The Republic, pp. CLVII—CLXV.

time. "The whole period of three years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity," 608. It is as nothing and an immortal being should think of the whole of life rather than the little space which we live here. The immortality of the soul is assumed and defended on two grounds: (1) That the soul can not be destroyed by moral evil; and (2) that it can not be destroyed by physical evil.

As evil is the principle of destruction and dissolution so good is the principle of life. If unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice and ignorance, will infect the soul, they will corrupt but not destroy it; annihilation is not the end even of the unjust, 609—10.

To see the soul as it is it must be stripped of all accidents of earth. The love of wisdom is the ultimate test of the soundness of the soul; it is this that brings the soul in harmony and unity with the eternal, 611—12. Therefore let every one do justly, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not,[1] 612.

The contest between the just and the unjust for the highest claim to happiness is now closed. Justice confers reality and does not deceive; this is the decisive thing in the comparison and when this is granted, then the position of preeminence is restored to the just for this life also. The nature of the just and the unjust is known to the gods; they must favor the just and permit only such evils to come upon men as are for their good.

"The clever, unjust men, are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting place to the goal but not back again from the goal; they are off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the crown. * * Of the unjust, the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish in the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable, are flouted alike by stranger and citizen," 613.

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[1] The reference here is to II. 359—60, the invisible ring of Gyges; see above Essay I. § 9, p. 195.

In conclusion the vision of Er[1] is recounted and this teaches by picturesque mingling of symbolism and mythology with astronomy that God weaves the web of life for man, but in such wise that every man exercises choice of the ends of his life, and so shares the responsibility with the inscrutable fates for the success or failure of his individual life, for its joys and its sorrows.

"Virtue is free, and as man honors or dishonors her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser —God is justified," 617c. All men can not have the first choice, but the last choice may be good, may even be the best.

"Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games, who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward."

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[1] X. 614—21.

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
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